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This dissertation examines the efforts of Pacific internationalists in the years during and 
after World War II to forge private intellectual connections between the West and Asia.  
One of the most prominent groups in this movement was the Institute of Pacific Relations 
(1925-61), an international non-governmental organization that nurtured a trans-Pacific 
community of scholars, businessmen and diplomats through research projects and 
international conferences.  In evaluating the work of these internationalists during the 
postwar period, this dissertation challenges conventional Cold War historiography that 
has marginalized such cooperative efforts during these years.  Previous scholarship 
concerning the Institute of Pacific Relations has noted the way in which the organization 
fell victim to anti-communist politics in the United States, yet no studies have examined 
the records of its postwar conferences, which reveal an active international agenda well 
into the 1950s.  The support of Asian members for such trans-Pacific ties, moreover, 
provides a counter-narrative to the story of revolutionary nationalism and third-world 
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solidarity among emerging Asian and African countries during this period.  The Institute 
of Pacific Relations acted as a valuable asset in the struggle for the ―mind of Asia,‖ this 
dissertation argues, largely because its leadership did not conform to the prevailing Cold 
War mindset.  As a private international organization, the IPR provided a venue for 
unofficial dialogue among private elites who at once confronted and transcended the 
geopolitical restrictions of their time.  In maintaining private East-West partnerships 
through such turbulent years, these Pacific internationalists set the stage for regional 
cooperative ventures to flourish later in the twentieth century.
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On December 6, 1946, Edward Carter, the long-serving secretary-general of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, wrote to Devereux Josephs, the president of the Carnegie 
Corporation of New York, requesting funding for the coming year.  For more than 20 
years, the Institute of Pacific Relations had been dedicated to the study of Pacific peoples 
―with a view to the improvement of their mutual relations,‖ according to the group‘s 
constitution.1  Bringing together academics, journalists, businessmen and former 
governmental officials from three continents, the IPR had held numerous international 
conferences; published thousands of books, articles and pamphlets; garnered the attention 
of national leaders and attracted considerable funding from companies and individuals.  
The aftermath of World War II now required a reassessment of operations based on 
changing world conditions. Carter explained to Josephs that the emergence of 
―revolutionary forces‖ throughout Asia as a result of World War II had unknown 
consequences.  Trans-Pacific cooperation was more essential than ever, the secretary-
general reminded his benefactor.  Carter left no doubt regarding the potential good his 
Institute could provide: ―In this fluid situation, the IPR recognizes, I hope in all humility, 
that it is the only private international organization functioning in this wide area on 
whose future depends so many of the issues of war and peace for mankind.‖2  
Carter‘s appeal reflected the ambitious program Pacific internationalists set for 
themselves at the end of World War II.  The Pacific region was at a crossroads: Japan had 
                                                 
1 Constitution of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Appendix III, in J.D. Condliffe, ed., Problems of the 
Pacific, 1927 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 607-610. 
2 Italics added.  Edward C. Carter to Devereux C. Josephs, Dec. 6, 1946, in Box 318, ―Carnegie Appeals,‖ 
Pacific Relations files, Columbia University archives (COL), New York. 
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been defeated, European imperialism was on the retreat, and the United States was 
ascending.  ―Americans may be amused when Congressman Izak of California3 shouts 
from Tokyo that ‗The Pacific Ocean is ours‘,‖ Carter wrote in his letter to Josephs.  ―But 
alas, this American [Izak] with a quaint name is merely the voice of that powerful 
minority in American life which seeks to make the greatest of oceans into a private 
American lake.‖  The IPR secretary-general insisted that his Institute was designed to 
work against such unilateralism, and instead help contribute to building a ―cooperative 
and gracious world society.‖4  The following month, Carnegie Corporation officials gave 
their approval to a $120,000 grant, payable over three years.5  Carter was optimistic about 
the ability of his Institute to apply its international agenda into the postwar world.      
This dissertation explores the history of trans-Pacific intellectual exchange in the 
middle decades of the twentieth century, using the Institute of Pacific Relations as the 
central organizing network of international activity.  It argues, first, that Pacific 
internationalists, working outside of government, played a decisive role in 
conceptualizing the postwar Asia-Pacific region as a shared project between Western and 
Asian countries.  Through publications and conferences, these non-state internationalists 
comprised an ―epistemic community‖ whose regionalist vision laid the intellectual 
groundwork for subsequent cooperative efforts.6  Second, it argues that this trans-Pacific 
intellectual network operated in parallel, but not always complementary, fashion to 
official state machinery during these years.  Among the individual national institutes 
                                                 
3 Edouard Izak, a Medal of Honor recipient for his service In World War I, served as a Democratic 
congressman from California from 1937-1947. 
4 Carter to Josephs, Dec. 6, 1946, in Box 318, ―Carnegie Appeals,‖ Pacific Relations files, COL. 
5 Although this represented the largest amount given to the organization, Carnegie officials indicated that 
this grant would be terminal, as corporation officials were beginning to shift financial support to university-
based programs.  Robert W. Lester to Edward C. Carter, Jan. 20, 1947, in Box 318, ―Carnegie Appeals,‖ 
Pacific Relations files, COL. 
6 The term ―epistemic community‖ here is used to denote a network of knowledge-based experts that help 
to shape debate through their professed expertise.  Peter M. Haas, ―Introduction: Epistemic Communities 
and International Policy Coordination,‖ International Organization Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992): 1-35. 
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associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations, many leaders maintained intimate ties 
with their respective foreign ministries, and tried to use the private organization to further 
their own domestic agendas.  Yet the IPR was more than simply a collection of national 
units.  During these years, the IPR‘s international secretariat maintained a defiantly 
independent vision of Asian-Pacific relations that often chafed against the regional vision 
of Western world powers.  Although the Institute depended primarily upon U.S. 
membership and capital, it operated internationally neither as an adjunct to American 
imperialism in the Pacific nor an appendage to Cold War propaganda.  Pacific 
internationalism, as reflected through the IPR‘s agenda, thus represented an important 
counterweight to the dominant political ideologies of the day. 
In focusing upon the years of the IPR‘s operation (1925-1961), this dissertation 
significantly revises the history of Asia-Pacific regionalism, a literature dominated by 
economists and political scientists and concentrated almost exclusively on the years since 
the late 1960s.7  The emphasis upon the recent past is understandable, given that inter-
governmental partnerships in the region have developed only in the last few decades, 
most notably the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation grouping (established in 1989).8  
From this perspective, scholars have highlighted the relative fragile and contemporary 
nature of Asia-Pacific regionalism.  While they are correct to note that the region is 
sprawling and diverse,9 it is unfair to conclude, as some have, that ―the Asia-Pacific 
                                                 
7 See, for instance, Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and 
Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); Hadi Soesastro and 
Christopher Findlay, eds., Reshaping the Asia Pacific Economic Order (Oxford: Routledge, 2007); and 
Derek McDougall, Asia-Pacific in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2007). 
8 For the most complete history of this organization see John Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of 
Pacific Rim Regionalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
9 Walt. W. Rostow, a champion for Asian regionalism as an adviser to President Lyndon B. Johnson, noted 
the challenges that effective regional organization at first glance appeared ―more absurd than inevitable … 
not a logical prospect for organization on a reasonably harmonious, cooperative basis.‖  W.W. Rostow, The 
United States and the Regional Organization of Asia and the Pacific, 1965-1985 (Austin: The University of 
Texas Press, 1986), pp. 18-19. 
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region … has no history of institutionalized cooperation.‖10  In order to resuscitate this 
story of private intellectual exchange, however, scholars must be willing to expand their 
perspective back in time, as well as beyond the nation-state.  An understanding of the 
long history of efforts by private elites in Europe, North America and Asia to forge such 
trans-Pacific connections provides an important corrective to this literature and an early 
example of private dialogue that continues to challenge and shape contemporary world 
affairs. 
In undertaking a study of the intellectual community sustained by the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, this dissertation builds upon the work of international historian Akira 
Iriye, who has advocated greater exploration of international non-governmental 
organizations as a way to challenge a state-driven narrative of modern world history.11  
Iriye argues that international organizations do not necessarily conform to the imperatives 
of national interests, but address instead the problems of societies, groups and even 
individuals.  As a reflection of increasing transnational interdependence, international 
organizations ―may be said to be creating an alternative world, one that is not identical 
with the sum of sovereign states and nations.‖12  Over its decades of existence, the 
Institute of Pacific Relations had a complex and even contradictory relationship with state 
power.  As a confederation of national institutes, the IPR in some ways reinforced 
national identities and at times served to promote state interests through non-
governmental means.  Yet through the work of a strong international secretariat, and 
specifically its conference program, the IPR forged personal and institutional alliances 
that cut across state boundaries and created new allegiances that often competed with 
                                                 
10 Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism, p. 42. 
11 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the 
Contemporary World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 
12 Iriye, Global Community, p. 7. 
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national identities.  At times, this ―imagined‖ world of an intellectual trans-Pacific 
community was strong enough to challenge the so-called ―real world‖ of competing 
nation-states.13     
The operation of this international intellectual community well into the late 1950s 
was in itself a fundamental challenge to the ―real world‖ of the Cold War, which sought 
to reduce the complexity of international affairs into a simplistic battle between 
capitalism and communism.  This dissertation does not minimize the importance of the 
Cold War, the Manichean politics of which undermined—and eventually destroyed—the 
Institute of Pacific Relations.  Yet the scholarly preoccupation with the geopolitical 
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union during these years has injected 
unwarranted cynicism into existing assessments of the work of internationalists in the 
1930s and 1940s.  With the passing of the Cold War, some historians are beginning to 
reassess the legacy of these internationalists and have noted that their multilateral vision 
for world affairs has since become embedded in the contemporary international system, 
whether in conceptions of national security, the rule of law, or human rights.14  This 
dissertation extends this counter-narrative through the first two postwar decades.  Rather 
than fold up their tent with the onset of the Cold War, Pacific internationalists continued 
to forge ahead with their projects, both as a rebuke both to their McCarthyist tormenters 
and the common conceit that the Pacific Ocean was an ―American lake.‖ 
 
                                                 
13 Iriye posits the simultaneous existence of ―two worlds‖ for the purposes of exploring the tensions 
between sovereign states and the project toward global community in ―Internationalizing International 
History,‖ in Thomas Bender, ed., Rethinking American History in a Global Age (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002), pp. 47-62.   
14 Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America‟s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 250-284. 
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“THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MIND OF ASIA” 
In pursuing a new conceptualization of the postwar period, this dissertation seeks 
to broaden our understanding of the Western ―struggle for the mind of Asia‖ beyond the 
narrow calculus of the Cold War.15  To be sure, the United States government in the late 
1940s and 1950s was involved a multitude of propaganda efforts—both public and 
covert, using governmental and non-governmental means—to win over ―hearts and 
minds‖ in ―uncommitted‖ third-world nations.16  Yet private contact to and within Asia 
persisted despite this constraining new imperative.  Pacific internationalists involved with 
the Institute of Pacific Relations were certainly aware of this new American-led 
campaign, yet no archival evidence suggests that they were complicit in any way as a 
front organization for the CIA or other Western intelligence services.  One explanation 
for this certainly must lie in the politically compromised position of the IPR by the early 
1950s as a result of a U.S. Senate subcommittee investigation into alleged communist 
infiltration of the group before and during World War II.  As importantly, however, the 
decentralized structure of the organization encouraged independence among the 
participating national councils.  To win over Asian minds in this context, Western 
members needed to listen and learn, not simply preach. 
By broadening the analysis of private East-West contact beyond the Cold War, 
this study brings into focus other major themes of the postwar years, especially the retreat 
of European imperialism and the rise of Asian nationalism.  As Edward Carter‘s 
December 1946 letter indicates, one of the principal objects of Pacific internationalists 
                                                 
15 The phrase is taken from Paul M.A. Linebarger, ―The Struggle for the Mind of Asia,‖ Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 278 (Nov. 1951): 32-37. 
16 Laura Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower‟s Secret 
Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2006); Scott Lucas, 
Freedom‟s War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union, 1945-56 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1999).  
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was to help control and guide the ―revolutionary forces‖ of Asia that were in the process 
of casting off centuries of colonialism.  Carter was less concerned that revolutionary 
nationalism might take the form of communism than that it might turn against the West.  
Cold War historiography has tended to conflate these two dominant Western concerns, 
but they were distinct problems at the time.  Among the principal functions of a group 
like the Institute of Pacific Relations, at least in Carter‘s mind, was to act as a private 
mediator between the peoples of Asia and the West as the postwar liberal international 
order was constructed.  As IPR secretary-general, Carter played a major role in the 
development of an Asian regional sensibility among leaders in India and China, 
particularly during World War II.  This Asian regionalism was not a threat to the West, so 
long as the IPR existed to provide a structured and controlled venue for it.  
 Given their success in forging pan-Pacific bridges, Pacific internationalists 
encountered a bitterly ironic stumbling block during the postwar years.  The project of 
maintaining private links to Asia was a critical element in the broad ―struggle for the 
mind of Asia,‖ yet the strident anti-communism of Western policymakers stymied these 
very efforts at intellectual bridge-building.  The establishment of the collective security 
group Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, for instance, was designed 
to create a ―Free Asia‖ regionalism and ward off communist incursions, but it only 
managed to further polarize the region while failing to provide a credible system for 
collective defense.17  The pressure to choose sides during the Cold War drove many 
Asian leaders toward ―non-alignment,‖ a trend that many Western officials viewed with 
alarm and dismay.  Pacific internationalists, however, had a far more subtle 
understanding of such developments. They viewed with relative equanimity the first 
Asian-African conference held in Bandung, Indonesia in the spring of 1955, whereby the 
                                                 
17 SEATO was eventually disbanded in 1977.  Justus Maria Van der Kroef, The Lives of SEATO 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976). 
 8 
leaders of newly independent countries proclaimed their desire to work together to 
oppose racism and colonialism around the world.  The Bandung conference, in their 
view, was a challenge rather than a rebuke to the West, and exposed new realities 
regarding the relationship between Western nations and newly independent Asian 
countries.  Through private channels, Asian intellectuals reassured Western counterparts 
that there was little chance of an anti-Western Afro-Asian ―bloc,‖ and recommitted 
themselves to building trans-Pacific relations and the larger international order. 
Rather than assuming the Cold War to be the principal framework for analyzing 
the twentieth century, this project instead builds upon scholarship that has recast modern 
international history as an age of accelerating globalization.  Revolutionary advances in 
communication, transportation, capital and technology, it has been argued, have created a 
greater sense of human interdependence and a sense of global consciousness—and thus 
require a new kind of global history.18  Scholars continue to debate what ―globalization‖ 
implies; its political, economic and cultural repercussions; its relationship to the nation-
state; and whether it is a new phenomenon.19  Without a doubt, Pacific internationalists in 
the early decades of the 20
th
 century believed themselves to be in the midst of an exciting 
new age that allowed private elites to assume roles once reserved for state-sponsored 
diplomats.  Writing in the March 1934 volume of Pacific Affairs, the Institute of Pacific 
Relations‘ house journal, newly installed editor Owen Lattimore described the Institute as 
an outgrowth of the need for ―extra-national communication‖ between groups of 
concerned citizens, not just between national leaders.  ―It is an organ for promoting 
                                                 
18 The literature on globalization is vast and growing. One early important work in separating the idea of 
global history from world history is Bruce Mazlish and Ralph Buultjens, eds., Conceptualizing Global 
History (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).  For a more recent overview of the field, see Bruce Mazlish 
and Akira Iriye, eds., The Global History Reader (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
19 On globalization‘s impact on national control over economic forces, see Susan Strange, The Retreat of 
the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
On the attempt to periodize globalization into distinct historical ages, see A.G. Hopkins, ed., Globalization 
in World History (New York: Norton, 2002).   
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information and understanding,‖ Lattimore continued, ―not so much between nations as 
between groups or individuals within nations, and on a plane which is not exactly 
international, but which transcends the national and does not attempt the universal.‖20  
Because the Pacific area had been overlooked by Western powers, private elites had the 
chance to fashion their own vision of a regional community that could serve as a 
stepping-stone into Carter‘s hopeful postwar ―gracious world society.‖ 
In more recent decades, globalization has been on the march, although few would 
argue that it has ushered in a more gracious world.  Critics of globalization have noted 
that trade liberalization and freer capital flows have resulted in greater social inequality 
than ever before, and that the economic progress of so-called ―developing‖ nations in 
many cases has all but stagnated.21  Others claim that globalization is merely a mask for 
Western cultural imperialism, a stepping-stone not into a genuine global community but 
instead the ―Americanization of the world.‖22  It is reasonable to question, therefore, 
whether Pacific internationalists were themselves complicit in exacerbating these trends.  
With a largely American membership base, funding from Rockefeller and Carnegie 
foundations, and corporate support from British and American companies, a group like 
the Institute of Pacific Relations naturally reflected Western, capitalist concerns.  Pacific 
internationalists in Asia, moreover, usually consisted of English-speaking scholars or 
businessmen with significant experience in North America and Europe.  With personal 
and professional ties to the West, such figures were not necessarily representative of the 
peoples they claimed to speak for at international gatherings.  
                                                 
20 Editorial (unsigned), ―Pacific Affairs,‖ Pacific Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1934): 83-85. 
21 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002). 
22 The phrase comes from W.T. Stead, The Americanization of the World: Or the Trend of the Twentieth 
Century (London: Horace Markley, 1902).  For a critical survey of ―cultural imperialism,‖ see John 
Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1991); Ryan Dunch, ―Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Cultural Theory, Christian Missions, and Global 
Modernity,‖ History and Theory, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Oct. 2002): 301-325. 
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A related criticism can be mounted against the Pacific internationalists‘ attempts 
to wed the West to Asia.  In undertaking this larger struggle for Asian minds, did Western 
intellectuals exhibit a ―Cold War orientalism‖ in their attitudes toward Asia?23  Christina 
Klein has written that many American ―middlebrow intellectuals‖ during these years 
eschewed prewar assertions of naked Western dominance in favor of a more 
―sentimental‖ framework that reflected tolerance and inclusion of Asian people.  Through 
stories, plays and movies such as The King and I (1956), Klein writes that cultural 
producers ―sought to replace the old nationalist map that Americans carried in their 
minds, in which the United States filled the frame, with a new internationalist one, in 
which the United States and ‗free‘ Asia alike were embedded within a larger world 
system.―24  Many Pacific internationalists certainly used their research and conference 
programs to tout the potential of such a world system and the centrality of the United 
States within it.  In this sense, one can argue they were complicit in helping to rationalize 
American involvement abroad, even as they rejected older forms of imperial behavior.25 
Wielding the pejorative ―imperialist‖ and ―orientalist‖ cudgels, however, 
collapses the very real differences between the project of many Pacific internationalists 
and American state power during the Cold War years.  For every defender of American 
foreign policy or Western business in Asia in the Institute of Pacific Relations, there was 
another to criticize their application.  At the very least, the geographical diversity of 
Pacific internationalists made them less susceptible to forming a homogeneous world 
view dominated by the Cold War.  In this respect they must be distinguished from other 
                                                 
23 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003).  Klein distinguishes this idea from the better-known prewar variety 
analyzed in Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979).  
24 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, pp. 11-13. 
25 Klein cites Mary Louise Pratt‘s key concept of the ―anti-conquest‖ narrative, defined by Pratt as ―the 
strategies of representation whereby European bourgeois subjects seek to secure their innocence in the 
same moment as they secure European hegemony.‖ Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and 
Transculturation (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 7. 
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private groups dealing with international relations, such as the Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR), the New York-based foreign-policy think tank that helped shape the 
contours of postwar American policy.  One CFR historian has described the way in which 
the ideological war between the United States and the Soviet Union caused many council 
members to take a ―myopic view‖ of international relations in the early Cold War, 
interpreting events solely through the lens of this confrontation.26  CFR members, of 
course, were not institutionally compelled to contend with the perspectives of non-
Americans.  While some American IPR members undoubtedly shared a Cold War 
mindset, they were frequently challenged by others, particularly in Asia, who rejected 
Western policies motivated only by anti-communism.  Overall, Pacific internationalists 
did not accept the parameters of Cold War politics as uncontested fact.  As a result, they 
increasingly found themselves at odds not only with McCarthyist attackers, but also with 
top officials in the Western diplomatic community. 
 
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 
Pacific internationalism found its expression from the 1920s through the 1950s 
through the private work of the Institute of Pacific Relations.  Established in 1925 at a 
Honolulu conference originally organized by the international Young Men‘s Christian 
Association (YMCA), the IPR developed a reputation during subsequent years as the 
organizer of several international conferences, and by World War II was widely praised 
as the ―single best source‖ for information on the Pacific region.27  Its articles, pamphlets 
                                                 
26 Michael Wala, The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War 
(Providence: Berghahn Books, 1994). 
27 Jacob Viner, a professor at Princeton University, provided the effusive praise during the war, comments 
which were later used in the Rockefeller Foundation‘s annual report in 1943.  John H. Willits phone 
conversation with Viner, Sept. 18, 1950, in Rockefeller Foundation files, RG 1.1, Series 200, Box 353, 
Folder 4198, Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), Tarrytown, NY. 
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and books reached millions of students and servicemen, and its leaders moved fluidly in 
and out of government service. In the earliest years of the Cold War, however, anti-
communist activists accused the IPR of promoting a communist line in its publications, 
and secretly supporting Mao Tse-tung‘s forces in China.  In the wake of the ―loss‖ of 
China to communism in 1949, Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin 
publicly reproached the American council, and Democratic Senator Pat McCarran of 
Nevada launched several months of U.S. Senate subcommittee hearings into the IPR‘s 
alleged violation of the Internal Security Act targeting subversive activities.  Although 
largely cleared of charges that it infiltrated the State Department, the IPR‘s tarnished 
reputation in the United States grievously affected its membership and finances until its 
dissolution in 1961.        
In using the Institute of Pacific Relations to understand the work of mid-century 
Pacific internationalists, this dissertation builds upon a growing body of literature 
concerning this early international non-governmental organization that seeks to reframe 
its significance beyond its notorious encounter with McCarthyism.  This project does not 
attempt to serve as a comprehensive history of the IPR, a daunting task for any one 
scholar.  With roughly a dozen national councils each engaged in independent programs 
of research and publications over a 36-year span, the Institute was a decentralized 
confederation of scholarly, business and diplomatic elites whose work varied 
tremendously from country to country and from year to year.  Even within the American 
council, significant divisions often emerged between West Coast regional offices and the 
headquarters in New York City.  In recent decades, however, scholars have undertaken 
projects that have illuminated different aspects of the Institute.  The emerging portrait has 
revealed the IPR as an important precursor to modern day university-based Asian Studies 
programs and as locus of interwar internationalism.  Yet current literature has neglected 
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the IPR‘s international projects after World War II, thus obscuring the ways in which its 
founding vision survived the trials of the Cold War and gained new relevance in the late 
20
th
 century.    
The first major scholarly interest in the IPR was devoted to the accusations of 
communist infiltration into the organization made by Senators McCarthy and McCarran 
in the early 1950s.  In his 1974 book The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars 
and American Politics, John N. Thomas criticized the McCarran subcommittee‘s 
investigation as shoddy and biased, and essentially cleared the Institute of the principal 
charges of being a communist front group to manipulate American policy in East Asia 
during the critical years leading up to the Chinese revolution in 1949.28  But elsewhere in 
the book, Thomas landed blows against the IPR‘s leadership, especially longtime 
Secretary-General Edward Carter, for failing to adjust the group‘s programs to the new 
political landscape of the Cold War.  The IPR‘s publication record dealing with the 
Soviet Union and Communist China, Thomas concluded, was ―shallow and lacking in 
perception.‖29  A failure to enunciate clear organizational goals and firm research 
guidelines, in his view, tripped the IPR into political controversy from which it could not 
recover.  Thomas‘ work suggested that greater willingness to toe the anti-communist line 
could have saved the IPR from dissolution. 
Thomas was interested in the Institute only inasmuch as it shed light into the 
McCarthy era in the United States, and coming on the heels of the IPR‘s downfall, his 
analysis did not explore the group‘s international impact or long-lasting scholarly 
influence.  In the 1980s, these aspects of the IPR‘s work were first brought into view by 
Paul F. Hooper, a historian at the University of Hawaii.  Hooper‘s 1980 book Elusive 
                                                 
28John N. Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars and American Politics (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1974). 
29 Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 163. 
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Destiny placed the Honolulu-founded IPR alongside other Hawaii-based internationalist 
projects of the modern era.30  A subsequent article by Hooper demonstrated the way in 
which the Institute‘s conference and research program ―laid the foundation‖ for 
contemporary Asian and Pacific area studies programs in the West.31  In 1993, Hooper 
organized an international research conference at the University of Hawaii entitled 
―Rediscovering the IPR,‖ a gathering that has since led to other conferences over the 
years, and whose collective work has established the internationalization of IPR 
scholarship.32   
One of the major works to emerge from this reorientation was Tomoko Akami‘s 
Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan, and the Institute of Relations in 
Peace and War (2001), which analyzed unofficial diplomatic contact between Japanese 
and American IPR members in the years preceding and during World War II.33  Akami‘s 
work was the first broad survey of the Institute‘s early history, and outlined the way in 
which American-led regionalism dominated the IPR‘s early conception of a Pacific 
community, as well as the way these non-state experts used their expertise to garner 
influence on the world stage.  Akami contended that by World War II, IPR experts were 
voluntarily co-opted into the service of governments.  Their non-governmental status did 
not challenge the nation-state‘s authority but instead worked within its framework, she 
found.  Akami further argued that the internationalist projects of the IPR were intimately 
                                                 
30 Paul F. Hooper, Elusive Destiny: The Internationalist Movement in Modern Hawaii (Honolulu: 
University Press of Hawaii, 1980). 
31 Hooper, ―The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Origins of Asian and Pacific Studies,‖ Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Spring 1988): 98-121. 
32 Hooper, ed., Rediscovering the IPR: Proceedings of the First International Research Conference on the 
Institute of Pacific Relations: University of Hawaii, August 9-10, 1993 (Manoa, Hawaii: Center for Arts 
and Humanities, University of Hawaii, 1994);  Michio Yamaoka and George M. Oshiro, eds., Toward the 
Construction of a New Discipline: International Conference Proceedings on the Re-evaluation of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations (Tokyo: Ronsosha, 2005). 
33 Tomoko Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan, and the Institute of Relations 
in Peace and War (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
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bound up in cultural and economic ―Americanization,‖ a process that appeared to be 
fulfilled with the rise of the Pax Americana at the conclusion of World War II.34 
This dissertation both extends the story of the Pacific internationalists in the IPR 
into the postwar years and challenges assumptions of Akami and others about the 
relationship between these private experts and the nation-state, especially in the United 
States.  From its beginning, the IPR represented a threat to traditional state diplomatic 
machinery.  The independent actions of Secretary-General Edward Carter, in particular, 
often confounded American diplomats, who found the charismatic IPR leader at once a 
useful and maddening figure.  State Department-IPR correspondence indicates that even 
during World War II, the close relationship between IPR leaders and state officials was 
also marked by wariness.  More pronounced differences emerged in the postwar era, as 
many Pacific internationalists fought against the onset of a mentality defined purely by 
the Cold War.  The inclusion of new Asian councils—especially India‘s—into the IPR‘s 
international structure further distinguished the group‘s agenda from that of Western 
governments.  International conferences in the postwar era were notable for their critique 
of American Cold War policies, further straining the IPR‘s relationship with officials in 
Washington.  Maintaining trans-Pacific intellectual ties in the postwar era, it became 
clear, could not be made compatible with an uncompromising Cold War agenda.  The 
IPR began to lose public support in the United States, becoming vulnerable to the kind of 
political attacks that would eventually doom the organization. 
The Institute of Pacific Relations may have succumbed to Cold War politics, but 
its vision of Pacific internationalism has survived.  Other scholars such as Lawrence T. 
Woods have pointed to the IPR as a forerunner to contemporary efforts at Pacific non-
                                                 
34 Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, pp. 276-281.  For more on this idea, see Emily S. Rosenberg, 
Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1982). 
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governmental cooperation and so-called ―track-two‖ informal diplomacy.35  Yet none 
have undertaken a historical study of the IPR‘s international postwar program to 
demonstrate the way in which Pacific internationalists carried the torch of their interwar 
vision into a new era, or kept alive the international ties that would later reconstitute 
themselves as regional associations.  The perspective of history is critical in this regard.  
The IPR‘s conceptualization of an Asia-Pacific region was not the only model for private 
dialogue, and challenges to it arose throughout this period.  Many Asia experts in Great 
Britain, for instance, touted the Commonwealth of Nations as the ideal basis for East-
West exchange in a bid to retain informal, post-imperial influence.  Meanwhile, some 
Asian leaders promoted the idea of a more Asian-only regional grouping that would 
exclude Western members.  In the several years following World War II, these visions 
intersected and collided as world conditions changed.  The IPR provided the critical 
institutional structure that sustained dialogue regarding East-West relations during an age 
when global relations were warped by Cold War ideology.  Although maligned at the 
time, their efforts should serve as a historical benchmark for contemporary non-
governmental and inter-governmental efforts to bridge the Pacific divide.      
In telling the story of mid-century Pacific internationalism, this dissertation makes 
use of archival materials that have not been mined in related studies.  Whereas previous 
work on the IPR has largely focused on the voluminous holdings at Columbia University 
in New York, few researchers have taken advantage of the IPR fonds (collection) at the 
University of British Columbia in Vancouver, which detail the Institute‘s last decade in 
the wake of the McCarran hearings.  Drawing from correspondence between the 
international secretariat and national councils, especially those in Asia, this dissertation 
                                                 
35 Lawrence T. Woods, Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and International 
Relations (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993). 
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recasts the IPR in the 1950s as a defiantly independent organization committed to 
carrying on an international research and conference agenda despite political troubles in 
the United States.  This study also makes significant use of governmental archives in the 
United States, Great Britain and France to establish the ties between Western diplomatic 
officials and the IPR.  These records reveal not only the complicated relationship between 
diplomats and their respective IPR councils, but also the fissures between Western 
nations in their approach to the struggle for Asian minds.  The Rockefeller Archive 
Center in New York and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, 
Texas, meanwhile, provided significant new material to facilitate an improved 
understanding of post-IPR ventures like the Asia Society and the East-West Center, 
respectively.  In combination, these materials provide scholars with a new portrait of 
postwar Pacific internationalism.  
 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter One traces the origins and development of Pacific internationalism from 
the end of World War I through the outbreak of World War II, paying particular attention 
to the founding and operation of the Institute of Pacific Relations.   It argues that the IPR 
managed to gain influence within the corporate and diplomatic worlds, especially in the 
United States, by marketing itself as the primary source for objective information about 
the Asia-Pacific region.  The organization also effectively billed itself as a private League 
of Nations, and its international conferences thus grew in stature.  Early leaders of the 
IPR traded on their ability to move between official diplomacy and private activity in the 
academic and business worlds.  The Institute‘s Secretary-General Edward Carter was 
particularly effective in winning over prominent financial supporters like John D. 
Rockefeller III to support the work of Carter‘s fellow Pacific internationalists.  Carter‘s 
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relationship with diplomatic officials in the United States, however, was more 
complicated than other scholars have noted, this chapter suggests.  Through his extensive 
travels in Asia, Carter offered unique insights into a region increasingly central to 
American strategic concerns, and thus was valuable to American diplomatic and military 
officials.  Yet Carter‘s actions made clear that his primary duty was to the international 
program put forward by the IPR, and as a non-state actor he showed he was not 
necessarily beholden to U.S. official interests. 
Chapter Two focuses on the wartime activities of the IPR.  Institute leaders saw 
their opportunity to play a role in the debate over the postwar Pacific world, and 
commissioned numerous studies to outline these ideas.  One of the critical components of 
a stable postwar world, most Pacific internationalists agreed, was an independent and 
thriving Asia-Pacific region with healthy partnerships between its major continental 
powers.  As the private institute with the deepest ties to Asia, the IPR found itself 
uniquely positioned to encourage these trends.  Edward Carter maximized his leverage 
with leaders around the world to engage in unofficial diplomacy, particularly between 
Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Chiang Kai-shek of China, helping to establish intra-Asian 
relationships that would have long-lasting effects on the continent. In a parallel effort, the 
IPR‘s role in helping establish the Indian Council of World Affairs encouraged an 
independent Indian view on international relations, distinct from that of the British 
Empire.  Meanwhile, IPR writers traded on their unofficial influence to encourage 
democratic trends in Nationalist China, but their critique often earned the ire of their 
wartime allies and the consternation of American governmental officials. 
The transition into the postwar world comprises the subject of Chapter Three.  
Pacific internationalists were forced to adapt to a global climate increasingly concerned 
with the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, and marked in some 
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ways by resurgence in European imperial confidence.  Although the United States may 
have been at the apex of its power in the Pacific, Europeans were able to dominate the 
direction of the Institute of Pacific Relations between the years 1945 and 1947, this 
chapter argues.  By banding together through IPR contacts, the British, French and Dutch 
councils were able to marginalize anti-colonial criticism of their actions, a prominent 
feature at previous wartime conferences, and put the research institute on more 
―scientific‖ and less political footing.  The forced retirement of the anti-colonial Edward 
Carter as secretary-general of the IPR was one of the prominent triumphs of this 
combined effort.  By 1947, however, it became increasingly clear that Asian 
representation in the IPR was sorely lacking, and that an international research program 
could not function adequately without sufficient voices from the newly independent 
countries of Asia. 
Chapter Four describes the IPR‘s efforts to establish private intellectual networks 
with Asian countries in the postwar period.  The success of this project was mixed, this 
chapter suggests.  On the one hand, the inclusion of India and Pakistan and the re-
introduction of a Japanese council marked significant headway in the effort to bring in 
Asian perspectives into the private institute.  On the other hand, the IPR found it difficult 
to translate the IPR model of a non-partisan and non-governmental research institute into 
countries where top regional experts were almost all working for the government, or 
seeking support from one political party or another.  The fall of China to communism was 
another significant blow to the Institute‘s program.  Not only did the IPR lose a national 
council from its ranks, but its work suddenly became highly politicized in the United 
States.  As IPR conferences provided greater voice to Asian discontent with Western 
policies, moreover, some Americans began to question the desirability of funding such an 
international enterprise. 
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Chapter Five explains how Senator Joseph McCarthy‘s attack on Asian expert and 
IPR leader Owen Lattimore spilled over into a larger Senate investigation of the Institute 
itself, led by Senator Pat McCarran.  During the course of the hearings, which lasted from 
1951 into early 1952, political enemies of Pacific internationalists questioned not only the 
ideology of particular IPR members, but the very method of the Institute‘s work.  The 
McCarran report condemned the Institute as a communist front organization that helped 
facilitate the ―loss‖ of China in 1949, and as a result financial support for the Institute in 
the United States dried up.  This chapter argues that by conflating the American IPR and 
the international IPR, senatorial inquisitors hurt their own purported cause of anti-
communism.  In undermining the American council, they threatened the very existence of 
the international structure of the IPR, which served as the best private contact point 
between elites in non-communist Asia and the West.  Winning over Asian minds, in other 
words, became harder, not easier, as a result of the hearings. 
Chapter Six examines the international reaction to the McCarran hearings, and 
places ongoing Asian affiliation with the IPR in the context of the ―Bandung spirit‖ of the 
1950s.  While the Asian-African conference held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 brought 
out fears of an anti-Western bloc in many politicians, the continued operation of the 
international non-governmental intellectual network centered around the IPR made clear 
that Asian elites were nevertheless actively interested in maintaining links with the West.  
In fact, these intellectuals were convinced more than ever of the IPR‘s utility and 
independence as a result of its treatment during the McCarran hearings.  This attachment 
to trans-Pacific dialogue was made abundantly clear when Chatham House Director-
General Ivison Macadam floated a proposal to dissolve the IPR.  The ensuing debate 
highlighted the commitment of Asian elites to the IPR.  A better understanding of these 
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private links, this chapter argues, might have helped mitigate the Cold War paranoia of 
many Western policymakers during this time. 
Chapter Seven traces how American political and philanthropic elites began to 
reassess East-West connections at the end of the 1950s.  With the American IPR 
hemorrhaging support, Institute supporters sought to find a replacement organization to 
take part in international research and conference work with Asian elites.  In the course of 
this search, however, IPR officials discovered that many American officials were more 
interested in selling American policies abroad than in hearing critical Asian voices.  
Governmental programs increasingly viewed non-governmental activity as useful only 
inasmuch as it could propagandize or engage in covert activity on behalf of U.S. interests.  
Rockefeller Foundation officials, meanwhile, created the Asia Society with much 
financial support and fanfare, but expressly shied away from political content and 
rejected the idea of taking over as the American council in the IPR.  U.S. Senator Lyndon 
B. Johnson proposed the creation of the Hawaii-based East-West Center, which opened in 
1960, all in the name of facilitating intellectual contact between the West and Asia, but 
its ―bridge-building‖ potential was undermined through bureaucratic wrangling.  By the 
time the IPR finally closed its doors for good in 1960, Institute officials were pessimistic 
about the ability to maintain private contact between Western and Asian elites.  
The dissolution of the Institute of Pacific Relations masked broader successes in 
its regional vision, the Epilogue makes clear.  Within a few years after the shuttering of 
the IPR, Japanese and Australian economists formerly associated with the group began 
collaborating on the creation of a Pacific free trade area, and later non-governmental 
contact resulted in the establishment of organizations such as the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council (1980) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
(1993).  This non-governmental activity has been matched by more inter-governmental 
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ventures, most notably the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (1989).  Yet challenges to 
Asia-Pacific partnerships are manifold, and it is by no means clear that such cooperative 
endeavors will persist.  As politicians and academics alike begin to confront new 
challenges regarding larger economic and strategic relationships between ―the West‖ and 
―the rest,‖ non-state actors are proving to be critical players in this debate.  It is an apt 





The New Diplomacy in the Pacific, 1919-1937 
In the years following World War I, a generation of Pacific internationalists 
coalesced around the project to reorder relations in the Pacific region and promote a more 
durable peace.1  Eschewing traditional diplomacy, non-governmental elites in a number 
of countries sought to organize intellectuals into regional partnerships, bypassing official 
state machinery, with the ultimate goal of bringing about better transnational 
understanding.  This collection of scholars, businessmen, journalists and philanthropists 
centered themselves around a new international private organization, the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, as a vehicle to collect data and organize research on the social and 
economic problems confronting the Pacific region. A series of international conferences 
convinced them of the beneficial results of such discussion, and earned the attention of 
prominent leaders in Europe, North America and Asia.  Institute leaders formally 
disclaimed any ambitions to take on a diplomatic role for themselves even as they 
reconfigured the possibilities for private international contact.   
Viewed in their immediate context, interwar Pacific internationalists were a 
decided failure: a second world war erupted, and anti-colonial nationalism flourished in 
Asia during subsequent years.  The IPR itself, meanwhile, would soon fall victim to Cold 
War politics.  Yet with a longer view of twentieth century history, one can argue that 
their vision had great resonance and international significance.  Most critically, Institute 
leaders saw the importance of American leadership in fostering private, elite contact 
                                                 
1 The most comprehensive study of Pacific internationalists during the interwar years can be found in 
Tomoko Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific: The Institute of Pacific Relations in Peace and War (New 
York: Routledge, 2002).  Also see Paul F. Hooper, Elusive Destiny: The Internationalist Movement in 
Modern Hawaii (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1980), pp. 79-125. 
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across the Pacific during an age in which the United States had eschewed membership in 
the League of Nations.  These American leaders articulated a vision for the Pacific that 
attempted to refashion Western involvement with the region away from the outworn 
model of European colonialism.  By constructing an edifice of cooperation and goodwill 
among private elites in the West and Asia during the interwar years, the American IPR as 
well as its fellow national councils were far better prepared to continue international 
efforts to bridge the Pacific in World War II and afterwards.  These efforts were often 
obscured in the context of the polarization of the Cold War, but emerged ascendant once 
again in the latter part of the century.  With this longer legacy in mind, the work of 
Pacific internationalists during the interwar period has shown remarkable durability.    
 
THE NEW INTERNATIONALISTS 
Even before the final shots were fired in the Great War, many international 
observers were convinced that the traditional practice of diplomacy that had undergirded 
the state system since 1815 was destined for the dustbin of history.  The ―old‖ diplomacy 
was associated with secret negotiations, trade rivalries and the arms race, all of which had 
contributed to the outbreak of the European war.  The ―new‖ diplomacy, on the other 
hand, promised to promote decision-making based on openness and public assent, an 
outlook sympathetic to the larger goals of disarmament, free trade and self-determination 
for peoples around the globe.2  Not surprisingly, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was the 
most prominent champion of this new approach, which saw a much greater role for 
Americans in international affairs.  Although the failure of the United States to join the 
                                                 
2 In hindsight, the differences between the ―old‖ and ―new‖ diplomacy have proved to be overstated, but 
the sense of dramatic departure from the past was nevertheless palpable at the time.  See Sasson Sofer, 
―Old and New Diplomacy: A Debate Revisited,‖ Review of International Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (July 
1988): 195-211. 
 25 
League of Nations dealt a blow to this vision, it was not destroyed in the 1920s.  A new 
wave of internationalism promoted public interest in foreign affairs in the United States.  
International relations were deemed too important to leave in the hands of a few 
diplomats; instead, a wider group of informed citizens felt obligated to take up the work 
of keeping the peace. 
Wilson‘s new diplomacy was visible in tangible ways at the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919 as a group of informal advisers, known simply as ―the Inquiry,‖ 
supplemented the American delegation‘s presence.3  They relished their descent from the 
ivory tower into the thicket of practical problems at the conference tables of Versailles, 
whether in redrawing frontier lines in Europe or negotiating the postwar economic 
settlement.  Fresh from this early success, Inquiry members determined to continue their 
work in the postwar period.  The result was the founding of the Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR), an independent foreign policy institute based in New York City.  A 
similar group of British experts, meanwhile, established their own national group, the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), acquiring grand London headquarters at 
Chatham House, the St. James‘s Square residence once owned by William Pitt.  With 
their Paris experiences bolstering their credentials and confidence, CFR and RIIA 
members quickly overcame the skepticism of governmental and business leaders, and 
these institutes soon established themselves as indispensible clearinghouses for the latest 
debates over foreign policy ideas.  The day of the scholar-expert clearly had arrived on 
the international scene. 
                                                 
3 Col. Edward M. House, known as Wilson‘s ―national security adviser,‖ pushed the scholar-president to 
accept the idea of a collection of outside experts to help guide his ideas concerning postwar policy.  Once 
approved, the young Harvard professor Walter Lippmann gathered together the group whose sole criterion 
for membership was, in his words, ―sheer, startling genius.‖ Peter Grose, Continuing the Inquiry: The 
Council on Foreign Relations From 1921 to 1996 (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), p. 
1. 
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American and British members of these two foreign relations groups closely 
collaborated on research projects, especially in the first years of operation in the 1920s.  
They were decidedly Atlantic in orientation, concerned with maintaining healthy Anglo-
American relations into the postwar years.  In the United States, Council on Foreign 
Relations founders by and large were representatives of the so-called Eastern 
Establishment, from former secretary of state Elihu Root to younger thinkers like W. 
Averell Harriman and John Foster Dulles.  Although they were outside of traditional state 
diplomatic machinery, CFR and RIIA members oriented their work toward the diplomatic 
community rather than the public at large.  They valued confidential deliberation over 
public education; they only rarely opened up their conference proceedings to non-
members.  Lionel Curtis, one of the principal founders of Chatham House (as the RIIA 
increasingly became known), spoke for both British and American officers when he 
opined that public opinion should not be followed so much as guided by ―a small number 
of people in real contact with the facts, who had thought out the issues involved.‖4  They 
were serious, independent thinkers who were unabashedly elitist in their conception of 
their role as a non-partisan cauldron of ideas for professional diplomats.  
The Council on Foreign Relations and Chatham House showcased the growing 
impact of non-state actors in the realm of foreign relations, but they were by no means 
the only offspring of citizen empowerment in the realm of international affairs stemming 
from World War I.  In 1918, an American group that called itself the ―Committee on 
Nothing at All‖ worked to build up support for President Wilson‘s League of Nations.  
Within months, it institutionalized itself as the Foreign Policy Association (FPA), a New 
York-based group dedicated to educating American citizens about international 
                                                 
4 Grose, Continuing the Inquiry, pp. 9-14. 
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relations.5  The FPA reflected a far more democratic vision than the CFR or Chatham 
House.  The American public, in their view, should be informed and active participants in 
debating the principles and purposes of foreign policy.  Within a few years, the Foreign 
Policy Association established itself in numerous cities around the United States as a 
stalwart of American adult education in the broad subject of world affairs.    
Far from the Atlantic-centered cities of New York City and London, meanwhile, a 
different conception of internationalism began to take shape.  The Hawaii-based 
journalist and civic booster Alexander Hume Ford was moved by the spirit of the times to 
foster greater international sentiment in the Pacific area. Ford had ventured to Hawaii as a 
young man early in the twentieth century and found a harmonious multi-racial society, a 
stark contrast to his childhood home of Charleston, South Carolina.  Upon settling down 
in the islands, Ford concluded that Hawaii‘s peaceful racial cosmopolitanism could be 
marketed alongside its natural beauty in attracting tourists and business. Ford—―as much 
a Babbitt as a Wilson,‖ according to historian Paul Hooper—created the Hands-Around-
the-Pacific Club in 1908 to promote international business development, as well as his 
own magazine, Mid-Pacific.6  International trade was good business for Hawaii, Ford 
concluded, as well as for world peace.  By World War I, Ford‘s singular vision had 
expanded into the creation of a more comprehensive organization, the Pan-Pacific Union, 
with plans for international conferences, a commercial museum and art gallery, and even 
an international college, all of whose programs were designed to bring the peoples of the 
Pacific Ocean into closer relations, with Hawaii as a linchpin.   
In the midst of world war, Ford showed a remarkable degree of enthusiasm and an 
ability to woo important Hawaiian and other prominent supporters to the cause of Pacific 
                                                 
5 There is little scholarship on the Foreign Policy Association apart from internal institutional histories.  For 
an overview, see Donald Philips Dennis, Foreign Policy in a Democracy: The Role of the Foreign Policy 
Association (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 2002). 
6 Hooper, Elusive Destiny, pp. 65-104. 
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regionalism.  Former Hawaii territorial governor Walter F. Frear agreed to serve as 
president of the Pan-Pacific Union; other officers included Hawaii notables such as Frank 
C. Atherton, William R. Castle and Syngman Rhee.  Ford convinced the prime ministers 
of Australia and New Zealand, William M. Hughes and W.F. Massey, to serve as 
honorary presidents, and later included U.S. President Woodrow Wilson as well.  Senator 
Warren G. Harding and Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane each had made 
separate trips to Hawaii, and upon meeting Ford, expressed great admiration of his 
endeavors.  A trip to Washington, D.C. in late 1919 to promote the Pan-Pacific Union 
among legislators earned Ford perhaps his greatest coup, when he won over Republican 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.  According to Ford‘s later account, the arch-opponent of 
Wilson‘s League of Nations was far more sympathetic to Pacific internationalism. Lodge 
reportedly told Ford: 
I don‘t believe we can ever have a League of Nations composed of the countries 
around the Atlantic, for the traditions there have always been traditions of envy 
and hatred, thousands of years in Europe of war, envy and hatred.  A world league 
of nations is a mad dream for the present, but out there in the Pacific, where you 
have never had a serious quarrel, your traditions are predominantly traditions of 
peace; there is the place to begin the work of a real League of Nations.  You may 
do it there, and I am for such a League.7 
Lodge‘s seemingly incongruous enthusiasm for Ford‘s internationalism made sense only 
in the context of a conception of the Pacific region as unsullied by European diplomatic 
failures.  Even to a supposed isolationist like Lodge, the Pacific presented itself as an 
opportunity for new international partnerships that the United States should support. 
Ford‘s Pan-Pacific Union succeeded in hosting a number of small conferences on 
scientific and educational concerns in Hawaii in the early 1920s, but it ultimately failed at 
                                                 
7 Ford account quoted in Hooper, Elusive Destiny, pp. 84-85.   As Hooper notes, Ford‘s account of his 
conversation with Lodge certainly could have been embellished, but the fact that the Union did receive the 
money and Lodge later sent an autographed photograph for publication in the Union periodical Mid-Pacific 
Magazine gives credence to the senator‘s support.  
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becoming a Pan-Pacific League of Nations, or even the Pacific equivalent of the Pan-
American Union, Ford‘s original goal.  For all of the encomia and grand rhetoric, the 
Union itself remained essentially a booster club for Hawaii businesses.  The activities of 
the Union increasingly centered around Honolulu, and indeed around Ford himself, 
despite his best intentions to cultivate broader Union leadership and an international 
presence.8 The Pan-Pacific Union may not have been the vehicle, but Ford‘s vision of 
Pacific internationalism clearly had resonance.  His conceptualization of the Pacific 
region as a single entity was a major contribution that led in no small measure to the 1925 
founding of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which would comprise the heart of the 
Pacific internationalist movement for the following three decades.  The IPR, with ties to 
financial and political elites in the mainland United States as well as among scholars and 
businessmen in Europe and Asia, would transform Pacific internationalism from a 
provincial Hawaiian concern into a matter of global importance in the coming years. 
 
ESTABLISHING THE IPR 
A combination of missionary-inspired activism, scholarly ideas and philanthropic 
interest resulted in the founding of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1925.  As early as 
1919, the American Young Men‘s Christian Association began making plans to hold a 
leadership conference in Honolulu on the ―fundamental‖ elements of Christianity and 
their application to the peoples of the Pacific in order to help the YMCA‘s work in the 
region.  The YMCA had a long-standing presence in the Pacific, with chapters in the 
                                                 
8 By the 1930s Ford‘s writings increasingly focused upon defending Japan against American critics, 
positions that resulted in earning him derision from the mainland and dwindling governmental and private 
support for Union projects.  The Pan-Pacific Union‘s publications and conference program withered away 
as the great depression sapped its resources until its eventual collapse in 1939.  Ford, meanwhile, 
increasingly sick and tired, slipped out of the public eye for the last several years of his life until his death, 
obscure and penniless, in 1945.  Hooper, Elusive Destiny, pp. 100-104.    
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Philippines, Korea, Japan and China, and a reputation for work in social development and 
racial justice.  The American YMCA turned to one of their prominent national leaders, 
Frank C. Atherton, to help organize the proposed gathering.  Atherton was a natural fit 
for the job. His father, Joseph Ballard Atherton, ran Castle and Cook, one of Hawaii‘s 
oldest business firms and played a key role in the founding of the Hawaii YMCA in 
1869.  Frank Atherton followed in his father‘s footsteps at Castle and Cook as well as the 
Hawaii YMCA, becoming one of Hawaii‘s best-known businessmen and philanthropists 
by the end of World War I.  Atherton may not have had the personal flair of Alexander 
Ford, but he was far more practical, and he earned a reputation as a man of personal 
integrity and organizational ability.  As a member of the national YMCA committee in 
charge of its international program, Atherton supported the idea of a YMCA meeting in 
Honolulu, but by 1923 he expressed a belief that such a conference might go beyond the 
training of Y officials and instead consider problems of the Pacific more broadly.9   
International YMCA officials quickly agreed to a more ambitious program for the 
Hawaii meeting, notably at the second World‘s Conference of YMCA Workers Among 
Boys in Portschach, Austria, in May 1923.  In a December 7, 1923 letter to national 
committees of the YMCA in Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the 
Philippines and the United States, Atherton and Charles Loomis, the co-chairs of the 
Honolulu conference committee, proposed holding a conference in 1925 ―to consider 
some of the problems of the Pacific peoples from a Christian viewpoint and to formulate 
some practical constructive plans that will help in their solution.‖10  Even as the YMCA 
used its machinery to contact members in these Pacific countries, the central purpose of 
the conference had begun to shift beyond a purely internal matter toward larger regional 
                                                 
9 For more on Frank Atherton, see Hooper, Elusive Destiny, pp. 105-117. 
10 Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session: June 30—July 14, 1925: History, Organization, 
Proceedings, Discussions and Addresses (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 10-11. 
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questions, as Atherton and others now recognized.  YMCA officials now decided to bring 
in outside experts to advise them on the proposed program, including Raymond Fosdick, 
former undersecretary general of the League of Nations (1919-20) as well as trustee 
(1921-36) and later president (1936-48) of the Rockefeller Foundation.  Fosdick showed 
enthusiasm about the idea of applying Christian principles to world problems, but was 
less certain that such a project would receive financial help if it were run as a purely 
YMCA activity.11 
Another prominent adviser, Stanford University President Ray Lyman Wilbur, 
also urged the planning committee to separate the Honolulu conference from the YMCA.  
Wilbur had been brought to the attention of conference organizers as a result of his two-
year study on Asian immigrants‘ integration into American society and subsequent 1924 
article, ―Survey of Race Relations: A Study of the Oriental on the Pacific Coast.‖  
Published in the context of severe Asian immigration restrictions as a result of the 1924 
Immigration Act, Wilbur and his survey team found that Japanese and Chinese 
immigrants were not a threat to economic life on the West Coast, but instead were a 
driving force behind the region‘s growth.  Moreover, Wilbur showed that these 
immigrants had revealed a ―remarkable‖ degree of assimilation into American culture, 
despite the prejudice and blatant discrimination they faced.12  It was this sort of project—
rigorous and objective, yet rooted in human experience—that appealed to the conference 
organizers as a model for their own proposed work.  Furthermore, Wilbur‘s presence as a 
respected educator added considerable prestige to the Honolulu project.  Once assured of 
the prospective conference‘s independence from religious concerns, Wilbur agreed to 
serve as the head of a New York-based organizing committee.13    
                                                 
11 Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, pp. 46-58. 
12 Ray Lyman Wilbur, Memoirs (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 315-318. 
13 Wilbur, Memoirs, p. 317. 
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With the involvement of officials at the Rockefeller Foundation and Stanford 
University, the Honolulu conference now took on a life of its own, and passed—
graciously and willingly, by all accounts—out of the hands of the YMCA and the 
Honolulu group‘s original organizing committee, and into the hands of Wilbur and other 
mainland establishment figures.14  At the suggestion of Roland S. Morris, the former 
American ambassador to Japan, Wilbur and his New York committee invited 41 people 
with experience in international and Pacific affairs to gather at New York City‘s Yale 
Club on February 22, 1925 for further planning.  The group represented an even mix of 
academics, journalists, publishers, businessmen, officials in non-profit foundations as 
well as YMCA members.  Prominent among them included Stanley K. Hornbeck, the 
Harvard lecturer and later State Department official specializing in China; James T. 
Shotwell, the Columbia University international law expert and former ―Inquiry‖ 
member; Archibald Coolidge, the editor of the Council on Foreign Relations‘ journal 
Foreign Affairs; and Charles Batchelder, former commissioner for the Far Eastern Trade 
Bureau.  The Yale Club gathering not only endorsed the idea of a broad Honolulu 
conference, but also gave shape to the agenda.  The proposed Hawaii gathering, they 
concluded, should stress common interests around the Pacific, be informative rather than 
argumentative, and not interfere with traditional diplomatic machinery.  Not least, the 
group determined that participants at the conference should consider forming a 
                                                 
14 A September 1924 meeting in Atlantic City agreed that the Hawaii conference would still employ a 
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permanent, international, non-governmental organization to carry on regional research 
and educational work: an Institute of Pacific Relations.15  
During the course of the first week in July, 140 participants from around the 
Pacific region gathered in Honolulu at the Punahou School for what would become the 
first international conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.  A plurality (39) came 
from the mainland United States, while Hawaiians formed an independent delegation of 
29 members and associates.  Japanese (20), Chinese (14) and Korean (8) delegates 
represented Asia, while the Pacific British Dominions were represented by Australia (6), 
Canada (7) and New Zealand (11).  Three Filipinos, as well as a handful of observers 
from the YMCA in England and Switzerland, rounded out the international gathering.  
YMCA members were a significant portion of the conference, but by no means 
dominated the proceedings.  A motley crew of scholars, journalists and businessmen, 
from a Japanese steamship company owner to the former Chinese commissioner of 
foreign affairs, met over morning meditation sessions, mingled in the hallways and stayed 
in dorms as if they were students at an international summer school.  ―It was an intensely 
human experience,‖ Ray Lyman Wilbur recalled of the time he spent there.  ―Men and 
women of conflicting interests and different backgrounds, with various social, economic, 
and political concepts of life—of different races and nine nationalities—lived and studied 
together to see if a new type of international community could be created in the Pacific 
area built upon reciprocity and mutual understanding.‖16  Later conference participants 
would use similar language to describe their experiences at such gatherings.  In this 
environment, ideas were debated, but just as importantly, relationships were formed that 
in many cases lasted decades.       
                                                 
15 Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session, pp. 19-22. 
16 Wilbur, Memoirs, p. 324. 
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From its very first days, the founders of the Institute of Pacific Relations 
confronted the problem of creating an independent actor on the international stage that 
would not conflict with official state machinery.  It was a delicate proposal that quickly 
caused headaches within the diplomatic community, especially in Washington.  An 
Institute subcommittee on the purpose and scope of the IPR on the eve of the Hawaii 
conference determined that the Institute should be devoted to collecting and elucidating 
the facts concerning the educational, social, political and even moral conditions of Pacific 
region, with a view to ―removal of difficulties in international relations.‖  Words such as 
these sent off alarms in those officials who were concerned that such conferences might 
focus on such ―difficulties,‖ especially the extremely sensitive issue of Japanese 
immigration policy.  The last thing American government officials wanted was a public 
forum for the airing of anti-American grievances.  State Department officials urged 
Institute leaders to restrict their agenda and publicity, and made it clear that the IPR 
would receive no official blessing from the U.S. government.17   
Institute leaders were sensitive to these charges and sought to rebut the worries of 
diplomats, even as they insisted that they would not shy away from controversial topics.  
They did this by emphasizing that their international gatherings would be composed of 
representative national groups, not official national delegations.  In one of the opening 
addresses to the 1925 Honolulu gathering, Arthur L. Dean, the president of the University 
of Hawaii, flatly stated, ―The business of this Institute is not diplomacy.‖ Conference 
participants were not present to seek advantages for their home country‘s official 
position, he continued, but rather to listen and learn: ―We are here as individuals looking 
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assistant secretary of state, who requested that he be kept apprised of all developments regarding the 
Honolulu conference.  J. Merle Davis to MacMurray, March 4, 1925; MacMurray to Davis, March 6, 1925, 
in Record Group 59, Central Decimal File, 811.43/Institute of Pacific Relations, National Archives and 
Records Association (NARA), College Park, MD. 
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for the light, seeking to gain wisdom, and, in all humbleness of mind hoping that through 
us wisdom may in some measure grow among the peoples from whom we come.‖18  
While Dean‘s remarks betrayed some defensiveness about this incipient international 
project, he also displayed his Progressive-era faith in the power of reasonable debate 
among elite, informed actors to reach mutually beneficial consensus.  Such comments 
also reflected the optimism of the mid-1920s that rational discussion really could prevent 
future conflict. 
Conference organizers emphasized matters of common interest, but the challenge 
of reconciling vastly different national perspectives was made clear as early as the 
opening statements from the leaders of each country‘s delegation.  China‘s T.K. Zoo, 
secretary of the World Christian Student Federation in Geneva, did not mince words 
when he described the problems of the Pacific as essentially a deep division between 
West and East, separated by the dynamics of race and power:  
On the one hand we find a group of nations, mainly of the white race, which 
through one means or another, have in the past years secured certain privileges, 
rights and territories from eastern peoples.  These they are very anxious to 
maintain and keep as long as possible. On the other hand, we find another group 
of nations in which the spirit of nationalism and racial consciousness is rapidly 
growing and which are therefore anxious to recover what has been wrested from 
them in the past. … Left to itself, the situation will inevitably lead to conflict and 
disaster  …[I]t is because we have all recognized the futility and horror of letting 
the situation drift to its inevitable end that we have come together to find another 
way out.19 
Americans did not like to think of themselves as sullied by this colonial tradition, as 
conference participants made clear.  Ray Lyman Wilbur, as head of the American group, 
put forward a picture of the United States that had largely stumbled into its Pacific 
interests and had no further territorial ambition.  Wilbur stressed the ―peculiar idealism 
                                                 
18 Arthur L. Dean, ―The Approach to Pacific Problems,‖ Honolulu Session, pp. 46-52. 
19 Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session, pp. 68-70. 
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and the pioneer spirit‖ of the American people, and their dedication to the sense of ―fair 
play.‖  Finally, he sought to downplay the impact of the recent decision to sharply limit 
Asian immigration into the United States by saying that it resulted from an inability of 
the American people to understand the larger problems of immigration.  Despite these 
setbacks in diplomacy, Wilbur reassured his audience that the United States exhibited 
―goodwill towards all countries of the Pacific,‖ and the country was determined not to 
repeat the mistakes of the past.20  
The mixture of frank talk with an atmosphere of civilized congeniality proved to 
be a winning recipe for the 1925 Honolulu conference attendees, and positive press 
quickly followed.  One participant, Paul Scharrenberg, the secretary and treasurer of the 
California State Federation of Labor, declared that the Japanese exclusion provisions in 
the 1924 Immigration Act would not have been passed had the Honolulu conference been 
held two years earlier.  A Tokyo editor, meanwhile, reported that anti-American 
editorials had sharply decreased since the Japanese delegates returned from Honolulu.21  
These kinds of anecdotes resonated with foundation officers and brought stable financial 
support.  Notably, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund appropriated $10,000 
for 1926 and 1927, an amount that increased to $15,000 annually for the rest of the 
decade, and marked the beginning of a long-standing commitment to the group.22  The 
success of the 1925 conference also allowed members to establish a permanent institute 
with autonomous national councils, an international secretariat‘s office located in 
Honolulu run by former YMCA official J. Merle Davis, and the creation of a governing 
body, the Pacific Council, consisting of one representative from each of the participating 
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national councils.  The Institute launched an ambitious research program and began 
publishing a newsletter, Pacific Affairs, which in a few years‘ time grew into a quarterly 
publication.   
By the time the Institute of Pacific Relations gathered for its second conference in 
Honolulu in the summer of 1927, it had gained a considerable reputation as an 
international research and education organization.  The IPR also had generally overcome 
the suspicions of American governmental officials who worried about scholarly amateurs 
intruding into the hallowed ground of high diplomacy.  William R. Castle, Jr., the 
Hawaii-born State Department chief of Western European affairs, wrote longtime White 
House aide Rudolph Forster that the Institute‘s first meeting had produced only good 
will, and that President Calvin Coolidge should be made aware that conference 
organizers were ―very careful to keep close to facts and to avoid criticism of this 
Government or of any other government.‖23  Coolidge sent a welcome message to the 
1927 conference, a practice that later presidents followed.  White House and State 
Department officials agreed to keep their hands off this new Institute once reassured that 
the international organization did not seek to undermine or replace American diplomatic 
efforts in the region.  
In the early years of the Institute, its leaders reaffirmed the IPR‘s status as an 
unofficial organization: non-governmental, non-sectarian, non-partisan and non-
propagandist.  The IPR was barred in its constitution from passing resolutions or 
advocating any policy decisions.  The object of the Institute was simply ―to study the 
conditions of the Pacific peoples with a view to the improvement of their mutual 
relations.‖24  Their contribution to international relations was made instead through 
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research projects and the publication of books, articles and pamphlets regarding matters 
of regional contemporary concern.  This alone could make a difference to the conduct of 
international relations, they believed, especially in the context of the League of Nations‘ 
approach to resolving disputes.  At a 1927 Institute roundtable discussion on ―the new 
diplomacy,‖ conference participants agreed that modern democratic institutions, universal 
education and improved communication had vastly undermined the potential for ―hole-
and-corner‖ secret diplomacy of the past, and instead promoted the more open conference 
approach to international problems.25   
Most IPR members agreed that the League of Nations‘ method of discussion had 
made tremendous strides in achieving greater public awareness of international 
deliberations, but they also recognized that the League had inherent disadvantages in 
adjudicating problems in the Pacific.  First, the Soviet Union and the United States were 
not members of the League, which severely limited its claims for full representation.  A 
second drawback was that many in China and Japan were distrustful of the League‘s 
Europe-centeredness, viewing it as another white man‘s club.  Some in the IPR believed 
that they should involve themselves in fashioning new diplomatic machinery for the 
Pacific area, but the idea was quashed: the Institute, its leaders insisted, was not an action 
organization and should keep its research ―scientific‖ in conception in execution.26 
Even as Institute leaders rushed to disclaim aspirations to set up alternative 
diplomacy in the Pacific region, their international conferences in many ways had radical 
and far-reaching implications.  Rather than assuming delegates had fixed national 
perspectives, IPR organizers believed that intensive, multi-day sessions could lead to 
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greater empathy between them, and perhaps result in a modification of views.  Stanford‘s 
Ray Lyman Wilbur expressed this hope in the IPR method during a 1927 commencement 
speech: ―To see yourself as others see you, to view your own country through the 
questioning eyes of foreign neighbors, is a chastening and wholesome experience and one 
that millions must undergo if we are to deal successfully across the great ocean.‖27  To 
this end, roundtable discussions at IPR conferences were held in private session, out of 
public view.   Reporters were briefed at the end of such sessions regarding the summary 
of discussions, so that delegate anonymity could be preserved.  Off-the-record 
conversations were more likely to express frank and contrary viewpoints, but they also 
allowed participants to change their opinions from the beginning to the end of 
conferences.  Delegates were expected to return home with a wider perspective and a 
greater understanding for those with whom they disagreed.28  
   
EVOLVING CONCEPTIONS OF THE PACIFIC 
In the Pan-Pacific Union, Alexander Ford had promoted the notion of a Pacific 
family in contrast to the fractiousness and failed relationships of the old world.  This 
notion of entering into a new Pacific-only partnership excited many Americans like 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge who otherwise opposed the United States entering 
entangling international alliances, especially with Europe.  Some original IPR founders 
shared this enthusiasm.  ―If the Institute of Pacific Relations can further this sense of 
solidarity in the Pacific community,‖ General Secretary J. Merle Davis wrote in 1929, ―it 
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will justify its actions.‖29  But after the first few years of operation, IPR leaders began to 
take stock of their purpose, and gradually stepped back from the grand idea of creating an 
exclusive Pacific community of nations. Instead they began to temper their idealism with 
a more ―realistic‖ in their approach to regional problems.30  Many leaders of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations now concluded that Pacific questions were not unique, but inevitably 
tied into larger world questions.  The problems of the Pacific, in this view, were the 
products of commercial and cultural contact between Western and Eastern civilizations.  
European nations, accordingly, should therefore be active participants in the Institute‘s 
work.  As the 1930s wore in, the IPR worked to provide a forum for an open airing of 
differences among nations interested in the Pacific rather than a false front of uniformity 
by an invoked ―community.‖  
European colonial powers were not considered ―Pacific‖ nations at the original 
Hawaii gathering in 1925, but participants quickly realized that they could not be ignored 
in a full discussion of regional matters.  Delegates from Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada—the so-called ―Pacific Dominions‖—protested at the lack of participation from 
Great Britain.  World War I may have spurred greater independence in foreign affairs for 
the Dominions, but as members of the incipient British Commonwealth of Nations, they 
also felt constrained in expressing views on international relations without the presence 
of British delegates.31   As a result of this protest, Institute leaders invited Chatham 
House to organize a Pacific Relations committee, which in turn assembled a delegation to 
the 1927 conference and which would go on to serve as the British national council for 
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the remainder of the IPR‘s existence.  Other European powers soon followed.  In the 
1930s, councils in France and the Netherlands were established to participate in the 
Institute‘s research and conference program.  As IPR chronicler Tomoko Akami has 
noted, while many early leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations had grand visions for 
a new democratic regional order, they also acknowledged the overriding reality that the 
Asia-Pacific region was still dominated by the colonial powers, and must be included in 
any projects debating its future.32   
The presence of Chatham House in the Institute of Pacific Relations—and 
specifically, the participation of leading member Lionel Curtis—provided a significantly 
new conception of potential Pacific relationships after 1927.  Curtis‘ vision for the Pacific 
was one of continued British imperial control, with the active support of the British 
Dominions as well as United States, rather than a specifically regional union.   Having 
served under Lord (Alfred) Milner, High Commissioner of South Africa, as a young man 
during the South African union in 1910, Curtis went on to dedicate his life to the 
principle of imperial unity—that is, the assumption of British imperial burdens by the 
settler colonies themselves—and was often credited as being the ―prophet‖ of the 
Commonwealth idea through the establishment of Round Table debating societies in the 
Dominions.33  Curtis became one of the principal founders of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (Chatham House) in London in 1920, and fostered the development 
of similar institutes of international affairs in Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  With 
the creation of the Institute of Pacific Relations a few years later, Curtis saw an 
opportunity to fuse the regional interests of Britain and the Pacific Dominions, as well as 
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to coordinate American and British thinking on Pacific questions.  Indeed, it was Curtis‘ 
ultimate hopes for a shared Anglo-American approach toward world affairs that animated 
British involvement in the Institute of Pacific Relations.   
The suspicion of collusion between Great Britain and the United States was a 
matter of great sensitivity to Asians, and IPR leaders worked hard to dispel the notion 
that the Institute was merely a tool of Western ―imperialism,‖ a charge leveled at various 
times in the Chinese nationalist press.34  On its surface, the criticism was unjust: 
American delegates disagreed with British members over matters of colonial policy with 
increasing vigor in the following years, despite the best efforts of Curtis and Chatham 
House to win them over to a ―democratic imperialist‖ mindset.  American leadership 
overwhelmingly defined the Institute‘s international program for its first two decades, a 
situation that often agitated the denizens of Chatham House and reinforced divisions in 
the Western view toward Asia.  But on another level, critics of Western bias in the IPR 
had a point.  American money and personnel were the indisputable engines driving the 
Institute.  The conference proceedings, moreover, were conducted entirely in English, a 
fact that put Asian members at a disadvantage in roundtable discussions.  ―I think all the 
members from my country would agree with me in saying that we might have been able 
to participate more intelligently and intelligibly were it not for the difficulties in the 
language,‖ a Japanese delegate complained in 1927. ―What is more important, we might 
have secured for members of our group perhaps better and stronger men had it not been 
for the same difficulty.‖35  In ways large and small, the IPR‘s early years reflected its 
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Western origins, even if its European and American members were not always in accord 
with one another.   
Despite the built-in Western predominance in IPR funding and membership, 
Chinese and Japanese delegates largely supported the design and operation of the 
Institute‘s work.  At a 1927 roundtable discussion concerning the future of the IPR, one 
American delegate argued on behalf of cutting the size of the American delegation by 
half.  A Chinese member, however, declined to object, noting that more Americans were 
interested in Pacific affairs than other countries.36  Institute leaders decided to hold the 
next two international conferences in Japan (1929) and China (1931) to boost publicity 
and interest in the organization in those countries, a strategy that largely succeeded.  One 
Japanese participant in the 1927 IPR conference attributed growing Asian support for the 
Institute to the fact that the group had ―nothing to sell, nothing to teach and nothing to 
preach—in short, nothing to put over on the Far East.‖37  Westerners may have 
dominated the leadership of the organization, but they at least appeared genuinely 
interested in listening to alternative viewpoints rather than simply defending their own 
country‘s policies. 
One of the greatest impediments to creating a sense of solidarity among the 
peoples of the Pacific was not the division between West and East, as China‘s T.K. Zoo 
had implied in 1925, but rather between Japan and China.  This division became 
dramatically apparent during the Manchurian crisis in the fall of 1931.  For many years 
China had claimed legal control over the northeastern province, but Japan exercised 
considerable trading privileges in the region, including leasing rights over the South 
                                                                                                                                                 
Roundtable discussion, ―The New Diplomacy,‖ in J.B. Condliffe, ed., Problems of the Pacific, 1927, p. 
166. 
36 Roundtable discussion, ―Future of the Institute,‖ in J.B. Condliffe, ed., Problems of the Pacific, 1927, pp. 
196-217. 
37 Anonymous ―Japanese leader‖ quotation in Merle Davis, preface, in J.B. Condliffe, ed., Problems of the 
Pacific, 1929, p. vi. 
 44 
Manchurian Railway.  Tension over local authority escalated in the late 1920s, and boiled 
over on September 18, 1931, when a section of railroad track was dynamited near 
Mukden in an act of sabotage later attributed to Japanese military officers.  The explosion 
provided a pretext for the Japanese imperial army to invade Manchuria and occupy its 
principal cities.  The Manchurian crisis, as it became known, not only provided the 
greatest test for the League of Nations to that point, but also for Pacific internationalism 
associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations.  The Institute already had made plans 
for its biennial conference to take place in Hangchow, China in late October 1931, but 
anti-Japanese sentiment was running so high at that time that Institute leaders considered 
abandoning the meeting altogether.  At a meeting a mere one month after the Mukden 
incident, the Pacific Council, the governing body of the Institute, determined that the IPR 
could go forward with the conference, but they recommended moving the proceedings to 
the international settlement in Shanghai and reducing somewhat the overall delegate 
numbers.  It was a remarkable moment, then, when inside Shanghai‘s International 
Recreation Club on October 21, 1931, Dr. Hu Shih, the president of the conference, 
China‘s leading public intellectual and future ambassador to the United States, 
announced: ―This is the Fourth Biennial Conference.‖38  
During the course of the next 12 days, Chinese and Japanese members sat 
alongside other national delegates in roundtable discussions dealing with issues from 
trade relations to the more sensitive subject of diplomacy in the Pacific region.  Emotions 
were raw, few facts concerning the Mukden incident were established, and the League of 
Nations‘ response was still uncertain.  The Chinese government had submitted a formal 
appeal to the League for the apparent Japanese act of aggression, a move that many 
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Japanese delegates claimed would only hamper direct talks between the two countries.  
At times the discussion became so heated that several Japanese withdrew from the 
conference and refused to participate until they had received apologies from Chinese 
members.  But these moments were the exceptions rather than the rule.  Disagreements at 
the conference were resolved amicably and did not spill over into public demonstrations 
outside the conference, as many feared might happen.  Given the circumstances, 
observers were struck by the remarkable degree of cordiality shown by all participants.39  
The fact the conference took place at all was a signal triumph for the Institute‘s agenda 
and methods, Hu Shih remarked to the assembled delegates:  
It is not saying too much that … this conference will long be remembered, not 
only in the annals of our own Institute, but also in the history of all sister 
institutions of an international nature, as having set up a splendid precedent that 
all those who in peaceful times pride themselves as being internationally-minded 
must not desert the ideal of calm thinking, patient research and open-minded 
discussion at a time when folly reigns and passions carry the day.40    
IPR leaders left the conference with a sense of vindication for its purpose, and with an 
enhanced international reputation for its willingness to confront and illuminate difficult 
regional problems in an evenhanded manner. 
The Manchurian crisis deepened the resolve among Pacific internationalists to 
seek extra-diplomatic forms of resolving disputes.  IPR members agreed that prompt 
international action at the time of the initial Mukden incident might have prevented an 
escalation of the situation, yet none was forthcoming.  No disinterested friends of China 
and Japan were prepared to step forward and institute a process for inquiry and 
reconciliation.  Instead, Japan became increasingly disillusioned with the League of 
Nations and finally withdrew its membership in March 1933.  Yet the Institute of Pacific 
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Relations continued to boast Japanese and Chinese members throughout the decade, even 
as war clouds gathered over the two countries.  As the 1930s wore on, the IPR found 
itself as one of the increasingly few avenues for airing the ambitions and interests of the 
Chinese and Japanese people side by side, not simply their stated governmental policies.  
As an unofficial body, furthermore, participants at conferences could advance a broader 
array of suggestions for resolving these underlying conflicts than official figures might.  
Although Institute members had rejected the ―diplomatic‖ label only a few years before, 
the deepening crisis in the Pacific embroiled the group ever more in political questions 
and forced them to consider how they might act to help prevent future disputes.  The 
League of Nations had failed its first great test, but the Manchurian crisis had the 
interesting effect of elevating the profile of Pacific internationalism.  
    
EDWARD CARTER’S INSTITUTE 
Regional events may have catapulted the Institute of Pacific Relations to greater 
prominence in the 1930s, but its more political turn was also the product of new 
leadership—specifically, the Institute‘s ambitious new secretary-general, Edward C. 
Carter.  During his time at the helm of the IPR‘s international secretariat (1933-1946), 
Carter directed the Institute‘s programs with an unrelenting vision to transform the IPR 
into a body with real policy relevance.  Described as a ―veritable whirlwind of activity‖ 
by his research associate and later successor, William L. Holland, Carter was more of an 
organizer than an academic, and he had a gift for promoting the Institute through the 
cultivation of numerous contacts in the philanthropic, business and diplomatic worlds in 
several countries.41  A handsome man with a large head featuring a shock of white hair 
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and thick eyebrows, Carter was no shrinking violet.  Although his job as secretary-
general was designed specifically to help coordinate the activities of the various national 
councils, Carter concentrated ever more power within the international office, which 
eventually shifted its headquarters from Honolulu to New York City, next door to the 
American council‘s headquarters.  Many in Hawaii and the U.S. West Coast were 
suspicious of Carter‘s actions as favoring an East Coast perspective over their Pacific-
centered community-building mission.  They were not his only critics.  In subsequent 
years, Carter‘s unrelenting anti-colonialism would provoke anger and resentment by the 
European councils.  His force of personality, however, combined with his expert 
fundraising skills and familiarity with world leaders made Carter an indispensable figure 
during the Institute‘s most active years.  ―I do not think it overemotional to suggest that 
the IPR was in so many ways his creation and therefore should be regarded as his 
monument,‖ Holland concluded many years later.42  Through his extensive international 
contacts, Carter demonstrated the ability to act as a roving ambassador for the cause of 
Pacific internationalism. 
Born in Massachusetts in 1878, Carter showed a public spiritedness as early as his 
graduation from Harvard College in 1900, when he became the first director of Harvard‘s 
Phillips Brooks House, a center dedicated to religious and social work.43  Two years later, 
he took up a position with the international YMCA and was posted to India, where he 
served as national secretary in Calcutta from 1902-08 and again from 1911-17.  While 
there, Carter saw first-hand the impact of British imperialism and developed a fondness 
for the Indian people that lasted for the rest of his life.  Upon U.S. entry into World War 
I, Carter served as chief secretary of the YMCA attached to the American Expeditionary 
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Force in Paris (1917-19) and later as foreign secretary with the British YMCA (1920-22), 
where he became friends with Lionel Curtis and other members of the Round Table 
movement.  Based on this extensive international experience with the YMCA and 
expressed interest in the study of race and labor relations, Carter found himself personally 
involved in the early development of the Institute of Pacific Relations, traveling to the 
first conference in Hawaii in 1925 and one year later assuming the role of secretary to the 
American council.  He immediately made his mark as an expert organizer and fundraiser 
within the American council, and during a period of transition for the organization in 
1933, he was elected to the top administrator‘s post in the international secretariat‘s 
office.    
Because Carter was the central figure within the international IPR during the 
1930s and 40s, the question of his ideological inclinations has been a subject of often 
heated debate.  During and after World War II, critics accused him of harboring 
sympathy with Soviet and Chinese communism and (inadvertently or not) allowing the 
IPR to become a ―front‖ for Communist infiltration of American experts on Asia.44  
Carter was indeed a man of the left, but critics were wrong to peg him as driven by 
ideology. Looking back on this time, William Holland had a far more accurate 
description of his mentor as ―an old-fashioned Christian liberal,‖ with a deep concern for 
ordinary people, especially in the developing world.45  It is true that Carter saw 
international problems in largely economic terms.  Deepening poverty, he believed, led to 
the increasing disintegration of society and war, and thus his rhetoric was often class-
centered.  In a 1936 speech, for instance, Carter concluded that ―the peasants of Japan in 
their unequal struggle for food and clothing, the share-croppers of the United States 
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engulfed in an outworn system, the farmers of Alberta mobilizing to fight debt and soil 
depreciation, and the villages of China fighting their losing battle are all members of a 
great unled international community of ‗have-nots.‘‖46  But he was no propagandist for 
communist revolution.  Carter‘s aim was to rouse the ―haves,‖ especially Americans, to a 
sense of responsibility to help the less fortunate.47   
As secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Carter elevated 
colleagues who shared his vision for the Institute and the Pacific region in general.  One 
of the most notable of these figures was Owen Lattimore, who in 1933 became the new 
editor of Pacific Affairs, the IPR‘s quarterly journal.   Raised in China by his school-
teacher parents, Lattimore briefly attended Harvard College but received the bulk of his 
education about Asia firsthand through his extensive travels in Mongolia and Manchuria.  
Fluent in Chinese, Russian and Mongol, he was regarded as the foremost American 
expert on central Asia, and later became the longtime director of the Page School of 
International Diplomacy at the Johns Hopkins University (1939-53).  Even more than 
Carter, Lattimore later found himself a prominent target of McCarthyist attacks in the 
postwar period for his supposed communist bias, and a central figure in the blame-game 
for the ―loss‖ of China (see Chapter Five).  Lattimore was no more communist than 
Carter, but he shared Carter‘s broad anti-imperial sensibilities, and in the 1930s he set 
about to transform Pacific Affairs from a somewhat staid and anodyne journal into one 
that was far livelier and unafraid to carry bold opinion pieces sharply rebuking Japanese 
aggression.  Under Lattimore‘s direction in the 1930s, the journal became more engaged 
in the debates over world affairs and thus more subject to criticism.  ―Above all, we 
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attempt to avoid a ‗static‘ presentation of issues, but to show, instead, the way in which 
things are going and the way in which they are likely to go,‖ he wrote in an unsigned 
editorial in late 1938.48  This attitude was in line with the general temper of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations under Carter‘s helm, on the razor‘s edge between analysis and 
advocacy. 
One of Carter‘s greatest assets was his ability to cultivate powerful financial 
supporters to the Institute‘s side, most notably the Rockefeller Foundation.  As secretary 
of the American council in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Carter was an active and able 
fundraiser, securing upwards of $30,000 yearly from the Rockefellers even through the 
early difficult years of the depression.  As secretary-general of the international 
secretariat, Carter continued to draw from the same well, winning $50,000 per year for 
the international research fund several years running.  By the latter part of the decade, 
three sources—the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace and the Carnegie Corporation—contributed close to half of the American council‘s 
budget.  The American council, in turn, provided by far the greatest contribution to the 
international IPR‘s fund.  Rockefeller Foundation officials frequently urged Carter to 
broaden his contributor base, and kept the group on a year-to-year stipend, but they 
always came through, convinced of the Institute‘s unique contribution to Pacific research 
and international understanding.  Large contributions such as these continued to fund the 
bulk of the Institute‘s projects all the way through the 1940s.49   
The personal interest of John D. Rockefeller III himself in the IPR‘s activities was 
particularly valuable in putting the Institute on sound financial footing.  Rockefeller 
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attended the 1929 Institute conference in Kyoto, and afterwards maintained a close 
relationship with its program and with Carter in particular.  In early 1937, for instance, 
Rockefeller wrote a letter of introduction for Carter to Malcolm Aldrich, the president 
and chairman of the charitable organization the Commonwealth Fund.  ―While I very 
rarely write letters of this nature I am glad to do so in this instance for two reasons: first 
because I think that the Institute of Pacific Relations is doing a swell job, if I may use the 
expression, and second Mr. Carter is such a fine and exceedingly interesting person that I 
know you would enjoy meeting him,‖ Rockefeller wrote Aldrich.50  One year later, at the 
behest of Frederick Vanderbilt Field—a top American IPR staffer and wealthy scion in 
his own right—Rockefeller organized a dinner for Carter and invited William A.M. 
Burden, the investment banker and philanthropist.  ―During the evening,‖ Field boldly 
suggested to Rockefeller, ―you could subtly lead the conversation around to the Far East 
situation so that Carter would have the chance to hold forth on how much we know and 
how good we are.‖  Rockefeller did hold the dinner, and later reported to Field that Carter 
indeed had found his mark: ―Mr. Carter was grand, as usual.  He couldn‘t have been more 
interesting and I think everybody enjoyed it a lot.‖51  Through such gatherings Carter 
managed to increase the pool of IPR donors significantly.  Between 1935 and 1936 alone, 
the American council increased their number of contributors from 170 individuals and six 
companies to 452 individuals and 37 companies.52   
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By moving the Institute‘s international headquarters from Hawaii to New York 
City, Carter not only put himself in closer contact with American donors, but also 
signaled his interest in bringing a higher international profile for his projects.  Enlisting 
greater European and Soviet participation in the IPR thus became a priority.  After a few 
trips with fellow Institute officials to make contacts with Asian scholars in the USSR, 
Carter oversaw the creation of an active Soviet IPR council in late 1934, and welcomed 
two Soviet delegates to the 1936 IPR conference held in Yosemite, California.53  
Meanwhile, a Dutch IPR council, composed of businessmen and scholars from the 
Netherlands as well as the Netherlands East Indies, officially formed around the same 
time.  In addition, a French council organized itself and brought to Yosemite a small but 
enthusiastic delegation led by the leftist former prime minister Albert Sarraut.54  Upon the 
conclusion of the Yosemite conference, Sarraut traveled to New York and to Washington, 
D.C., where he met President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the White House and discussed 
the French position in the Pacific and other matters stemming from the IPR conference.  
Sarraut‘s report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs concluded that the French delegation‘s 
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trip to the United States was useful in overturning American misapprehensions regarding 
their position in Indochina, and that the French retained ―un prestige certain‖ among a 
healthy number of American citizens.55  With this growing interest of top intellectuals 
and politicians from around the world, Carter was well on his way to making the Institute 
a more representative as well as prominent international body. 
Carter‘s success in raising the profile of the Institute opened up new questions 
about the international body‘s non-governmental status.  The newly admitted French 
council was run through the Comité d‘études des problèmes du Pacifique (CEPP) with 
direct financial support from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.56  Sarraut and other 
leaders clearly saw the IPR as an informal means of keeping tabs on the Asia-Pacific 
region and influencing American public opinion.  The admittance of a Soviet council, 
meanwhile, may have been a triumph of inclusivity, but very few Institute leaders could 
argue that participants from the USSR were prepared to give their own view of foreign 
relations independent of the Kremlin.  European councils were not the only countries 
interested in using the IPR for their own purposes.  As Tomoko Akami has shown, the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was an active financial contributor and participant 
in the direction of the Japanese council.57  
In the United States, meanwhile, the American council had a far more 
complicated relationship with the State Department, largely because of the competing 
personalities of Edward Carter and Stanley Hornbeck, the chief of the Division of Far 
Eastern Affairs.  Hornbeck had been one of the IPR‘s founders when he was a lecturer at 
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Harvard.  Once in the State Department, he developed a reputation as one of the most 
influential East Asian experts in the country.  Hornbeck wielded an influence over 
American regional policy that few could match, yet his personality won few admirers.  
Contemporaries took note of his bullying behavior, his violent prejudices, and his 
undiplomatic behavior concerning matters with which he disagreed.  John Carter Vincent, 
who worked under Hornbeck in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, described his boss as 
―irascible and pigheaded.‖58  Now in the corridors of power, Hornbeck saw little reason 
to use the Institute in any way that might dilute his authority.           
During the 1930s, the American council of the IPR sought to elevate its profile by 
inviting government officials into its membership while at the same time asserting its 
independence from American policymaking.  Executive secretary Frederick V. Field 
wrote a series of letters in 1936 to Washington officials in the Department of State and 
Foreign Service officers working in Asia, asking them to join the IPR in a limited-
membership capacity.  Field explained the outreach program in a letter to Hornbeck: 
We like to have closely associated with our work a number of government 
officials as well as private citizens, but we do not invite the government officials 
either to attend our international conferences or to become officers of the 
organization.  In this way we feel that we have the benefit of a close connection 
with these persons without violating the private and unofficial nature of our 
activities and deliberations.59   
Field was a questionable figure, in Hornbeck‘s mind; the IPR official had recently 
circulated a memorandum on the purposes of American Far Eastern policy that Hornbeck 
deemed overly critical.60  But Field‘s outreach program did not overstep any bounds.  In 
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the end, Hornbeck told Foreign Service officials that the State Department would ―not 
seek to discourage‖ them from joining the American IPR.61  Numerous American consuls 
and high commissioners serving in Asia added their names to the IPR rolls, along with 
more high-ranking officials like Joseph C. Grew, Ambassador to Japan, and John V.A. 
MacMurray, Ambassador to Turkey and former chief of the Division of Far Eastern 
Affairs.   Others, however, declined the invitation, citing a conflict of interest with their 
official duties.  Such figures included Maxwell Hamilton, Hornbeck‘s successor at the 
Division of Far Eastern Affairs, as well as Francis B. Sayre, assistant secretary of state.62   
 Hornbeck‘s relationship with Edward Carter was especially fraught.  The 
autocratic State Department official could not have been more different from the suave 
IPR secretary-general.  Yet Carter was indisputably a useful source.  Carter‘s many 
private contacts in Asia gave him a broad perspective on regional issues, which he 
frequently shared with Hornbeck and other top officials in Washington.  After Carter 
returned from a trip to Asia in 1937, he paid a visit to Hornbeck, who then scheduled a 
meeting between Carter and Army and Navy intelligence officers at the War Department. 
Carter had been in Peiping at the time of the Marco Polo Bridge attack that formally 
launched the Sino-Japanese War.  He also described his travels to Manchuria, where he 
had met the senior Japanese administrator Naoki Hoshino, and gave his impressions of 
Japanese naval installations in North Korean ports, of which American army and naval 
intelligence had little information at the time.63  When Carter desired a visit with 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull in the spring of 1939 before another such trip, Hornbeck 
urged Hull to meet with him, calling the IPR secretary-general a valuable ―political 
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missionary,‖ and acknowledged that the Institute was ―very sympathetic‖ toward 
American policies in the Far East.64 
Despite Hornbeck‘s more than 20-year close association with Carter and the IPR, 
the State Department official nevertheless remained wary of the peripatetic Institute head.  
When writing letters of introduction for Carter to American consul generals in Shanghai, 
Hong Kong and elsewhere, Hornbeck called Carter a ―friend.‖  Yet significantly, in 
addition to the formal letters of introduction to these consuls, Hornbeck included a 
private note warning them about Carter‘s penchant for overstepping boundaries regarding 
his relationships with governmental figures: ―He has never quite grasped the line of 
distinction between what a responsible official can do and what a responsible official 
cannot do.‖  Hornbeck went on still further: 
In my own contacts with [Carter] since I became an officer of the Government, I 
have made it a point to try to be helpful and to be frank but always to be on guard 
against giving information which I would not be willing to have imparted to third 
parties.  … The Secretary of the IPR is of necessity walking on eggs and carrying 
eggs in a basket.  I am glad to be helpful toward preventing undesired breaking of 
eggs; and, incidentally, with that thought constantly in mind I am not putting any 
of my eggs in the pathway or in the basket.65     
Hornbeck clearly saw a sharp line dividing the State Department and that of the IPR, 
however sympathetic they may have been toward one another‘s work.  The Department‘s 
job was to help maintain American national interests abroad.  The IPR, however, had an 
international constituency, with a broad agenda to promote international understanding.  
It was a flexible mission, subject to the strategy of its headstrong secretary-general. 
The ambivalent reaction by Hornbeck to the IPR is important to note, especially 
in the context of postwar charges of collusion between the Institute and the State 
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Department‘s Far Eastern division over American policy in China.  IPR historian 
Tomoko Akami has pointed out that some Institute officials became increasingly ―state-
centered‖ during these years as the war drew nearer and public-private distinctions 
collapsed.66  Greater contact between private and public officials, however, did not 
necessarily mean a greater alignment in their policies.  In the case of Hornbeck, it only 
reaffirmed the distinctions between the work of American diplomats in Asia and the work 
of private Pacific internationalists.   
During the course of the 1930s, Edward Carter transformed the Institute of Pacific 
Relations from a community-building effort based in Hawaii into a serious international 
research institute and quasi-think tank for Asian and Pacific affairs. Scholars, 
businessmen and even diplomats joined the Institute as a means of receiving the latest 
information on the conditions of the people, land and economy in the Pacific region.  
Foundations pledged considerable financial support to the group, recognizing its unique 
contribution as a non-governmental organization.  In addition to its research agenda and 
publication record, the IPR‘s conferences earned an international reputation as a 
relatively objective and respectable forum for the airing of contentious issues, featuring 
national councils whose regional representation exceeded that of the League of Nations.  
Not surprisingly, governmental officials in Europe, North America and Asia saw IPR 
councils in their own country as useful entities to monitor if not control.  But despite the 
increasing state-centeredness of various national councils by the end of the 1930s, the 
IPR‘s international secretariat, under the direction of Carter, had an agenda separate from 
any one country, including the United States.  The mission of these Pacific 
internationalists ultimately was not to support or defend any one national interest, but 
rather work toward the reconciliation of regional interests through international research 
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projects and conferences.  The project of cultivating an international sensibility in the 
peoples of the Pacific, however, was still in its infancy, and would be tested even more 
severely as the war clouds gathering over the Pacific finally broke into a storm.  
 59 
Chapter Two 
“A True New Order”: Pacific Internationalists at War, 1938-1945 
―You will be glad to know that the IPR was manning its feeble guns when Japan 
struck,‖ Edward Carter wrote Sydnor H. Walker, a top Rockefeller Foundation official, 
on December 12, 1941.1 Five days earlier, Carter was attending a weekend regional 
conference at a Cleveland, Ohio, country club hosted by the American council of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, when the first newsflashes were relayed from the White 
House regarding the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.  The IPR secretary-general promptly 
announced the news to the stunned international gathering.  ―A few thought I was putting 
on an Orson Welles stunt,‖ he dryly recalled, ―but they soon realized the realities.‖  
Within moments, a few isolationist Republicans in attendance promptly declared their 
willingness to fight, and Europeans expressed relief that the United States would now 
finally become a wartime ally.   One of those in attendance, John W. Holmes, the new 
secretary of the Canadian Institute of International Relations, wrote to Carter immediately 
after the conference saying he hoped the attack would not sap the IPR‘s resolve but 
instead crystallize its purpose: ―The vigour and intelligence of the discussions should 
leave no doubt that the IPR is preparing and can prepare for a true new order in the region 
which is its special concern.‖2 
The outbreak of World War II was a boon to the IPR‘s profile.  The League of 
Nations may have shown itself to be impotent, but the spirit of internationalism remained 
stronger than ever.  As the most prominent regional organization operating in the Pacific, 
                                                 
1 Edward C. Carter to Miss Sydnor H. Walker, Dec. 12, 1941, in Rockefeller Foundation grant files, 
Record Group 1.1, Series 200, Box 351, Folder 4178, Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), Tarrytown, NY. 
2 John W. Holmes to Carter, quoted in Ibid. 
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the IPR found itself ideally situated to help the Allies.  The United States government 
found particular utility in the Institute‘s research and publication output, which catered 
both to policymakers and the public at large. Lauchlin Currie, special assistant to 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, wrote in 1942 that IPR-commissioned studies were of 
―distinct use‖ to the White House.  ―I do not know of any agency inside the government 
or out which is in a position to do the work which the Institute has been doing,‖ Currie 
concluded.  Meanwhile, the State Department and various military agencies purchased 
millions of copies of American IPR pamphlets during the war as an introduction to the 
Asia-Pacific region for American soldiers and university students.  Government officials 
praised the Institute‘s work as a useful means of educating Americans not only about the 
social and economic forces in Asia, but about longer-term foreign policy objectives in the 
region.  Sumner Welles, the acting U.S. secretary of state in 1942, touted the IPR‘s ability 
to develop ―an informed public opinion‖ on foreign affairs.  In honor of its wartime 
service, the American IPR received the Navy Certificate of Achievement.3 
This chapter focuses on the way in which Pacific internationalists took advantage 
of World War II to press forward their regional agenda.  It is not a comprehensive 
examination of the Institute of Pacific Relations‘ wartime conferences, an effort that has 
merited its own exhaustive study.4  Rather, this chapter examines the behind-the-scenes 
                                                 
3 At least one Army officer attempted to nominate the American IPR for a similar award but found that no 
Army commendation existed at that time for publishers of wartime materials.  He nevertheless wished to 
make clear to AIPR officials that they had ―made a definite contribution to the Army in this war and have 
more than earned any award the Army could give you.‖  Col. Joseph I. Greene to Miss Rosamond Lee, 
Nov. 19, 1945, in Box 104, ―U.S. Navy Award, November 1945,‖ Pacific Relations files, Columbia 
University archives (COL), New York.  
4 Yutoko Sasaki, ―The Struggle for Scholarly Objectivity: Unofficial Diplomacy and the Institute of Pacific 
Relations from the Sino-Japanese War to the McCarthy Era‖ (Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 2005).  
Sasaki’s dissertation demonstrates the way in which these wartime conferences encouraged extensive 
debates, especially between the United States and Great Britain, over the future of the colonial world.  For 
the wider context in which these debates took place, see Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United 
States and the Decolonization of the British Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) and 
Christopher G. Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1978).  It should be noted that Sasaki does not extend his analysis into the 
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maneuvering of Institute officials, especially Edward Carter, in the effort to shape private 
ties between Asia and the West.  As the following pages make clear, Carter certainly 
knew how to manipulate ties with state officials, most dramatically in his American 
government-sponsored trip to Asia in 1943.  This does not mean, however, that he was 
beholden to them, as Stanley Hornbeck and other State Department officials already 
recognized.  Carter and his Pacific allies maintained an independent vision of a post-
imperial world, a vision that often supported the more liberal elements of President 
Roosevelt‘s administration but also pushed them to stand up for the democratic ideals 
they espoused.   
Carter shepherded the IPR into playing an active role in the debate over the 
postwar world in at least two important ways.  First, in 1938 he initiated a far-reaching 
new research project called the Inquiry—modeled on the World War I-era effort—into 
the causes of the Sino-Japanese War and their possible resolution.  This project resulted 
in a series of reports, published in the early 1940s, which outlined possible regional 
solutions to the war.  Second, Carter personally involved himself in the development of 
new IPR initiatives in India, and acted as a facilitator of Indian-Chinese dialogue through 
his personal relationships with prominent Asian leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and 
Chiang Kai-shek.  Indian and Chinese nationalists alike saw the IPR as an important 
means for Asian intellectuals to solidify international connections outside of an imperial 
framework.  Through this informal dialogue as well as pamphleteering, Carter‘s Institute 
not only promoted the development of an independent Asia, but in fact actively forged 
the connections that would generate a greater postwar regional sensibility. 
   
                                                                                                                                                 
―unofficial diplomacy‖ of Institute officials on wartime trips to Asia, nor does he examine any of the 
Institute’s postwar conferences.  
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POST-WAR WORLDS 
In late 1937, within a few months of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, 
Carter formulated a new research project through the international secretariat that sought 
to examine the sources of the crisis and propose long-term solutions.  Called the Inquiry, 
the project proposal quickly earned a substantial $90,000 grant from the Rockefeller 
Foundation to sponsor a series of studies to examine the issue from different national 
perspectives.  The development of the Inquiry was significant because it made clear that 
the Institute of Pacific Relations was prepared to court controversy by tackling the most 
explosive and political issues, even as leaders professed the group‘s continued status as a 
disinterested and scholarly body—a tightrope that became considerably more perilous in 
the midst of war.  Another significant characteristic was the fact that the Inquiry was 
organized and run through the international secretariat of the IPR, and not its constituent 
national councils, which provided Carter and his staff with considerably more power over 
the direction and scope of the project.  If it had not been evident previously, the Inquiry 
showcased the international mission of the Institute, above and beyond the interests of 
any one nation. 
Carter‘s bold initiative met with almost immediate resistance.  The launch of the 
Inquiry series set into motion a protest movement by the Japanese council that would 
eventually result in their withdrawal from the IPR in early 1941.  Kenzo Takayanagi, a 
professor of English law at Tokyo Imperial University, had attended every IPR 
conference since 1925 and was taken aback when he learned of the Institute‘s new 
Inquiry project.5  The Japanese council was not consulted in advance, and Takayanagi 
reported that his fellow members felt as though the series was concocted behind their 
                                                 
5 Summary of conversations between members of the IPR Committee of Chatham House with Dr. 
Takayanagi and M. Dennery, Chatham House, Sept. 1, 1938, in CHA 6/1/6, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs archives (RIIA), London. 
 63 
backs.  Furthermore, the Japanese had little faith in the impartiality of the international 
secretariat‘s staff.  Carter, along with Research Secretary William Holland and Pacific 
Affairs editor Owen Lattimore had each made speeches in the wake of the outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese War provoking Japanese criticism, Takayanagi reported.  But the Japanese 
were not alone in their criticism of the project.  The British at Chatham House privately 
agreed with the Japanese critique of Carter, believing that the international secretariat 
should act merely as a liaison between national councils, and not engage in scholarly 
projects of its own.  G.E. Hubbard, an officer in the Foreign Office‘s Political 
Intelligence department, decried the Inquiry to Chatham House staffer Margaret Cleeve 
as evidence of ―sloppy internationalism,‖ with standards ―well below our own‖ and with 
a research direction that was ―vague and unsystematic.‖6  Hubbard even went so far as to 
recommend a reevaluation of Chatham House‘s affiliation with the IPR.  But whereas 
war ultimately cut off Japan from the Institute, British officials gamely soldiered on with 
their wartime allies in the IPR, determined to take their licks in an effort to reconcile 
strident American anti-colonialism and European control in Asia.  
Even more than attempting to understand the Sino-Japanese War, the Inquiry 
series set out to configure new arrangements for the region to ensure a lasting peace. In 
many ways the IPR was entering an already crowded field of scholars, prognosticators, 
and idealists all seeking to refashion the world in the midst of a global crisis.  Those with 
an Atlantic bias already had a clear lead in proposing new forms of international 
cooperation, especially between the United States and Europe, as the European troubles 
deepened in the 1930s.  Lionel Curtis‘ Civitas Dei7 repurposed his older arguments for 
the unification of the British Commonwealth and the United States, while the American 
                                                 
6 G.E. Hubbard to Miss Margaret Cleeve, Jan. 8, 1940, in CHA 6/4/51, RIIA. 
7 Lionel Curtis, Civitas Dei (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939). 
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author Clarence Streit‘s Union Now (1939)8 offered a variation on the same theme: a 
federal union of world democracies, eventually leading to a common world government.  
But while these authors made an effective case for cooperation between the United States 
and Europe, they had little to say about the Pacific region.  With the Japanese invasion 
and occupation of French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and perhaps 
most dramatically, the fall of the British naval base at Singapore in February of 1942, it 
suddenly became clear that the old imperial order had come to an end.  But what would 
replace this order?  Could former colonies survive on their own as viable democracies?  
What kind of regional structure could support their efforts?  And finally, what relation 
should such a potential regional organization have with a new international order at the 
conclusion of the war?  
Through its Inquiry series, the Institute of Pacific Relations took the lead in 
assessing potential postwar regional solutions for the various countries in ―Southeast 
Asia,‖ a term that the Institute helped bring into existence.9  One of the first major 
monographs of the series was Percy E. Corbett‘s Post-War Worlds, published in 1942. 
Corbett, a Canadian professor of international law, taught at McGill University and later 
at Yale University.  His association with the Institute of Pacific Relations was a close 
one; he later served as head of the Canadian national council and eventually became the 
chairman of the IPR‘s Pacific Council.  In Post-War Worlds, Corbett proposed the 
creation of an Eastern League, first through the cooperation of Western powers, but 
ultimately one that could function largely on its own.10  The League‘s organization would 
                                                 
8 Clarence K. Streit, Union Now: The Proposal for Inter-Democracy Federal Union (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1940).   
9 Many give credit to Lord Mountbatten‘s Southeast Asia Command as the origin of the term, but William 
L. Holland noted that ―Southeast Asia‖ was used in several IPR publications as early as 1941.  Paul F. 
Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations: The Memoirs of William L. Holland (Tokyo: 
Ryukei shosha, 1995), pp. 123-4.   
10 P.E. Corbett, Post-War Worlds (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942), p. 74. 
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include a non-aggression pact, a regional assembly, a military commission, Pacific court, 
a joint economic and financial commission, as well as a commission for social 
legislation.  The essential ―nucleus‖ of the League would include China, Japan, India and 
the Indonesian Union (consisting of Netherlands East Indies, Indochina, Malaya, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Burma).  Corbett supported colonial self-determination, but 
claimed that individual national freedom must give way to the larger imperatives of 
community. Corbett‘s regional approach attempted to bridge the claims of nationalism 
and sovereignty on the one hand with the promise of international peace and 
cooperation—a compromise that other IPR members would attempt to forge in the 
coming years.11   
Corbett‘s regional scheme was advanced in a special supplemental edition of 
Fortune magazine in August 1942.  The editors of Fortune, under the direction of their 
Asia-oriented publisher and IPR trustee Henry Luce, were similarly bold in their vision 
for fashioning Southeast Asia.  They proposed an ambitious plan to create a ―new and 
somewhat experimental state‖ out of Thailand, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and 
Portuguese Timor—a regional federation.  The editors acknowledged the challenge of 
federating such a diverse population—―illiterate, heterogeneous, completely lacking in 
common traditions or political training‖—into a single unit, yet they were not deterred.  
They emphasized some broad similarities among them: pre-capitalist, agrarian societies, 
whose primary social unit was the village and the patriarchal family, and who all felt a 
shared sense of exploitation at the hands of European imperialists. But in contrast to 
Corbett‘s Eastern League, which proposed a diminishing Western presence, Luce and his 
Fortune editors advocated a more paternalistic ―Pacific Council,‖ composed of all 
members of the United Nations whose interests touched on the Pacific—not to be 
                                                 
11 P.E. Corbett, Supplement to “Post-War Worlds,” Secretariat Paper No. 3, Eighth Conference of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, Mont Tremblant, Quebec, Canada (Dec. 1942), pp. 8-9. 
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confused with the IPR‘s governing board by the same name.  The United States would be 
allowed, through this scheme, to keep island bases in the Pacific as ―an international 
highway by which the freedom of the Pacific may be protected.‖12  The editors at Fortune 
insisted that the creation of a Pacific Council as a final judicial arbiter over Pacific 
matters would not be a renewed form of imperialism, but rather ―a new international 
framework in which the creative spirit of East and West can work dynamically together 
for a better world,‖ a view that could have been taken verbatim from the pages of an IPR 
journal.13 
Within the State Department‘s Far East division, discussions about the potential 
for a federation scheme in Southeast Asia provoked added interest in the summer of 
1942.  One draft memorandum supported the idea that the countries involved—the 
Philippines, French Indochina, Netherlands East Indies, Burma, and possibly Thailand—
could function as a unit, with a central capital in Manila.  The proposal justified such 
federation as a natural grouping, claiming that the inhabitants were almost all engaged in 
the production of raw materials and spoke ―related Malayo-Polynesian languages and are 
racially interrelated.‖  The memorandum summarily dismissed potential problems 
regarding the association of independent and dependent states with a single sentence: 
―Differences in sovereignty need not interfere with a federation of the type in mind.‖  
One of the first duties of this federation, the memorandum continued, would be to adopt 
common programs for universal education, set into motion steps for greater political 
autonomy, and give assurances regarding the establishment of liberal economic policies. 
Indeed, the primary benefit of such a federal arrangement, this memo suggested, would 
be a guarantee of an open door in Southeast Asia, ―to assure to all the peoples of the 
                                                 
12 Fortune, Supplement: The United States in a New World, II: Pacific Relations (Aug. 1942): 1-12. 
13Ibid., p. 8. 
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world equality of opportunity to acquire on a non-discriminatory basis for legitimate and 
peaceful purposes the products of the area within the federation.‖14  Economic 
opportunity for American businesses was now added to strategic advantages in favoring a 
regional organization in Southeast Asia. 
By the time of the IPR‘s international conference in December 1942, there was 
considerable enthusiasm for new regional association in the Pacific.  Over 10 days in 
Mont Tremblant, Quebec, delegates discussed various possibilities for a postwar order.  
One of the most talked-about plans was initiated by Lord Hailey, the chairman of the 
British delegation and one of the most respected colonial experts in the United Kingdom.  
In his opening address to the conference, Hailey proposed the creation a ―Pacific Zone 
Council,‖ composed of the major sovereign powers in the region, which would act to 
safeguard the peace in Asia through military and civil activities, but also to create joint 
policies to foster economic development of the area. Rather than simply acquiesce to the 
liquidation of British Pacific colonies, Hailey offered that the creation of a Pacific Zone 
Council would oversee ―the periodic review of the progress made in the promotion of 
self-governing institutions in the dependencies, and in the improvement of their standard 
of living.‖15  Hailey‘s regional council essentially invited local sovereign powers—
particularly the United States—to join in the administration of the regional dependencies, 
rather than submit them to direct international supervision.16  It was an ingenious way to 
acquiesce to the burst of Asian regionalism but at the same time ensure Western control. 
                                                 
14 ―Indonesian or Malaysian Federation,‖ Document P-42, Aug. 14, 1942, in RG 59, Lot File 54D 109, 
Philippine and Southeast Asia Division, 1944-58, Microfilm C0014, Reel 6, National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 
15 Lord Hailey, ―A British View of a Far Eastern Settlement,‖ War and Peace in the Pacific: A Preliminary 
Report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations on Wartime and Post-war Cooperation 
of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East, Mount Tremblant, Quebec, December 4-14, 1942 
(New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943), pp. 6-15. 
16 The same essential invitation to the Americans came from South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts in 
the pages of Life magazine later that month.  In his article, Smuts advocated a system of ―enlarged colonial 
units,‖ grouping them together for greater ease of administration, and handing over the responsibility of 
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Hailey‘s proposed Pacific Zone Council suddenly altered the dynamics of the 
debate over regional machinery in the Pacific.  Such a council, if initiated, could serve to 
refashion the old colonial empires but not dismantle them. This was not the ―true new 
order‖ Carter envisioned for the post-war world, nor was it what many Asian nationalists 
contemplated.  Not surprisingly, Chinese and Indian participants at the 1942 conference 
offered different emphases regarding postwar regional solutions.  K.M. Panikkar, one of 
the Indian observers, believed that such a regional scheme should place India in the 
driver‘s seat.17  The former editor of the Hindustan Times and future Indian ambassador 
to China insisted that India could take the lead in a post-Japanese ―co-prosperity sphere‖ 
for the countries of Southeast Asia.  Panikkar warned that the prospects of a regional 
economic breakdown in Southeast Asia were real, and only the establishment of closer 
economic and political ties between India and Southeast Asia could help avert such a 
regional calamity.  Meanwhile, S.R. Chow, a Chinese international relations professor 
living in the United States, submitted a data paper in which he touted the idea of a 
―Pacific Association‖ including China, the Soviet Union, India, the United States, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Great Britain, Japan and Thailand.  
While Chow welcomed the participation of other countries in his planned association, 
China served as the true linchpin.  A fully restored China, free from foreign economic 
and political interference, he wrote, could be a decisive player in gradually leading the 
way to Asian democracy, as well as a ―great moral force for peace and justice throughout 
the whole region.‖18 
                                                                                                                                                 
general or common policies to a regional commission or council.  Smuts said he had no doubt that the 
―partnership‖ of the United States in ―overhead colonial controls would be cordially welcomed‖ by the 
British Commonwealth.  ―The British Colonial Empire,‖ Life, Vol. 13, No. 26 (Dec. 28, 1942): 11-14. 
17 Panikkar‘s data paper to the IPR conference would later be expanded and published as The Future of 
South-East Asia: An Indian View (New York: Macmillian, 1943). 
18 S.R. Chow, Winning the Peace in the Pacific (New York: Macmillan, 1944), pp. 91-94. 
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Edward Carter and other IPR leaders recognized that any workable postwar 
solution for the region could not simply be dictated by Westerners but must have the 
active involvement of Asian powers—most importantly, China and India.  These two 
countries boasted the oldest civilizations in Asia, yet they were just beginning to think of 
themselves as regional powers unto themselves through their respective nationalist 
movements.  One of Carter‘s principal wartime objectives was to reconcile the enormous 
ambitions of these two large countries and facilitate an international sensibility among 
their leading intellectuals.  It was not an easy task, as the countries themselves were 
internally divided.  In India, Congress party and Muslim League adherents vied for 
preeminence in the nationalist uprising against British rule.  Meanwhile in China, 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek‘s ruling Kuomintang nationalist party was increasingly 
defensive against the growing insurgency of Mao Tse-tung‘s Chinese Communist 
movement.  These internal political debates starkly delineated India and China‘s contacts 
with the outside world.  But through Carter‘s deep connections in both countries, he 
helped initiate Sino-Indian relationships that would alter Asian international relations for 
years to come. 
     
INDIA AND THE PACIFIC  
Edward Carter was convinced that a critical foundation for any ―true new order‖ 
in postwar Asia was to have an independent India take on greater regional leadership, yet 
his role in helping this process has been overlooked.  During World War II, Indian 
nationalists escalated their rhetoric against imperial control and advocated developing 
their own approach to international questions, distinct from that of the British Raj.  A 
major problem was that there was little institutional apparatus to develop such a 
perspective.  The only foreign relations think-tank in India, the Indian Institute of 
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International Affairs (IIIA), had been founded in 1935 as a direct product of Chatham 
House, and was generally deferential to the Government of India.  Carter, whose interest 
in and relations with India traced back to his pre-World War I days as a YMCA officer 
there, set out to change matters.  Through his numerous contacts with prominent Indian 
intellectuals, especially Jawaharlal Nehru, Carter helped encourage a movement to 
organize a new organization, the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), which 
spearheaded the first Asian Relations Conference (1947) and served for decades as 
India‘s primary independent international relations think-tank.  
The story of Carter‘s role in the development of the Indian Council of World 
Affairs has greater significance than merely revising the early institutional history of this 
specific organization.  First, an understanding of the influence of the IPR on Indian 
intellectuals helps explain the way in which their international interests developed in a 
specifically Pacific sense, especially regarding India‘s relations with China and Southeast 
Asia.  Second, the prospect of affiliation with the IPR boosted Indian internationalists on 
the world stage long before formal independence.  Finally, this episode alters our 
understanding of the origins of Asian regionalism and its consequences for the postwar 
East-West partnership.  Western internationalists, working in tandem with Asian leaders, 
helped foster regional relationships that would define the post-colonial order.  Carter‘s 
success in nurturing an independent Indian IPR national council tested Anglo-American 
relations, but generated enormous goodwill on the part of Indian intellectuals that carried 
over into the postwar period. 
The manner in which Carter carried out his India initiative was indicative of the 
ability of a uniquely well-connected private citizen to navigate the worlds between 
private and official state business in multiple countries.19 Furthermore, it was an effort 
                                                 
19 The following account is partially drawn from Edward Carter‘s own remembrance of events many years 
later, and in which he, not surprisingly, cast himself in a central role and favorable light.  Carter was 
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that developed over the course of many years.  Well before the war, in 1934, Carter and 
his wife were traveling in England when Carter‘s British friend Philip Kerr (now Lord 
Lothian) invited him over to one of Kerr‘s ancestral homes in Norfolk, in East Anglia.  
Among the other guests was Sir Austen Chamberlain, the former British foreign 
secretary.  Like John D. Rockefeller, III, and his dinner guests on other occasions, 
Chamberlain was favorably impressed by the new IPR secretary-general and invited him 
to a private luncheon in London to discuss Asian affairs.  Upon learning that Carter was 
about to travel through Asia, Chamberlain offered to put him in touch with the Viceroy of 
India, Lord Willingdon.  When Carter and his wife arrived in Bombay a few weeks later, 
Willingdon extended an invitation for them to stay at the Viceroy‘s House in New Delhi.  
For a few days, Carter answered questions about the IPR and the Far East from Viceroy 
and Lady Willingdon, as well as their guests.  During the course of these discussions, 
Carter made clear that he did not yet recommend the formation of an Indian IPR council, 
but instead merely wished to establish direct contact with relevant research institutions 
and prominent intellectuals, a project of which the Viceroy approved.20 
Carter recognized that the question of Indian representation at IPR conferences 
was a delicate matter.  Years earlier, in 1929, Chatham House had agreed to allow one 
Indian, Dr. S.K. Datta, to attend the IPR gathering in Kyoto as an observer.  Datta, who 
had served a term as a vice regal nominee on the Legislative Assembly and attended the 
second Round Table conference in London at the invitation of Mohandas Gandhi, was 
someone trusted by both British officials and Indian nationalists, and said nothing to 
                                                                                                                                                 
writing to Allen Wardwell, a lawyer who was helping the IPR during its defense at the McCarran 
subcommittee hearings in 1952.  Carter was responding to charges that his contacts with prominent Soviet 
figures was somehow anomalous to his work as IPR secretary-general by recounting other such episodes of 
high-level discussions.  Carter to Wardwell, March 5, 1952, in Box 9, Folder 8, Edward C. Carter papers, 
University of Vermont archives (UVM), Burlington.  
20 Edward C. Carter to R.C.M. Arnold, Chatham House, April 4, 1939, quoted in ―Indian Representation at 
the IPR Conferences,‖ CHA 6/2/38, RIIA. 
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upset the British delegation.  But in the mid-1930s the opportunity to create a full Indian 
council was not yet feasible.  It was difficult to find Indians, such as Datta, who were 
both knowledgeable about regional matters and politically palatable to all sides, 
especially given the context of the ongoing debates over the future of Indian home rule.  
Furthermore, the IPR constitution did not yet list India as a country eligible for 
membership; it did not border the Pacific Ocean, or have colonial holdings there. 
Nevertheless, Carter‘s conversations with the Viceroy, Datta and others convinced him 
that an Indian IPR could render valuable service as long as it was ―authentically 
Indian‖—in other words, representative of the people as well as free from the patronage 
of the Viceroy and other British and Indian government officials.21  
Before IPR affiliation could even be considered, an appropriate Indian group 
needed to form.  Within months after Carter‘s 1934 visit, one possible organization 
emerged when Chatham House announced that it had established a branch in India.  The 
Indian Institute of International Affairs (IIIA) was modeled on other Commonwealth 
institutes (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) that grew out of the Round Table 
movement, and was dedicated to the independent inquiry of international relations.  The 
chairman of the IIIA was Ramasamy Mudaliar, a senior leader in India‘s Justice Party 
and editor of their journal.  But while Mudaliar was a respected politician, some Indian 
nationalists dismissed him as a British puppet.22  A member of the Council of the 
Secretary of State for India, Mudaliar was knighted in 1937 and would go on to serve on 
the Viceroy‘s Executive Council (1939-42) as well as in the Imperial War Cabinet (1942-
45).  Unsurprisingly, Mudaliar‘s Indian Institute did not seek to launch a research 
program that challenged the British in any way.  So when Carter wished to receive an 
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22 Editorial, National Call (Delhi), Oct. 28, 1942.  
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―authentically Indian‖ point of view in the late 1930s, he chose to write either Datta, who 
was then the principal of Forman College in Lahore, or increasingly, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
the Congress Party leader at the vanguard of the independence movement.23 
Early in the summer of 1939 Carter was in the midst of visiting Japan and China 
on Institute of Pacific Relations business, and had just met with Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek when an urgent letter arrived from Datta indicating that he and Nehru wished to 
meet with Carter in India regarding the establishment of an IPR affiliate.24   The 
secretary-general flew into Allahabad, where they originally had intended to meet, but 
Nehru was stranded in Bombay due to monsoons.  The three men decided instead to take 
separate trains and meet in the small town of Itarsi, halfway between Allahabad and 
Bombay.  By then, Nehru was a well-known political figure, and word of his arrival 
leaked to the public. Thousands of people greeted his sudden arrival at the train platform, 
but Nehru, Datta and Carter soon found a quiet place to talk in the home of an English 
Quaker missionary.  As Carter recalled years later, the three of them spent nearly 12 
hours discussing the problems of India as well as sharing thoughts on Japan and China.25  
Nehru‘s long interest in Indian-Chinese partnership, it can be argued, began on this day.   
Toward the end of their marathon discussion, Carter put into motion a plan that 
would bring together Jawaharlal Nehru and Chiang Kai-shek for the first time. Carter told 
Nehru that it was of the ―utmost importance‖ that he visit China himself. Nehru replied 
that he had never been formally asked.   So upon his return to Allahabad, Carter cabled 
Liu Yu-Wan, the secretary of the Chinese Institute of Pacific Relations, and suggested 
that the group invite the Indian leader to China.  Carter then boarded his plane for 
Amsterdam.  By the time Carter landed in Europe, Nehru had already cabled, explaining 
                                                 
23 Edward C. Carter to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Feb. 13, 1940, in Box 7, Folder 7, Carter papers, UVM. 
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25 Ibid. 
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that he had an invitation not only from the Chinese IPR council but also from the 
Generalissimo himself.  Nehru asked what he should do.  Carter replied in one word: 
―Accept.‖  Years later, Carter recalled Nehru‘s remarkable visit to China in August 1939: 
[Nehru] flew to Chunking as the guest of the Generalissimo and received an 
overwhelming reception.  He had an exceptional opportunity for a very long talk 
with the Chiangs for, in the middle of a big state dinner in his honor, there was a 
Japanese air raid on Chunking.  The Chiangs took Nehru alone to one of those 
deep shelters in the cliffs of war-time Chunking, where for several hours, under 
rather dramatic circumstances, the three of them were able to quietly discuss the 
total Asian situation and to begin to examine all the common problems of the two 
most populated countries of the world: China and India.26 
Nehru‘s visit to China was cut short by the outbreak of war in Europe, but this trip 
initiated a broader India-China relationship for next several years, in which nationalists in 
both countries began to speak of one another in a fraternal manner.27 Carter‘s role in 
helping bring together these Indian and Chinese leaders made him a trusted figure, and 
made the IPR a natural site for future Asian regional collaboration.  
The outbreak of war between Japan and the Allies in December 1941 thrust India 
directly into the heart of Pacific matters, and made the question of their participation in 
the IPR even more pressing.  As Carter began planning the next international IPR 
conference, set for late 1942 in Mont Tremblant, Quebec, he contacted his old friend 
Datta and asked him to be a participant.  Datta, who was by then close to retiring from 
Forman College, responded with enthusiasm, and noted that he had just seen Nehru for 
the first time since he and Carter met with him in 1939.  ―I reminded [Nehru] that it was a 
result of that visit that he had paid a visit to Chungking,‖ Datta wrote Carter.  Datta 
himself remained an enthusiastic campaigner for Indian-Chinese collaboration. In fact, he 
had recently written Nehru asking what chances there were of allowing Indian men to 
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sign up and join the Chinese army if the Indian army had no place for them.  (Not good, 
Nehru implied in his response.)  In any case, Datta felt that Carter was just the man who 
was needed more than ever to help ―link up‖ the United States, Great Britain, India and 
China. ―Your place is in India,‖ Datta pleaded. ―You could carry on your work on Pacific 
Relations in this country.‖28  But Datta‘s death a few months later, in addition to Nehru‘s 
jailing during the ―Quit India‖ campaign in the summer of 1942, stripped Carter of his 
two most trusted correspondents in India.  
Carter resolved to have a diverse Indian presence at the December 1942 IPR 
conference, but any prospective group had to be cleared through the Viceroy of India, 
Lord Linlithgow, who had replaced Willingdon in 1936.  Linlithgow clearly had no 
interest in encouraging Indian nationalists to travel abroad to an international conference, 
especially given the uncertainty surrounding the ―Quit India‖ movement.  In August of 
1942, Mohandas Gandhi called for the immediate independence of India, which sparked a 
national civil disobedience movement that quickly spread throughout India.  Fearing 
greater unrest during a critical period of the war, Linlithgow ordered the arrest of Gandhi, 
Nehru and most of the top Congress party‘s leadership, where many would remain 
incarcerated for the duration of the war.  Carter wrote to Lord Halifax, himself a former 
Viceroy of India and later British foreign secretary, as well as Sir Girija Bajpai, a 
member of the Viceroy‘s Executive Council, to help plead a case to include a ―wider and 
more representative‖ body of Indian citizens at the December conference.29  Linlithgow 
was in a bind.  He could not simply disregard Carter‘s efforts to bring Indians to the IPR 
conference, as it was important to maintain good relations with wartime allies, especially 
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the United States.  Yet he also could not afford to allow the potential public relations 
disaster of Indian dissent on an international stage.    
In the end the Viceroy chose to distance himself from the situation by handing 
over the responsibility for choosing the Indian delegates to Ramaswami Mudaliar, the 
chairman of the Indian Institute of International Affairs.  All sections of the Indian press, 
from the Congress party to the Muslim League, derided the resulting delegation as 
―packed‖ in favor of British interests.30  In addition to the ―British creation‖ Mudaliar as 
chairman, the group included Sir Muhammed Zafrulla Khan, a Muslim judge who was 
also on the Viceroy‘s Executive Council; Diwan Bahadur S.E. Runganadhan, a Christian 
who was also a member of the Council of the Secretary of State for India; K.M. Panikkar, 
foreign minister of Bikaner; and finally, Rai Begum Shah Nawez, a female Muslim 
League politician and member of the National Defense Council.  ―Between the five there 
are two things in common,‖ Delhi‘s National Call hooted derisively.  ―They do not 
represent any group of men in this country, and they can all speak very well if they are 
appropriately briefed, on any subject.‖31  For Linlithgow, however, the decision 
represented a way to avoid a controversial matter. 
The selection of the Indian group by Mudaliar stirred dissent not only in the 
nationalist community, but also within the Indian Institute itself.  Some pointed out that 
the Indian group was appointed by Mudaliar personally, not through the Institute, and 
that the group included figures who were not even members of the IIIA.  One of the most 
vociferous opponents of the selection process was Dr. H.N. Kunzru, a Liberal politician 
and member of the Indian Institute‘s governing council.  The Indian Institute was never 
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consulted on the subject of the IPR delegation, Kunzru insisted in a public statement he 
issued November 3, 1942, and therefore all those chosen must be considered as the 
―personal nominees‖ of Mudaliar.  Kunzru proceeded to lament the fact that the 
composition of the delegation meant Indians would only provide an official point of 
view, which ran counter to the ideals of the IPR as well as the Indian Institute‘s own 
constitution, which barred the group from disseminating governmental propaganda.  
―Any delegation from India should consist predominantly of non-officials and be led by a 
non-official Indian,‖ Kunzru complained.32  Because of the ―irregular and autocratic‖ 
methods employed by Mudaliar and the resulting ―great injury‖ to the reputation of the 
Institute, Kunzru announced a protest movement against the selection of the delegates.  
Although he and his fellow dissenters did not succeed in changing the members of the 
Indian group at the conference, Kunzru made clear that many Indian intellectuals 
preferred to be represented by more independent voices on the world stage.     
British leaders were understandably pleased with the final selection of the Indian 
group for the 1942 international IPR conference in Canada.33  What had first promised to 
be a public relations nightmare for them now had distinctly rosier prospects. The British, 
to be sure, were unhappy that Carter had put India and Burma on the agenda for the 1942 
conference; after all, they had never before been considered ―Pacific‖ concerns, and the 
British preferred to keep such matters internal to the empire and thereby avoid public 
debate.34  Moreover, they were deeply suspicious of Carter‘s Indian ―friends‖ in the 
                                                 
32 H.N. Kunzru statement to press, ―India and the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference,‖ Nov. 3, 1942, 
transcribed in Rockefeller Foundation files, Record Group 1.1, Series 200, Box 356, Folder 4232, RAC. 
33 For a full report on the conference proceedings, see Institute of Pacific Relations, War and Peace in the 
Pacific: Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations on Wartime and 
Post-war Cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East, Mount Tremblant, Quebec, 
December 4-14, 1942 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943). 
34 Margaret Cleeve of Chatham House explained to W.J. Hinton of the Foreign Office that they considered 
protesting the inclusion of Indian topics at the conference from a constitutional point of view, but decided 
against it: ―The IPR Committee thrashed the whole problem out at length and finally decided that it was 
better to face the fact that the Americans at the IPR Conference, and possibly the Canadians, intended as 
 78 
Congress party.  As Chatham House staffer Margaret Cleeve bluntly put it, Carter‘s 
approach to India ―is distinctly detached—from British interests.‖35  But when they heard 
about the friendly delegation assembled by Mudaliar, they grew considerably more 
amenable.  Once in Quebec, the British delegates watched with amusement as Mudaliar 
and his fellow Indians urged restraint and moderation regarding Indian independence at 
the IPR roundtable discussions.  ―Ramaswami and his Indian lot were, I think, the prize 
turn,‖ Sir Frederick Whyte gushed to Cleeve a week after the conference ended, praising 
Mudaliar‘s ―patience and realism,‖ the ―feminine performance‖ of Rai Begum Shah 
Nawez, and even the ―vigorous‖ contribution of the aging Zafrulla Khan.36  The British 
had endured some sharp questioning at the conference, but they felt confident that they 
and the Indians had presented a strong defense of imperial policies.            
 Carter was no doubt disappointed with the Indian group‘s fidelity to British 
control, but the 1942 conference succeeded in putting India on the IPR agenda, where it 
would remain a central concern for the organization.  Furthermore, Indian involvement in 
the IPR publicized the fact that Indians were beginning to think of themselves as future 
regional powers in their own right, as evidenced by Panikkar‘s data paper on the regional 
development of Southeast Asia.37  With Indian intellectuals now engaged in the Pacific 
region, the IPR‘s governing Pacific Council voted to amend the Institute‘s constitution to 
allow India to put a group forward as a potential national council in its own right, and not 
simply be involved as unofficial observers.  Carter leaped into action, organizing a small 
IPR conference on India in the war effort in Princeton, New Jersey one weekend in April 
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1943.38  One of the principal conclusions from the gathering was that the United States 
was sorely lacking in information on India, and that a non-partisan organization like the 
Institute of Pacific Relations was well-situated to embark on such a project.39 After the 
meeting, Carter coolly wrote to his British colleagues regarding his intentions:  ―As our 
contacts with India multiply, which we hope they will, we will endeavor to keep you 
informed.‖40  British observers could only wring their hands.  W.J. Hinton, an official 
with the Foreign Office working at the wartime office for the British Information Service 
in New York City, attended the Princeton conference and reported to Chatham House that 
he regarded Carter‘s initiative as ―dangerous,‖ inasmuch as Hinton had ―little confidence 
in the impartiality of the IPR research.‖41 Yet there was very little the British could do: 
India had now been moved into the province of the Pacific internationalists in the IPR. 
Within the next few months, Carter helped usher in a brand new Indian 
organization for the study of world affairs.  During a visit to India in September 1943, 
Carter met with dissidents from the Indian Institute of International Affairs, including 
H.R. Kunzru.  The Indian leader told Carter that they were prepared to form a new 
organization—the Indian Council of World Affairs—and were interested in the 
possibility of affiliating with the IPR.  Upon hearing of these meetings, a Government of 
India officer from the External Affairs Department, Hugh Weightman, called Carter into 
his office and berated the IPR secretary-general for meeting with Kunzru and interfering 
in internal Indian matters.  Weightman alleged that Kunzru was manipulating the IPR to 
create a schism among Indian intellectuals, and that his breakaway group ―could not 
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succeed.‖42  The Government of India clearly saw the threat of a new organization where 
members were dedicated to an independent Indian view of foreign affairs, distinct from 
the British imperial perspective. Weightman‘s intimidating tactics, however, were 
ineffective.  Within weeks, Kunzru and other dissidents established the Indian Council of 
World Affairs, boldly severing ties between Indian intellectuals and Chatham House.  A 
new era in the study of Indian international affairs had begun.   
 
WARTIME CHINA AND THE IPR 
If the political situation in India made Edward Carter‘s initiatives sensitive, they 
were doubly so for China.  In India, Carter merely had to usher in a new organization in 
the face of British reluctance.  But in China, the IPR secretary-general faced the problem 
of maintaining good relations with an existing Chinese IPR council, which was itself 
confronting a double threat: war with Japan and a growing communist insurgency.  The 
Chinese council had close ties with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the nationalist leader 
of China‘s Kuomintang party.  Western IPR leaders had close ties with Chiang as well.  
Early in the war, Pacific Affairs editor Owen Lattimore left his position to serve as 
President Roosevelt‘s personal representative to Chiang (1941-42).43  Research Secretary 
William Holland, meanwhile, took a temporary leave of absence from the IPR late in the 
war to serve as the director of the Office of War Information (OWI) in Chungking, where 
Chiang and his wife based their headquarters.  But these close ties did not mean uncritical 
acceptance of the nationalist leader.  During the war, many China observers became 
frustrated with corruption surrounding Chiang and his failure to rally his countrymen 
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against the Japanese.  Opposition to Chiang manifested itself in the increasing popularity 
of the Chinese Communist party led by Mao Tse-tung.  By then, many of the IPR‘s 
administrators and writers began to view Chiang as an impediment rather than a conduit 
for a ―true new order‖ in China, and thus they plunged headlong into the political 
brambles of an incipient Chinese civil war.          
Bringing about a new order in China meant not only winning the war against 
Japan and keeping the country united but also mitigating the impact of Western financial 
penetration of the country.  For decades, many in China seethed over extraterritoriality 
zones exempting Westerners from Chinese laws, and condemned ―imperialists‖ who 
were fleecing the Chinese people and government through extractive loan agreements.  
The editors of the IPR journal Pacific Affairs made an effort to include these critical 
assessments of Western economic presence in China.  As early as 1929, for instance, the 
magazine published a translation of an article by Hu Heng Sin, ―Foreign Economic 
Domination of China,‖ that originally appeared in Eastern Miscellany.  ―The imperialists 
and the politicians do not consider the Chinese State as a state, but as a great market,‖ Hu 
wrote.  ―The Chinese nation they regard not as a nation, but as a great body of 
consumers.‖44  One year later, an article by Chang Yun-Yo, ―American Imperialism: A 
Chinese View,‖ was even more precise in its condemnation of open-door trade policies 
that overwhelmingly benefited the United States.45  Such expressions were shared among 
most Chinese at the time, regardless of their affiliation to the ―nationalist‖ or 
―communist‖ cause. 
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Although the sense of victimhood was common among the Chinese people during 
the interwar years, Chinese delegates at IPR conferences were relatively diplomatic and 
courteous towards Western colleagues. In addition to Hu Shih, China‘s leading public 
intellectual who would later serve as Chinese Ambassador to the United States during 
World War II, other distinguished Chinese conference delegates in the 1930s included 
W.W. Yen, the former prime minister and former Chinese ambassador to the United 
States and Soviet Union; and K.P. Chen, the general manager of Shanghai‘s Commercial 
and Savings Bank.  These figures all had strong ties with the United States and were 
generally pro-Western in their perspectives.  As tension escalated with Japan, they were 
even more inclined to cultivate American concern for China.  The IPR served as an 
important international forum for Chinese intellectual figures to make a case for the 
defense of China against the aggression of the Japan.  With the decision by the Japanese 
council to remove itself from IPR activities altogether in early 1941, the Chinese IPR 
council became the primary institutional link between Western scholars and Asia.    
As much as the Chinese council wished to project a single voice to the West, it 
was clear by the late 1930s that China was deeply divided politically.  Mao‘s Chinese 
Communists had broken from the Kuomintang party and launched a grassroots 
revolutionary movement to take control of China.  With the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese War, communists and nationalists formally put away their differences and 
agreed to create a ―united front‖ against the Japanese.  But this partnership proved to be a 
mirage, as Chiang and Mao continued to siphon away fighting resources in order to 
consolidate domestic political advantages.  As leader of the Kuomintang party with 
supposed control of the Chinese government, Chiang was the recipient of $500 million in 
Western economic aid and a fleet of American fighter planes in the war against Japan.  
Chiang‘s government also had an enormous investment in projecting the sense abroad 
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that they were the rightful rulers of a unified country.  Close observers of China, 
however, recognized that the country was far less united than the nationalists portrayed.  
Hanson Baldwin, foreign correspondent for The New York Times, wrote an article for 
Reader‟s Digest in 1943 that called ―China‖ more of a geographer‘s expression than a 
modern nation.46  Chiang‘s nationalist supporters vehemently objected to such frank 
assessments as hurtful to their wartime efforts to consolidate power. 
Pacific internationalists in the IPR agreed with the American government that 
uniting China was not only a valuable wartime strategy but also a critical component of 
nurturing a stable and democratic country at the end of the war.  But to deny the existence 
of a powerful communist movement was wishful thinking.  Furthermore, IPR writers 
increasingly noticed that the wartime actions of Chiang—threatening to postpone 
constitutional reforms and eliminating political enemies by force—increasingly made the 
Chinese Nationalists look more like the forces of repression rather than liberation.  
Institute publications, especially in the United States, expressed this frustration with 
Chiang in no uncertain terms.  T.A. Bisson, an American expert on U.S. policies in Asia, 
wrote an article for the July 1943 issue of the American IPR journal Far Eastern Survey 
in which he advanced a ―Two China‖ thesis.  One China, Bisson claimed, was ―feudal,‖ 
and was represented by the Kuomintang party inasmuch as it had done little to overturn 
landlord-tenant relationships or provide greater political reforms and civil liberties to its 
people.47  The other China, Bisson continued, was ―democratic,‖ and was represented by 
the ―so-called‖ Communist party inasmuch as its land reforms had freed peasants from 
the weight of rent, taxes and interest.  Bisson concluded that the Kuomintang leadership‘s 
failure to challenge the basic tenets of the feudal system was the principal obstacle to the 
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unification of China under democratic principles and an impediment to the country‘s full 
wartime mobilization.48  Widely reprinted in China, Bisson‘s article was decried by the 
Nationalists as an outrageous attack, and later would be used as evidence of bias during 
the U.S. Senate investigation of the Institute. The article nevertheless quietly earned the 
respect of some American diplomatic officials serving in China.  Chinese sensitivity to 
American public opinion was such that critical expressions, these officials hoped, could 
serve to push Chiang‘s party toward greater reforms.49 
Concern about Chiang‘s government in the summer of 1943 brought IPR 
Secretary-General Edward Carter into action as an unofficial envoy for the United States 
while simultaneously giving him an opportunity to advance his international work on 
behalf of the Institute of Pacific Relations.  The ostensible reason for the trip was a 
humanitarian crisis.  The anti-American Chinese Minister of Education was 
systematically cutting financial support and even rice rations for scholars who disagreed 
with him, and American officials determined that some 300 Chinese professors were in 
need of help.50  The minister had gone so far as to reject aid from United China Relief, on 
whose board Carter sat.  President Franklin Roosevelt‘s economic adviser Lauchlin 
Currie, who had previously served as Roosevelt‘s personal representative to China and 
knew Carter and the IPR,  called Carter to the White House and asked him if he might 
meet with Chiang Kai-shek and assess the situation.51  Carter readily accepted, and upon 
securing permission from the highest levels of the Chinese and American governments, 
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he obtained free travel aboard military aircraft and high-priority seats for himself as well 
as IPR Research Secretary William L. Holland.52   
Carter and Holland‘s 1943 trip to Asia may have been funded by the U.S. 
government, but it primarily served as a means to conduct international IPR work.  By 
the time Carter reached Chungking, the crisis over the scholars had ended, and thus the 
hour-long meeting between Carter, Holland, Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-
shek passed without any awkwardness.  Carter made no mention of American concerns 
about the Generalissimo‘s leadership, nor did Chiang make any mention of the recent 
Bisson article that had caused such grumbling within the Nationalist government. For his 
part, the Generalissimo made it abundantly clear that he was interested in the IPR‘s 
research agenda, even going so far as to suggest subjects about which he wished the 
Chinese council would study and write.53  Chiang also saw Carter as someone who could 
provide insight into the whole Asian situation, and grilled him with questions about 
American attitudes toward Korea and India.  On the latter subject, Carter candidly told 
Chiang that the heavy-handed British repression of Indian nationalists was effective only 
as a short-term solution and was in danger of breaking down at any time.  Chiang, whose 
sympathy with Indian nationalism was well known, asked Carter to repeat his statement 
to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill the next time Carter saw him.54  Carter made 
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clear during his meeting with Chiang that he did not speak on behalf of the U.S. 
government; perhaps for this very reason the Generalissimo found him to be a trusted 
international contact.  
Carter‘s visit to Chungking revealed his proximity to the halls of power, yet it 
also demonstrated his fraught relationship with top American diplomats in Washington.  
The IPR secretary-general received travel support every step of the way, often with 
directives from Secretary of State Cordell Hull himself.  When he and Holland arrived at 
the American embassy in Chungking, they stayed with George Atcheson, the charge 
d‘affaires.  But American officials continued to be circumspect toward the IPR secretary-
general, an approach urged by the State Department‘s Stanley Hornbeck even before the 
war.  When Atcheson reported to Hull that Carter and Holland were interested in 
knowing more about the communist situation in China, Hull quickly responded that they 
should be kept in the dark. ―[T]he less discussion there is currently of Kuomintang-
Communist difficulties and problems the better,‖ the Secretary of State curtly informed 
Embassy officials.55  American diplomats recognized that Carter was not one of them, 
even if he often acted as a roving ambassador.  Carter could be a useful supplier of 
information, yet he was not beholden to the American government or its policies.56  
Supplying Carter with a candid appraisal of the communist situation in China would only 
complicate the American effort to portray China as united in the defense of its country. 
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While mid-level American diplomats in China—the so-called ―China Hands‖—
continued to recognize the value of the IPR‘s work in giving an independent assessment 
of the Chinese situation, they too worried that such frankness might hurt Chinese-
American wartime relations.  In early 1944, the American council of the IPR produced a 
draft manuscript of a pamphlet, ―Wartime China,‖ by the American writer Maxwell 
Stewart, intended to give U.S. readers a primer on China‘s achievements and setbacks in 
the war effort, as well as a short treatise on the political divisions in the country.57  As a 
courtesy, American IPR officials circulated the draft among American officials, including 
John K. Fairbank, the Harvard Sinologist who was then head of the American Publication 
Service at the U.S. embassy in Chungking.  The previous summer Fairbank had written 
some self-confessed ―fan mail‖ to T.A. Bisson over his article in Far Eastern Survey.58  
Upon seeing Stewart‘s manuscript making similar criticisms of the nationalists, Fairbank 
did not raise any objections to the content so much as to the tone.  No doubt remembering 
the outrage to Bisson‘s article, Fairbank urged the editor of the pamphlet series, 
American IPR staffer Miriam Farley, to soften some language so as not to create another 
Chinese-American contretemps.59  Fairbank even raised the specter of fallout between the 
Chinese council and the international IPR. In the end, Farley encouraged Stewart to make 
a few stylistic changes, but the essential substance remained.  ―I felt that a sound 
relationship between China and America could not in the long run be based on 
concealment of facts from the American public,‖ Farley wrote Fairbank years later, ―and 
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that it was better for the American public to learn the facts from China‘s friends than 
from her enemies.‖60  The pamphlet was published in April 1944, and while the Chinese 
IPR objected, they remained an active council in the IPR.       
In pressing for a new order in the Pacific, the American IPR pamphlet series at 
times stepped on the toes not only of China but also of other wartime allies.  The 1944 
publication of Our Job in the Pacific was a case in point.  In early 1944, Owen Lattimore 
approached Henry Wallace, then vice president of the United States, and urged him to set 
down his ideas about the postwar world, and then enlisted Lattimore‘s wife, Eleanor, to 
help Wallace write the pamphlet under the auspices of the American IPR.61  Wallace, 
who was friendly with the Lattimores and would later serve as an Institute trustee after 
the war, had a reputation as a committed left-leaning liberal, and the manuscript reflected 
his strong belief in the breakup of the European colonial empires.  The pamphlet 
proposed the creation of a ―Free Asia,‖ consisting of ―all China and Soviet Asia, which 
form a great area of freedom, potentially a ‗freedom bloc‘.‖62  In his diary, Wallace noted 
that he showed a complete draft to John Carter Vincent, then chief of the State 
Department‘s Division of Chinese Affairs, who did not see ―any reason‖ why other 
diplomats might complain about its contents.63  But Wallace and the IPR underestimated 
the impact his words could have, especially on the British, who were by then desperate to 
dampen American wartime anti-colonialism.  Lord Halifax, British ambassador to the 
United States, protested directly to Secretary of State Hull about Wallace‘s ―regrettable‖ 
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comments, while other British diplomats joined an effort to push the liberal Wallace off 
the presidential ticket that fall, a movement that eventually proved successful.64   
In the coming years, the Institute of Pacific Relations would come under heavy 
scrutiny for the communist ―line‖ it supposedly took during the war and the Institute‘s 
alleged attempts to infiltrate the American diplomatic corps.  The evidence points to a far 
different conclusion.  Edward Carter‘s contacts in China were heavily weighted to 
nationalists in the Chinese IPR council and to their leader Chiang Kai-shek.  Carter‘s 
interests were first and foremost in Asian regionalism and the promotion of a post-
imperial world order.  State Department officials, particularly those in Washington, 
worked with Carter, but continued to regard him as an outsider.  American IPR 
publications, such as those by Stewart and Wallace, were lauded by American officials as 
honest if not the most delicate assessments of the region‘s problems.  Diplomatic officials 
and American IPR writers alike were searching for a ―true new order‖ in China, but the 
former were far more willing to suppress concerns about their allies during the war. Such 
reaction was understandable, yet it did nothing to advance American public awareness, 
especially regarding the Chinese situation.  Looking back in the wake of the 1949 
Communist revolution, John K. Fairbank noted that far from giving aid and comfort to 
Chinese Communists, a pamphlet such as Stewart‘s managed to give a rare understanding 
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of the ―realities‖ of wartime China.  ―This is something that lies behind our disaster in 
China,‖ Fairbank told his questioners at a 1952 Senate subcommittee hearing to 
investigate the IPR‘s role in the ―loss‖ of China to communism.  ―The fact that we did not 
really know what was going on, and we did not make the effort we could have made for 
reform programs in China before it was too late.‖65  The IPR‘s program may have been 
diplomatically embarrassing and politically dangerous, but such were the byproducts of 
the debate over the future of the Pacific. 
The end of World War II did not usher in the ―new world order‖ that many in the 
IPR had envisioned at the beginning of the war.  European imperialism had not died; in 
many ways, it had visions of reconstituting itself in the postwar period.  Asians 
themselves, meanwhile, were divided over what would constitute the best new regional 
order.  But by addressing these questions, Carter‘s IPR situated itself as a critical forum 
where Asian and Western intellectuals could wrestle with these large questions. It was 
not a perfectly representative body, of course—internal political disputes as well as 
continued imperial imperatives restricted the international body‘s membership and 
activities.  But the IPR provided at least one important answer to the rise of Asian 
nationalism during the war.  Anti-colonial sentiment had indeed exploded in strength 
during World War II.  Left untended, it had the capacity to revert into a broad anti-
Western movement—a version of the Japanese slogan to leave ―Asia to the Asiatics.‖  By 
harnessing the power of a nascent Asian nationalism rather than denying it, Edward 
Carter and other IPR leaders were successful in bringing them into conversation with 
Western powers—an internationalist mission that would continue for the next several 
years. 
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Chapter Three 
Internationalism in Flux: Europe and the IPR, 1945-1947 
The years immediately surrounding the conclusion of World War II are regarded 
as a ―liberal moment,‖ a time in which the postwar international order became fixed for 
the next several decades.1  Yet the kind of liberal internationalism that this moment 
engendered was not the kind that Edward Carter and his fellow Pacific internationalists 
envisioned at the beginning of the war.  Although the Allies had won the war and were in 
the process of establishing numerous economic and collective security measures (the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) to 
insure postwar stability, these international institutions increasingly were geared around 
the specific goals of extending capitalism and defending the West from communist 
aggression.2  While continuing to mouth the democratic ideals enunciated in the Atlantic 
Charter, the United States led the way in creating a new global order under the wing of an 
American ―preponderance of power‖ in military and economic might to combat the 
Soviet Union in the Cold War.3 
This chapter examines the way in which Pacific internationalists made often 
uncomfortable adjustments to the postwar era.  Within the United States, a growing 
concern about communism circumscribed the debate about Pacific matters at IPR 
meetings.  Any attitude that deviated from an acceptance of U.S. policies regarding 
containment became suspicious in the eyes of State Department observers and supporters 
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of Nationalist China.  European IPR members, sensing American uncertainty, found an 
opening to gain greater control over the most prominent Asian scholarly organization in 
the world, and thereby curtail its anti-colonial agenda.  Eager to internationalize the 
Institute‘s work and to distance itself from charges of communist bias, American IPR 
leaders accepted the European councils‘ demands to reform the international secretariat, 
including the removal of Edward Carter, the outspoken secretary-general.  During the 
tenth international IPR conference in Stratford-on-Avon, England, in September 1947, 
newly energized European members reasserted their vision of a disinterested, unofficial, 
non-politicized Asian organization—one that, importantly, would refrain from attacking 
their imperial policies.  Despite the preponderance of American power in the Pacific 
region and within the Institute of Pacific Relations, Europeans were largely successful in 
their effort to quash imperial criticism in the immediate postwar era.4 
Pacific internationalists in the IPR‘s New York secretariat believed it was 
important to disassociate themselves from governmental policies.  As an international 
private organization, the IPR provided a forum in which elites from several countries 
could research and debate issues outside the purview of the nation-state.  Some top 
leaders at the IPR, including Secretary-General Edward Carter, worked to reclaim this 
transnational role for the Institute.  To achieve this broad vision, however, required a 
conscientious rejection of the nationalism exacerbated by the war years, in which quasi-
official delegations at IPR conferences bickered over the foreign policy objectives of 
their respective countries. Such nationalism, however, was a particularly intractable 
opponent at the end of the war.  Harriet Moore, a staff worker in the IPR‘s international 
office, wrote to Carter about her feelings of discouragement: ―Unless they [the national 
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councils] return to greater tolerance, greater intellectual freedom and greater social 
curiosity I have little hope for the IPR.‖5  Moore, like Carter, was advocating that the IPR 
encourage an internationalist sensibility, and not simply be a forum in which national 
interests were debated. 
The irony for Pacific internationalists in the aftermath of World War II was that 
they had succeeded almost too well in promoting regional sensibilities.  Carter‘s trips to 
Asia during the war encouraged collaboration among intellectuals in India and China.  
But with the challenges to imperialism in ascendance, European councils now found 
themselves willing to enter into unofficial alliances as well.  By 1945, British, French and 
Dutch members of the IPR found common cause in defending their colonial policies.  
Evidence from British and French archives suggests, moreover, that this informal 
collaboration extended to sharing information with their respective governments—even 
as European officials denied such contact with their counterparts in Washington.  In 
banding together, the Europeans were able to show that the impulse toward 
internationalism could cut in more conservative directions.  With an American council 
increasingly uncertain about its place within the new global climate, Europe now took the 
lead in defining postwar intellectual ties to Asia.  
 
COMMUNISM AND INTERNATIONALISM 
The end of the war was the high-water mark for Pacific internationalists in the 
United States.  The Institute of Pacific Relations was recognized by both the American 
diplomatic and military communities for its wartime services in research on the Asia-
Pacific region, and some government agencies sought to keep the IPR as collaborators 
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after the war. The State Department‘s Division of Cultural Relations, for instance, 
approached the American IPR in 1944 about possible ―guidance‖ on postwar projects on 
educational planning in Japan and China. Officials meeting with IPR leaders held out the 
carrot that as a government-affiliated private organization, it ―would be in a very 
excellent position to exercise some influence upon eventual policy.‖6  Other officials, 
however, recognized the importance of a truly independent organization such as the IPR 
in serving as an unofficial link between West and East. Charles B. Fahs, chief of the Far 
Eastern Division of the Office of Strategic Services, spent some time with the IPR‘s Bay 
Area office while he was in San Francisco for the United Nations charter conference in 
April 1945.  Upon his return to the East Coast, Fahs reported that he was ―more 
impressed than ever before with the value of the IPR in making possible informal 
contacts between Americans and persons of other nationalities interested in international 
relations.‖7  Fahs strongly believed that U.S. national interests were being served by the 
independent work of the American council of the IPR, and called for a continuation of the 
close alliance between government officials and the private research institute.8 
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The American IPR‘s rising stature among US officials presented a conundrum for 
the private group.  It was clear that the postwar IPR did not wish to be seen as an agent of 
the U.S. government.  IPR officials maintained that they should not seek to create or even 
reflect particular national policies, but simply to represent its diverse community of 
experts—scholars, businessmen, and journalists.  American IPR leaders thus sought to 
distance themselves from U.S. policymakers in the interests of both expediency and 
principle.   They continued to accept solicitations for governmental research projects, and 
maintained close ties with various agencies, but they also worked to reclaim the IPR‘s 
identity and value as a private, independent research organization beholden to no outside 
party.9  More broadly, leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations took pains to 
emphasize that the American Institute was only one national council within a larger 
international structure.  Institute leaders stressed their unique position as a private bridge 
between European, American and Asian elites.  Close contact with American officials 
had provided a sense of short-term influence, but it undermined the IPR‘s scholarly 
stature and its long-term efforts to serve as a neutral forum for its international 
membership. 
Accusations during the war did even more to undermine the Institute‘s objectivity.  
In November 1944, Alfred Kohlberg, an American IPR member and owner of a Chinese 
textile manufacturing business, circulated a letter to top IPR officials claiming that the 
Institute had been infiltrated by Communist party supporters.  A fervent supporter of the 
Nationalist Chinese cause, Kohlberg assembled an 88-page document that purported to 
show evidence of pro-communist bias in several wartime IPR publications, which had 
been used in military orientation camps and schools around the United States.  He 
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especially targeted Maxwell Stewart‘s pamphlet Wartime China, from which he 
selectively quoted and concluded that ―from start to finish [it was] a deliberate smear of 
China and the Chinese government.‖  Kohlberg charged that Stewart, T.A. Bisson and 
other IPR staff writers were ―unpatriotic, biased, uninformed and incompetent,‖ and filed 
a court action to track down the names and addresses of all American members.  
Kohlberg was not involved in the Institute‘s administration, and had a long-standing 
reputation as a troublemaker, but his vocal charges dealt a blow to a group whose 
reputation rested on its impartiality. Edward Carter, the IPR secretary-general, prepared 
an analysis of Kohlberg‘s charges a few months later, dismissing them as ―irresponsible‖ 
and ―reckless.‖10  Kohlberg nevertheless continued his public campaign over the next two 
years to ferret out supposed Communists in the IPR, taking aim at targets such as 
Frederick Vanderbilt Field.  In April 1947, American IPR members finally exonerated the 
Institute‘s leadership with an overwhelming vote of confidence.  At least for a time, the 
charges of communist bias were put to rest.11 
Kohlberg‘s charges alone may not have shaken the confidence in the IPR‘s 
American council, but they came at a time of transition in the life of the organization as 
well as in the world at large.  The Rockefeller Foundation, the largest single financial 
supporter of the IPR, announced in the spring of 1945 that it was planning to taper its 
subsidies of independent research institutes dealing with international relations in 
general, and instead contribute greater resources to university-based programs focusing 
on subjects of particular ―strategic importance.‖  Joseph Willits, the Rockefeller 
Foundation‘s social sciences division head, questioned whether ―adult education‖ bodies 
like the IPR, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association ―want 
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RF to go on relieving their budgetary situation indefinitely.‖12 The Kohlberg controversy 
only increased the critical scrutiny by Rockefeller officials.  Willits believed IPR officials 
when they characterized Kohlberg as ―something of a meat-axe,‖ but that did not mean 
the American council was completely innocent of the charges of bias: ―In fact,‖ Willits 
confided, ―I do not think it is.‖  Foundation officials considered the impact of a complete 
and immediate cessation of funds on the IPR, and determined that such a move would 
doom the organization.  A decision had to be made, Willis believed, whether the IPR 
should be ―killed or purified.‖  Rockefeller Foundation officials decided ―it would be the 
wiser course to preserve and cleanse it,‖ and approved a five-year terminating grant to the 
IPR that would carry the Institute through the rest of the decade.13  The IPR had been 
spared a death sentence, but American members had been put on notice that their 
financial backers were no longer willing to issue carte blanche support. 
The American council in 1945 was forced to deal with another kind of internal 
crisis, in the form of a regional revolt by the West Coast branches of the IPR.  Ever since 
the American and international offices of the IPR moved to New York in 1933, West 
Coast IPR members had felt underappreciated and overlooked.  With the emergence of 
Kohlberg, criticism of the New York office burst out into the open. West Coast branches 
largely defended IPR leaders from Kohlberg‘s charges, but they pointed out that such 
charges could have been avoided with greater oversight from the New York leadership.  
The Seattle regional office, for example, complained to Rockefeller Foundation officials 
that unless IPR management became more democratic, ―there was little reason to 
continue affiliation.‖14  Critics in the San Francisco office put their concerns into more 
                                                 
12 Joseph H. Willits, ―Postwar Policy in the Support of International Relations,‖ May 1945, in RF files, RG 
3, Series 910, Box 8, Folder 67, RAC. 
13Willits, Memo to Board of Trustees, Rockefeller Foundation, April 1946, in RF files, RG 1.1, Series 200, 
Box 357, Folder 4237, RAC. 
14 Edward W. Allen to Roger F. Evans, Feb. 15, 1945, in RF files, RG 1.1, Series 200, Box 357. Folder 
4235, RAC. 
 98 
personal terms.  Secretary-General Edward Carter‘s leadership, one executive officer 
complained, was marked by extreme arrogance.  ―I acknowledge his abilities,‖ the officer 
wrote, ―but do not believe in dictatorship.‖15   Bay Area members demanded that the 
American headquarters be moved to San Francisco; New York officials protested, saying 
that the Californians had shown very little interest in supporting the national or 
international IPR programs.16  The crisis soon passed, but the underlying tension 
remained.  The American council was still the largest and wealthiest in the IPR, but it 
was far from the most unified.  
―I can‘t yet make up my mind whether the American Council is suffering from 
growing pains or death pangs,‖ one concerned government professor confessed to Philip 
C. Jessup, the prominent scholar-diplomat and senior IPR leader, in the wake of 
Kohlberg‘s allegations.17  Asian scholars in the American IPR were indeed on the 
defensive after World War II, only a few months after being praised effusively by fellow 
specialists inside and outside the corridors of power.  Much of this concern was a result 
of the rapid change in international climate brought on by the emergence of the Cold 
War.  Liberal internationalists of the IPR variety were seen by some as a vestige of the 
Roosevelt era—naïve to the cold realities of the emerging strategic necessities of Great 
Power politics.  Kohlberg‘s charges of communist infiltration in the American IPR threw 
into stark relief the changed political landscape of the postwar era.  American IPR leaders 
sought to maintain their independence from the American foreign policy establishment in 
the postwar world as a way to heighten their value as a scholarly resource.  Instead, they 
found themselves attacked from within and marginalized by former allies.  For those who 
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saw the Pacific Ocean as an ―American lake‖ in the postwar years, Pacific 
internationalists represented a constraint to American foreign policy at best, and a 
subversive element at worst. 
 
THE HOT SPRINGS CONFERENCE, 1945 
During the 1945 IPR conference at the Homestead Resort in Hot Springs, 
Virginia, the European powers confronted not only American, Canadian, and Chinese 
opposition to the continuation of imperialism in Asia, but also were forced to reckon with 
their own colonial subjects.  Carter secured the attendance of Indian, Burmese, 
Cambodian and Vietnamese participants, whose presence alone put the British and 
French on the defensive.  But even as the final wartime IPR conference was more 
representative than ever of Pacific peoples, it did not herald the end of European 
influence over these trans-Pacific scholarly connections.  Quite the opposite: British and 
French delegates confronted and largely contained criticism of their policies, and worked 
harder than ever to secure a favorable position for their common interests.     
For the British, the question of Indian representation at the 1945 conference in 
Hot Springs was just as delicate as the situation three years earlier.  Carter did not wish to 
have a repeat performance of the uniformly British-friendly group that ultimately 
attended the 1942 gathering in Mont Tremblant.  The situation in India had changed since 
1942, however.  As detailed in Chapter Two, the creation of the Indian Council of World 
Affairs (ICWA) had led to a rupture within the Indian Institute of International Affairs 
(IIIA).  A problem now erupted inasmuch as both groups wished to be accepted as the 
new IPR national council for India.  For months, Carter and other IPR officials attempted 
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to broker a deal between the two organizations, but to no avail.18  While members of 
Chatham House quietly congratulated one another on the impasse, they hoped that the 
deadlock would result in no Indian representation whatsoever.19  They far preferred to 
avoid the subject of India altogether rather than allow Indian nationalists to air grievances 
at an international conference.  
Undeterred, the IPR‘s conference committee issued invitations to both Indian 
institutes seeking four nominations each for the 1945 IPR conference.  The ICWA 
accepted immediately, nominating two of its founders, H.R. Kunzru, the president of the 
Servants of India Society, as well as Shiva Rao, the India correspondent for the 
Manchester Guardian.  In addition, they put forward the names of Mrs. V.L. Pandit, the 
sister of Jawaharlal Nehru, as well as Dr. Jeoraj Mehta, both of whom were Congress 
party members.20  The Indian Institute of International Affairs, for its part, declined to 
nominate anyone, instead sending a ―polite refusal‖ to IPR officials.  Sir Sultan Ahmed, 
who chaired the Indian Institute along with Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, explained to 
British friends that IIIA members were rethinking their strategy of associating with the 
IPR:   
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To speak bluntly, there is a suspicion … that the Secretariat of the IPR has not 
always been as impartial as is desirable, or entirely free from certain American 
groups anxious to press aims, and it sticks in their memory that Mr. Carter visited 
India apparently for the purposes of creating the Indian Council of World Affairs.  
They fear that the Indian Institute may put itself in the undignified position of 
competing with a body of whose origin they thus take a somewhat suspicious 
view.21    
The members of the Indian Institute of International Relations may have preserved their 
dignity, but in failing to nominate any delegates to the IPR‘s conference, they effectively 
silenced their voice on the international stage.  Therefore, the Indian delegation that 
showed up in Hot Springs, Virginia in January 1945 was considerably less amenable to 
the arguments for continued British presence on the subcontinent. 
 The January 1945 Hot Springs conference featured Indian charges against 
European colonialism, but the experienced British delegation limited the damage.22 At 
one roundtable discussion, Indian delegates accused the British of ―leaning back in their 
chairs and acting as if they had already left India‖ while they continued to enjoy full 
authority.23  Sir Andrew McFadyean, the head of the British delegation, summarized the 
often heated exchanges as ―catch-as-catch can, with no holds barred and occasionally, 
when the Referee was not looking, I think there was some biting.‖24  But McFadyean 
noted that while the criticisms of Indians may have been provocative, they also were 
alienating to others—including, he thought, the Chinese.  ―As a group, [the British] 
policy is to allow [the Indians] all the rope they require to hang themselves,‖ he wrote to 
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his British colleagues at Chatham House.25  For all of the grief they took, the British 
walked away from Hot Springs confident that they had made a forceful reply to the anti-
colonial attacks.     
The British were not the only imperial power to share the stage with their colonial 
subjects at the Hot Springs conference.  The French, only a few months removed from 
the liberation of Paris and the restoration of their republic, made a commitment to send a 
representative delegation to the United States.  Correspondence among senior French 
foreign affairs officials reveals that top governmental figures were convinced that the 
upcoming IPR conference was an ideal place to demonstrate their commitment to the 
progressive colonial policies enunciated by the reformist Brazzaville Declaration earlier 
in 1944.  The French Minister of Colonies, René Pleven, launched an outreach effort to 
dependent peoples living in France, and in late 1944 decided to include some of them as a 
part of the French delegation to the IPR conference.26  Pleven nominated three 
Indochinese delegates: Prince Youtevong Sisowath, a member of the Royal Family of 
Cambodia; ―Philippe‖ Tran Ba Huy, a surgeon who also wrote extensively on regional 
matters; and finally, ―André-Marie‖ Tao Kim Hai, a lawyer, secretary of ―La Patrie 
Annamite,‖ and an author of many books on Indochina.  These three were cleared to 
travel to the United States where they would join several other high-level French 
delegates, led by Paul-Emile Naggiar, the former ambassador to the Soviet Union.  The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, convinced that the IPR conference was of great importance, 
subsidized the French delegation‘s travels to the tune of 100,000 francs.27 
                                                 
25 McFadyean, Jan. 9, 1945, Appendix C, in CHA 6/1/10, RIIA. 
26 For more on the relationship between the French government and the Vietnamese in France, see Virginia 
Thompson, ―The Vietnamese Community in France,‖ Pacific Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 1952), 49-58. 
27 Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à Direction la Comptabilité, Dec. 4, 1944, in Vol. 6, Direction Asie-
Océanie, 1944-1955, Archives de Ministre des Affaires Etrangères (MAE), Paris.  
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Although the French government itself approved the nominations of the 
Indochinese delegates, their presence nevertheless caused consternation among officials 
who were deeply concerned that the French group speak with a single voice and avoid 
international embarrassment.  Ambassador Naggiar had only met the three Indochinese 
delegates mere days before their late December departure for the United States.  Once 
they had departed, Pleven, the colonial minister, received alarming reports that certain 
―Annamites‖ (Vietnamese) living in France had recently approached the Indochinese 
delegates and urged them to declare their support at the IPR conference for an 
international mandate over French Indochina.  This report concerned Pleven enough that 
he sent a top-secret urgent message to Georges Bidault, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
asking him to tell Ambassador Naggiar to keep an especially close eye on the 
Indochinese at the Hot Springs conference.  ―A French representative should at all times 
find himself next to them,‖ Pleven warned.28  On the eve of the conference, Pleven once 
again reminded Bidault that even though the Indochinese delegates were meant to be 
―sures‖—that is, amenable to French positions—the other French delegates should watch 
them closely.29 
Once the conference began, the Indochinese proved relatively loyal French 
delegates.  Naggiar reported Prince Sisowath was ―très bien,‖ while Tao Ki May was 
―docile et des plus corrects.‖30  Meanwhile, Tran Ba Huy, the surgeon whom the French 
                                                 
28 Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Top Secret – Urgent,  Dec. 29, 
1944, in Vol. 7, Direction Asie-Océanie, 1944-1955, MAE. 
29 ―Bien qu‘il s‘agisse de personalités à priori très sures, vous devrez exercer sur eux un contrôl 
extrêmement discrèt et courtois mais néanmoins très serre.‖  Ministre des Colonies à Mon. le Min. des 
Affaires Etrangères, Jan. 4, 1945, in Vol. 7, Direction Asie-Océanie, 1944-55, MAE. 
30 At the suggestion of Naggiar, Tao Kim Hi left the Hot Springs conference and continued on to San 
Francisco, where he was placed in charge of following radio programs in Vietnamese that the United States 
Office of War Information was sending to Indochina.  He then went to the University of Wyoming in 1946 
to take part in a series of conferences and debates about Vietnam, where he defended the French position 
―avec un loyalisme irreprochable et un grand désintéressement.‖  Roger Levy, February 1946, 
memorandum on IPR Pacific Council meeting, in Vol. 8, Direction Asie-Océanie, MAE. 
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thought was most likely to have received advice from the French Vietnamese community, 
said nothing inappropriate.  Naggiar certainly thought that all three were preferable to the 
Indian delegation, who showed themselves to be anti-colonial ―agitateurs‖ at every 
opportunity.  Nevertheless, the French ambassador counseled against repeating the 
experiment of bringing along Indochinese with the French delegation to future IPR 
conferences.  First of all, the three Indochinese members represented almost a third of the 
entire French delegation—far too high, in his opinion.  Second, he noted that the 
Indochinese were in a restricted position.  They could neither speak on behalf of France 
as Indochinese; nor could they speak on behalf of Indochinese, for if Indochina were cut 
off from France at that time it would be under Japanese control.  Finally, the French 
ambassador complained that the mere presence of Indochinese was too easily exploited 
by American anti-colonialists at the conference who wasted no opportunity in treating 
them distinctly from the other French delegates.31 
 However well the Europeans managed anti-colonial criticism, the Hot Springs 
conference confirmed in their mind that the Pacific internationalists in the IPR were 
determined to undermine their colonial projects.  The question was how to respond.    
Some wondered whether they should quit the IPR altogether.  J.M. Boeke, secretary of 
the Dutch council, had endured criticism of Dutch rule in Indonesia and now wrote to 
Chatham House that he saw little hope for the Institute: ―The IPR will always remain an 
American Institute: you may weaken it, but you are unable to take away its American 
nature or transplant it into British soil.‖  Boeke‘s solution was to propose an entirely new 
institute as a ―set-off‖ to the IPR: an International Institute for the Study of Plural 
Societies, focused on Asia and Africa, with a headquarters in London, whose purpose 
would be simply to study the impact of Western society upon native cultures, and thereby 
                                                 
31 Monsieur P.E. Naggiar à Monsieur G. Bidault, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Jan. 24, 1945, in Vol. 7, 
Direction Asie-Océanie, MAE. 
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avoid delicate questions surrounding independence movements.  Boeke floated the idea 
to British colonial expert Lord Hailey, but Hailey‘s response revealed a distinct lack of 
enthusiasm.  Hailey wrote Chatham House Director-General Ivison Macadam that 
Boeke‘s proposed institute was at once too broad a mandate and unclear in specifics—
altogether a ―sufficiently bewildering prospect.‖  Hailey underscored his more general 
opposition to the creation of more London-based institutes, whose numbers already 
diluted the effectiveness of their work.  Boeke‘s idea to replace the IPR thus expired 
practically at the moment of its conception.32 
For all of the European criticism of the IPR, it was clear by 1945 that the 
organization was too important to be dismissed or minimized; it must be worked with, 
rather than around.  And as the Europeans discovered at Hot Springs, perhaps they could 
even use the Institute to their advantage.  Sir Andrew McFadyean, the head of the British 
delegation to Hot Springs, complained of ―too many slogans, too many platitudes and too 
many clichés‖ at the conference, but he was not prepared to abandon the group 
altogether.  McFadyean wrote to his fellow members at Chatham House that despite their 
frustrations, they must maintain a strong connection to the IPR, and showing solidarity 
with his French colleagues, he could not resist a slogan of his own: ―Les absents ont 
toujours tort.‖33 He continued: ―[W]e cannot afford to refuse to participate in future 
activities of the Institute; but I am quite convinced that something must be done if they 
ignore the hints which Hailey must have given them, and the blunt statements which I 
shall have made to bring them to a sense of realities.‖  Sir Raibeart M. MacDougall, 
longtime member of the Indian civil service and counselor to the governor of Burma, 
concurred in a separate letter to Chatham House: ―If we were to break off relations with 
                                                 
32 Boeke to Macadam, Nov. 6. 1945; and Hailey to Macadam, Nov. 21, 1945, both in CHA 6/2/37, RIIA. 
33 ―Those who are absent are always wrong.‖ 
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the IPR and decline to take part in any further Conference, Great Britain would 
immediately be ‗framed‘ as the arch criminal in the Far East by the anti-British party in 
the IPR.‖  The British had a great many American friends in the IPR, MacDougall 
continued, but ―we cannot expect them to fight our battles if we ourselves pack in and 
leave the battlefield.‖34 
In the course of weathering criticism at the wartime IPR conferences, British 
officials made another discovery: they shared a ―community of interest‖ with the French 
and the Dutch delegations.  As a result of the Hot Springs conference, the delegates from 
the European colonial powers agreed to meet and discuss how to plan their future strategy 
regarding the Institute, and to work with their respective governments in this regard.  The 
Dutch readily agreed, noting their enthusiasm for such a ―common front‖ approach.   
Significantly, this informal collaboration took place even as the British, French and 
Dutch governments were making statements to United States officials denying such 
contact.  The Chief of the Far Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office gave an 
―informal yet emphatic‖ statement to an officer at the American embassy that there was 
no ―understanding‖ between the Dutch and British over the future of Southeast Asia.  A 
State Department memorandum to President Roosevelt repeated the denials of the British, 
French and Dutch on the matter of collaboration on the very day that Roosevelt had lunch 
with the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley.35 
Besides coordination with fellow European councils, Chatham House members 
also tried to bring the Americans around to their side through smaller meetings.  In the 
summer of 1945, members of Chatham House proposed a 10-day Anglo-American IPR 
                                                 
34 Sir Andrew McFadyean final speech at Hot Spring, Jan. 1945, Appendix B; McFadyean letter on final 
speech, Jan. 15, 1945, Appendix C; and Sir Raibeart M. MacDougall on Hot Springs conference, n.d., all in 
―Pacific Relations Committee,‖ CHA 6/1/10, RIIA. 
35 ―Preliminary Memorandum on Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Colonel Stanley,‖ January 16, 1945; ―Memorandum for the President,‖ January 16, 1945, in RG 
59, Lot Files 54D 109, Philippine and Southeast Asia Division, Microfilm C0014, Reel 6, NARA. 
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gathering in early September designed to smooth over differences and bring about a 
closer alliance between the two councils.  Lord Astor wrote to the chairman of the 
American IPR, Dr. Robert Sproul, while Chatham House Director Ivison Macadam made 
a concurrent entreaty to Raymond Dennett, the American IPR‘s executive secretary.   
Dennett‘s personal feelings were positive toward a meeting.  He anticipated a number of 
splits between British and American policy over Far Eastern matters in the coming years, 
and thus believed such a meeting would prepare Chatham House for those differences.  
The American council, however, voted against holding such a conference.  Dennett‘s 
official response to Macadam declined the British invitation, indicating that such a 
meeting might create an ―unfortunate impression‖ upon other IPR members that there 
existed an Anglo-American bloc.  However much some Americans might be disposed to 
the idea, Dennett wrote privately to Macadam, the Americans were under sufficient fire, 
especially from China, to make such a meeting far too ―risky.‖36  With the olive branch 
rejected, Chatham House and the rest of the European councils now felt free to work 
assiduously toward removing the prime source of their troubles with the Institute of 
Pacific Relations: Secretary-General Edward Carter. 
 
REMOVING EDWARD CARTER 
In September and October 1945, Edward Carter visited Europe to shore up 
support among the British, French and Dutch IPR councils.  Carter knew that Europeans 
were upset with the tenor of the wartime conferences, and wished to put the IPR on more 
neutral footing. If Carter expected deference and civility, he was mistaken.  Carter‘s 
                                                 
36 Ivison S. Macadam to Raymond Dennett, June 23, 1945; Dennett to the American Council Executive 
Committee, July 9, 1945; Dennett to Macadam, July 25, 1945; all in Box 196, ―Chatham House 
Conference,‖ Pacific Relations, COL; official Dennett regret to Macadam, July 25, 1945, in CHA 6/1/10, 
RIIA. 
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letters to Percy Corbett, the wartime chairman of the IPR‘s Pacific Council, amply 
demonstrated the tension that continued to exist between himself and the European 
councils.37  Carter visited the Netherlands, and found ―discouraging‖ news there.  Many 
Dutch IPR members were convinced that the international IPR was a mere front 
operation to defend American policies, and that international research publications were 
overwhelmingly American-created and oriented; they demanded future IPR conferences 
must be held outside North America or the Institute would risk the curtailment of Dutch 
financial contributions.   Carter feigned astonishment at ―the somewhat bizarre nature of 
their criticism,‖ and explained away the Dutch misapprehensions as the result of wartime 
Axis propaganda.  But the veteran secretary-general did acknowledge that he had 
―inadvertently been responsible in past years for some of the things that they criticize … 
[and] thus this revelation … has been invaluable to me and I hope that I will have the 
ability to profit by it.‖38  While Carter denied any inappropriate action on his part, he 
nevertheless realized that he could no longer take European support for granted. 
Carter‘s visit did not get any easier when he made it to London.  There, he was 
met by Ivison Macadam, the director of Chatham House, who ―unburdened himself‖ 
regarding the IPR over two long talks.  Macadam pulled no punches.   He outlined the 
criticism that British members had endured at conferences, and charged that IPR 
publications, which formerly had maintained a high quality, had deteriorated into ―some 
kind of ideology.‖ Exactly what kind of ideology Macadam did not say, nor did Carter 
                                                 
37 Corbett, a Canadian citizen, was the chairman of the Department of Government at Yale University.  
Corbett served as the chairman of the IPR Pacific Council, the leaders of each national council, from 1945 
to 1947. 
38 Carter protested to Corbett particularly about the impression that the international IPR was essentially an 
arm of the U.S. government: ―They, of course, have no conception of how much of a thorn in the flesh both 
the International Secretariat and the American Council have been to the U.S. State Department.  They, in 
common with a few at Chatham House, blame on the International Secretariat everything that the American 
Council publishes which they do not like.‖ Carter to Corbett, Sept. 29, 1945, in Box 89, ―Carter, Edward – 
Personal,‖ Pacific Relations, COL.  
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press him on this matter.  Macadam told Carter that he was ―tired of persuading the best 
men in England to go at great expense to North America only to have them subjected to 
unfriendly criticism from people whom they would never desire to meet again and people 
of a type they never met except under the auspices of the IPR.‖  Clearly, Macadam 
believed anti-colonial sentiments were unfairly dominating the international secretariat, 
and he demanded a curtailment in Carter‘s activism.  Like the Dutch, Macadam ended his 
harangue with an implicit threat of withdrawal from the IPR altogether.  Carter was left 
with the understanding that Chatham House ―was so fed up with the IPR that [Macadam] 
and his colleagues had come to the conclusion that they would give the Institute one more 
chance in the hope that it might reorganize its programme so as to be an asset instead of a 
liability to Chatham House.‖  With this challenge hanging in the air, Carter left the 
Chatham House director once again rebuffed by an Institute partner.39 
Many European critics of the IPR increasingly believed that Carter himself must 
be replaced as secretary-general before the Institute could be truly reformed.40  Criticisms 
of Carter‘s leadership, coming from the West Coast of the United States and now in 
Europe, forced Carter to reassess his position as head of the international IPR.41  Within 
                                                 
39 Carter was careful not to ascribe Macadam‘s criticisms to the whole of Chatham House when Carter 
noted that at least ―some of the [Pacific Relations] Committee and the staff feel that the IPR, even the 
International Secretariat, have been a most unusual asset to Chatham House and they desire more rather 
than less from the IPR in the future.‖  Furthermore, Carter pointed out that Chatham House did not 
necessarily represent the more liberal and open-minded segment of the British population:  ―Many such 
people believe that Chatham House is a sort of steel curtain between the IPR and the British public and that 
until Chatham House changes the IPR cannot fully serve the British public, nor can British scholars and 
businessmen make their rightful contribution to the total international work of the IPR.‖  Carter to Corbett, 
Oct. 12, 1945, in Ibid. 
40 Sir Andrew McFadyean wrote to fellow members of Chatham House from the January 1945 Hot Springs 
conference that Anglo-American tension in the organization would not lessen until Carter left the IPR.  Jan. 
15, 1945, CHA 6/1/10. Roger Levy, the chairman of the Comité d‘études des Problèmes du Pacifique, 
wrote to his French colleagues in early 1946 that the British had actively campaigned for the removal of 
Carter at least since his September 1945 visit.  Note de Roger Levy, n.d. [Feb. 1946], Vol. 7, Asie-Océanie, 
1944-55, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères (MAE), Paris. 
41 William F. Holland, Carter‘s successor as IPR secretary general, noted decades later: ―Either the decision 
to ask [Carter] to resign was made by a small group on a confidential basis or it was edited out of the 
minutes.‖  Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 369. 
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weeks of his return, he began floating the idea of his retirement as secretary-general in 
conversations with close friends and IPR supporters, including officers at the Rockefeller 
Foundation.42  By the end of 1945, the 67-year-old secretary-general gave word that he 
was willing to cede control of the international Institute he had led since 1933.  The 
controversial, charismatic administrator had personified the IPR for more than a decade, 
and its stature at the end of the war was the result of his efforts more than any other 
individual.  Yet Carter‘s strong-willed leadership often left others within the organization 
feeling on the margins, whether they were in California or in Amsterdam.  Many long-
time supporters of the IPR thus viewed Carter‘s resignation as secretary-general as a 
positive step as the Institute began to grapple with a changed world. 
Being able to operate outside the constraints of governmental policies 
traditionally had given the IPR a platform to discuss the possibilities for a future world—
an idealistic position that Carter did not wish the IPR to abandon.   Many Europeans, 
however, were calling for a more dispassionate approach to IPR research projects, a 
concentration on long-term regional problems and the careful avoidance of controversial 
political subjects.  Carter‘s position clearly was on the wane.  Nevertheless, in his 
secretary-general‘s draft report to the Pacific Council, the IPR‘s governing body, in early 
1946, Carter delivered a full defense of scholarly idealism: 
How can … research be organized to meet situations two decades ahead when 
those who now plan and carry out the research have not formulated the social and 
economic goals they would like to see dominating society in the next generation?  
How can long-range research for the future be planned by an Institute which some 
of its leaders affirm should not spend any time studying current controversial 
problems? 
                                                 
42 In an interview with Joseph H. Willits, the social sciences director for the Rockefeller Foundation, Carter 
asked him ―as a personal friend‖ for his advice on retirement.  Willits responded circumspectly that such a 
matter was for Carter and the IPR to work out on their own.  In a memorandum to Foundation colleagues, 
Willits made clear that he sensed that Carter‘s position, along with larger world events, put the IPR in a 
fluid state: ―Deep currents are moving in IPR … I think we belong outside of them.‖  Willits memorandum, 
Oct. 25, 1945, RF files, RG 1.1, Series 200, Box 357, Folder 4235, RAC.  
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Carter believed that with the advent of atomic power, the problems of the postwar world 
required bold and innovative thinking beyond the conventional framework of nation-
states.  This is not to say he wished the abolition of nations, or the advent of communism, 
as some of his detractors later claimed.  His vision of the IPR, nevertheless, as a 
transformative and radically international instrument meshed with his hopes for a 
potentially radical democratic world.  In his view, the ―moderate nationalisms‖ of the 
more cautious IPR members merely reproduced the mentality that led to war.43 
Carter‘s desire to separate the IPR from nationalist sentiments in 1945 misread the 
degree to which many IPR members in Europe had subsumed themselves to their 
respective national policies.  Nowhere was this more dramatically represented than in 
France.  The French IPR council received subsidies for research, travel, and Pacific 
Council dues (totaling $1000 per year) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a direct 
contravention of IPR rules that prohibited direct governmental support.44  French 
governmental interest was nevertheless quite brazen in its attempt to control IPR research 
and conference activities from afar.  The French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, went 
so far as to solicit a French official to be placed on staff at the IPR international 
secretariat in New York in the spring of 1945, a scheme that had the blessings of the 
Minister of Colonies and the French ambassador to the United States.  Bidault wrote that 
having a French official representative at the heart of the international IPR headquarters 
                                                 
43 Edward C. Carter, secretary general interim draft report to Pacific Council, n.d. [1945], as well as 
personal postscript, in Box A128, ―IPR Pacific Council, Jan. 1946, Atlantic City Conference,‖ Philip 
Jessup Papers, Library of Congress (LOC).  Also see Carter to Devereux C. Josephs (Carnegie 
Corporation), Dec. 6, 1946, in Box 318, ―Carnegie Appeals,‖ Pacific Relations, COL.  
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Minutes, June 18, 1946, CHA 6/1/11, RIIA.  William L. Holland, IPR’s secretary general, noted in his 
memoirs that the French contribution to the Pacific Council was delivered on a check headed ―Affaires 
etrangères,‖ indicating its provenance from the French Foreign Ministry, but that ―we never questioned this 
and gladly accepted the money.‖  Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 118. 
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was the only way to ensure that ―our observations may be presented, and pushed, if need 
be.‖  Carter and the IPR‘s international staff rejected this attempted French infiltration, 
unsurprisingly, but the episode nevertheless represented an illustrative moment about the 
perceived importance of the IPR to some European governmental officials, eager to 
leverage intellectual influence in Asia wherever they could find it.45 
With new European activity in the IPR, and with Carter‘s influence on the wane, 
the Pacific Council met in Atlantic City in January 1946 to discuss the future scope and 
agenda of the Institute.  The British wasted no time in seizing the initiative to 
circumscribe the IPR‘s activism.  On the first afternoon of meetings, Ivison Macadam 
proposed changing the IPR‘s constitution to read: ―The object of the Institute is to study 
the conditions of the Pacific peoples with a view to an increase in mutual knowledge and 
understanding‖ rather than the longstanding phrase, ―with a view to the improvement of 
their mutual relations.‖  The rewording was significant: Macadam‘s statement 
presupposed no harmony of interest in the Pacific region, nor any desire in working 
toward such a goal—a touchstone belief that had animated the group since 1927.  The 
British leader reiterated that the IPR‘s purpose should be merely to study, not to improve, 
Pacific relations.46  The Pacific Council put off any decision on specific constitutional 
changes, but Macadam clearly won the broader argument: IPR leaders, by the end of the 
meeting, agreed that the production of research should be the overriding focus of the 
group, and that they should minimize their forays into amateur diplomacy.  Macadam 
was understandably pleased with his efforts.  At the conclusion of the Pacific Council 
                                                 
45 French official interest in the IPR in 1945 is well documented in the archives at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Paris.  The first suggestion regarding the placement of a French official on the IPR international 
secretariat staff came from P.E. Naggiar, head of the French delegation to the Hot Springs conference to 
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in Vols. 7 and 8, Direction Asie-Océanie, 1944-55, MAE. 
46 Minutes of the Meeting of the Pacific Council (I), Jan. 26, 1946, in Box A128, ―IPR Pacific Council, 
Jan. 1946, Atlantic City Conference,‖ Jessup papers, LOC. 
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meeting, he privately gloated to Rockefeller Foundation officials that the British were 
―thoroughly satisfied‖ with the outcome, as they had gotten ―one hundred percent of what 
we asked for.‖47  
The Atlantic City gathering also saw the formal resignation of Edward Carter as 
secretary-general.  The man who had epitomized the activist, anti-colonialist wing of the 
IPR handed the torch to his successor, William L. Holland.  A native of New Zealand, 
Holland had joined the IPR staff as a young man in 1929 and served as international 
research secretary from 1933 until 1944. Bookish and trim, with glasses framing a boyish 
face, he was far more a scholar than an organizer, and was less politically connected than 
Carter.48  At first, the British were cool to the idea of Holland as the leader of the 
international IPR: he was now an American, after all, and moreover he was Carter‘s 
hand-picked successor.  Chatham House members wondered whether Holland, the 
consummate Institute man, would be able to free himself from Carter‘s influence.  But 
conversations at Atlantic City apparently dampened these criticisms, and in March 1946, 
Sir Andrew McFadyean confidently reported to the Chatham House Pacific Relations 
Committee that Holland‘s ―attitude and objectives were quite different from those of the 
retiring Secretary-General.‖49   The British Foreign Office was equally relieved to hear 
the news, and officials cleared the way for Holland to meet with its heads of the China, 
Japan, Southeast Asia and North American departments during his visit to London in 
June 1946.  Holland, in one British official‘s estimation, was ―intelligent and responsible 
… unlike the truly emotional Mr. Carter.‖  Even if his reputation was more anti-
                                                 
47 Roger F. Evans, ―Ivison Macadam – Chatham House,‖ Feb. 5, 1946, in RF files, RG 1.1, Series 200, 
Box 357, Folder 4236, RAC.  
48 William Lancelot Holland resume, n.d., in Box 327, ―Holland, W.L.–Personal,‖ Pacific Relations, COL. 
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imperialist than the average New Zealander, Holland ―will probably be amenable to 
reason and anxious to learn our points of view.‖  With Carter ousted from the IPR‘s top 
job, the European councils, as well as their official diplomatic counterparts, now felt they 
would be given fairer hearings at future IPR gatherings.50  
 
THE STRATFORD CONFERENCE, 1947 
A final triumph for European interests in the IPR came with the decision by the 
Pacific Council to hold the first post-war IPR conference in Great Britain in September 
1947.  As the host national council, Chatham House members worked to make sure that 
this conference would be set on a more ―scientific,‖ apolitical foundation.  They set a 
narrow agenda—―the Economic and Social Reconstruction of the Far East‖—and limited 
conference participation to 75 official delegates, and a few dozen ―guest observers.‖  This 
more rigorous control of the conference agenda and membership intended to prevent the 
proceedings from degenerating into the ―loose talk-fests‖ that they believed characterized 
the wartime proceedings.51  On one level, the British succeeded in their objective: 
discussion at the 15-day conference at Stratford-on-Avon was confined to agricultural 
and industrial development, with little or no mention of dependencies and trusteeships.  
No major fights broke out between national councils. Yet what the 1947 IPR conference 
gained in amicability of discussion was lost in diversity of representation.  The 
conference was marked by a preponderance of Western countries; only the Chinese sent a 
national delegation from Asia, with a handful of other observers from India, Burma, 
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 115 
Korea and Siam.52  The lack of Asian delegates served as a rebuke to an Institute that 
prided itself on serving as a putative link between East and West.   
The Dutch, French and British councils may have restricted the topics of 
discussion at Stratford, but internal correspondence and off-the-agenda conversations 
revealed the serious internal struggles each was having with an aggrieved colonial 
subject.  The Dutch IPR council, for instance, was riven over the question of the 
Netherlands East Indies since the end of the war.  Most members of the Netherlands-
Netherlands East Indies council, centered in Amsterdam and representing more 
conservative business interests, were quite bitter over the prospect of greater political 
independence in the archipelago.  A number of members who took a more liberal outlook 
on Indonesia, however, broke away and set up a rival group at the University of Leiden.   
Leaders of the now-weakened Amsterdam group, wary of a possible confrontation at 
Stratford, informed Percy Corbett, the IPR‘s Pacific Council chairman, during a visit in 
the fall of 1946 that Dutch participation in the upcoming conference was impossible.  The 
Amsterdam group claimed that the fluid political situation in the archipelago meant good 
information was scarce, and thus would only foster amateurish debate and knee-jerk 
criticism of Dutch colonial policy—criticisms they already had endured at the wartime 
conferences.  In a blunt exchange that Corbett found ―quite rude,‖ they claimed that 
holding any IPR conference at all in 1947 would be ―premature and doomed to futility.‖53  
Even the promise to drop all political subjects at the conference met with skepticism from 
the Amsterdam group.  Desperate for any Dutch participation at the Stratford gathering, 
and knowing that their actions would offend the official Dutch IPR council, Institute 
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leaders managed to secure three members of the more liberal Leiden group as guest 
observers.54    
Practically lost amid the drama surrounding Dutch participation at Stratford was 
the matter of Indonesian participation, as well as that of the Vietnamese. IPR leaders in 
New York requested that the Dutch and French make efforts to include colonial subjects 
in their national delegations, but they were unable to dictate their composition.  Both the 
Dutch and French councils, however, found excuses not to repeat the Hot Springs 
experiment.  They did so through an appeal to the private nature of the IPR itself.  An 
appeal by representatives of the ―Indonesian Republic‖ was rejected by IPR leaders on 
the grounds that governmental representation was not allowed at IPR conferences.55  
Similarly, the Viet-Nam Press Service in Paris petitioned IPR officials to include 
Vietnamese representatives in the French delegation to Stratford, but Roger Levy, the 
French IPR‘s principal leader, noted that the IPR, a private organization, could not accede 
to appeals from a ―government agency.‖  Levy of course made no mention of his own 
committee‘s servile relationship with the French foreign ministry, and the French refusal 
to include Vietnamese representatives went largely unchallenged by IPR leadership.56  
Institute leaders turned a blind eye to the close relationship between European 
governments and their national councils.  But when Asian ―officials‖ requested better 
representation at the Stratford conference, their appeals often went unanswered.  
The matter of Indian representation in the IPR, however, was no longer a purely 
internal matter for the British by the fall of 1947.  With independence recently granted to 
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the Asian subcontinent, the Pacific Council acknowledged the need to incorporate Indian 
and Pakistani delegations into the IPR for future conferences, and admitted that they had 
made a ―mistake in judgement‖ in not inviting official representatives from the Indian 
Council of World Affairs to attend the Stratford gathering.  Chatham House members 
pressed for additional delays, not wishing to privilege the Indian Council of World 
Affairs over the Indian Institute of International Affairs, which had closer ties to Britain.  
Over the hesitations of Sir Andrew McFadyean and other members of Chatham House, 
the American delegation pushed the IPR‘s governing body formally to accept groups in 
India and Pakistan as IPR national councils as soon as possible.57 
As the Stratford conference wore on through mid-September, it became 
increasingly clear that the lack of Asian members was a major hindrance to discussion.  
As one conference observer from the Rockefeller Foundation noted, the conference took 
on the aspect of ―a consultation of Western doctors on an absent and unwilling group of 
Eastern patients.‖58  Holland, the IPR‘s recently elected secretary-general, admonished 
delegates that they must not judge Asian problems by Western standards.  Yet this 
mandate proved almost impossible in a conference dominated by British, American and 
Canadian members.  During one of the final plenary sessions, Pao-Nan Cheng, a member 
of the Chinese IPR council, announced that he, a self-proclaimed ―inscrutable oriental,‖ 
felt obliged to speak.59  Cheng noted that other delegates often talked about the 
introduction of ―democracy‖ into Asia as if it were a panacea, and without a critical 
examination of the relationship between political philosophy and economic well-being.  
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Cheng agreed with Holland that a Western mindset often obscured the real problems in 
Asia:   
[T]oo much Anglo-Saxon psychology which has not the willing consent of Asian 
peoples will fail.  We may set up beautiful formulas but we cannot see, or we 
refuse to see, all the invisible forces and undercurrents at work. I am reminded of 
the criminal who tried to commit the perfect crime, but always later something 
turned up to incriminate him.  These invisible currents are already making 
themselves felt.60 
Revolutionary changes in Asia were these ―invisible currents,‖ Cheng observed.  While 
IPR leaders prided themselves on their unique contacts with Asia, they obviously could 
not come to grips with these changes in a conference room in Stratford-on-Avon without 
a significant number of Asian members present.  Only through a renewed effort to 
encourage and support such contact would the IPR live up to its promise as the best 
private bridge between West and East. 
IPR delegates left Stratford in late September in 1947 only to confront a series of 
immediate and confounding challenges.  They had earned a reputation for national 
service during the war, yet they now needed to distance themselves from governments in 
order to maintain their independent scholarly reputations.  Their private status gave them 
the ability to speak out bluntly at conferences, yet they now needed to restrict their 
meeting agendas in order to salve wounded European pride, and mitigate attacks on their 
supposed political biases.  And while IPR leaders wished to maintain the highest 
scholarly standards of objective research, they were now faced with a more pressing 
demand: the encouragement of Asian national councils to join the ranks of Pacific 
internationalists.  In the postwar years, IPR leaders began to recognize that they could 
have a vital role to play in winning over the ―mind of Asia.‖  But they could only do so if 
the ―absent and unwilling‖ Eastern patients were allowed to become doctors as well. 
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Chapter Four 
“Something to Join”: Asia and the IPR, 1947-1950 
However ambivalent toward the onset of the Cold War, Pacific internationalists 
felt new urgency regarding their work in reaching out to Asia the late 1940s.  Leaders of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations saw not only academic value in encouraging Asian 
collaboration with Western elites, but they were also sensitive to the larger geopolitical 
realities of the moment.  How could the West hope to win over Asian minds if 
Westerners were not fully aware of the real concerns of Asians themselves?  In a 1951 
article, Paul Linebarger, an American professor of Asian politics, gave the United States 
a failing grade for its post-war propaganda efforts in Asia.  The United States, Linebarger 
wrote, wanted Asians to love Americans, but did not give Asians a sense of full 
participation in a larger cause. Communists ―offer people something to join, something to 
do, something to fight,‖ he wrote. ―You couldn‘t join the American side if you were an 
Asian. There isn‘t anything to join.‖
1
 Leaders of the IPR, however, felt that they were 
uniquely situated to offer Asian intellectuals something to join—a project they now took 
on with renewed energy. 
One of the greatest tasks for Pacific internationalists in the postwar period was to 
grasp the enormous complexity of a region in flux.  In the several years following the 
war, millions of people emerged from colonialism into independence, an upheaval that 
Arnold J. Toynbee called the most significant event of the twentieth century and ―more 
explosive than the atom bomb.‖2 Nationalist movements in places such as India, the 
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Dutch East Indies and French Indochina pledged to reverse centuries of European 
dominance in Asia.  China embraced communist leadership in 1949.  Events often 
seemed to outpace the scholarly assessments of the situation.  By the mid-1950s, 
historian Hugh Tinker remarked that Asian specialists were like spectators at a magic 
lantern show: ―before one situation has become familiar—click—it has been replaced by 
another.‖3 As European, American and Asian politicians struggled to make sense of the 
rapidly shifting geopolitical terrain in the region, IPR intellectuals began the process of 
reaching out to Asian elites in these newly independent countries.   
The situation in Asia may have been in flux, but the stakes were real. Western 
policymakers and Pacific internationalists alike were concerned with preventing the 
emergence of an anti-Western bloc geared around revolutionary Asian nationalism.  The 
ideas of the Institute of Pacific Relations appeared to offer at least one means by which 
trans-Pacific private contact could be maintained, and engender a wider solidarity 
between West and East.  Internationalists in the IPR did not reject nascent Asian 
regionalism; in fact they had done much to develop this sensibility.  Yet they were also 
aware of the dangers of a purely pan-Asian movement, and wished to situate Asian 
regionalism within a broader internationalist perspective.  Their efforts to enlist new 
Asian councils into the international IPR reflected this imperative. 
The ―loss‖ of China to the Communist Party in the fall of 1949 dramatically 
changed the circumstances for leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations.  For one, the 
Institute was forced to accept the dissolution of the China council of the IPR, a severance 
of a more than 20-year relationship without any promise of renewal.  Second, the 
prospect of collaboration between the neutralist Indians and the communist Chinese 
suddenly took on a far more menacing prospect for Western policymakers.  Third, 
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American participants in the IPR found themselves caught between political extremes.  In 
the United States, conservative activists targeted American members as complicit in the 
fall of Nationalist China.  During the IPR‘s 1950 conference in India, meanwhile, Asians 
put American members on the defensive regarding ―imperial‖ U.S. regional foreign 
policy.  The launching of the Korean War only exacerbated both of these trends, making 
the IPR‘s project of reconciling West and East a greater challenge than ever before. 
 
THE ASIAN RELATIONS CONFERENCE, 1947 
At the end of World War II, the attempt to create an Asian regional sensibility 
entered a new phase.  Japan‘s vision of a regional ―co-prosperity sphere‖ had collapsed 
with its imperial plans in World War II, and its expansion into China and Korea had left a 
distinctly bitter taste for coerced federalism.  Many in Southeast Asia, meanwhile, had 
long been suspicious of Chinese attempts at regional dominance.4  Despite these fractured 
cultural identities, Indians at the end of the war took the lead in promoting pan-Asian 
values, and even the possibility of some kind of political federation, as a way to establish 
their regional leadership.  In December 1945, Congress party leader Jawaharlal Nehru 
proposed the idea of an all-Asian conference to Shiva Rao, special correspondent at the 
Manchester Guardian and a participant at the IPR‘s Hot Springs conference earlier that 
year.  Nehru quickly made concrete designs on an unofficial cultural gathering to 
exchange ideas regarding the common problems among Asian countries—problems he 
had discussed with the IPR‘s Edward Carter as early as 1939.  But with the end of the 
war, Nehru now took action.  By early 1946, the Indian Council of World Affairs 
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(ICWA) was tapped to develop a conference agenda and invite delegates to meet in New 
Delhi in March 1947.5    
From its inception, it was clear that the Asian Relations Conference would not be 
an Institute of Pacific Relations kind of gathering.  First of all, its scope was decidedly 
pan-Asian, rather than trans-Pacific. Organizers invited 29 Asian countries to send 
delegates, with limited ―observer‖ positions allocated for Australia, Great Britain, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, as well as specific organizations such as the IPR and 
the United Nations.  But it would be a mistake to interpret the Asian Relations 
Conference as a rejection of IPR ideals or practices.  The conference‘s primary 
organizing body, the Indian Council of World Affairs, was in many ways a child of the 
IPR.  Founded in 1943, and devoted to the objective study of international affairs, the 
Indian council had limited experience in international conferences beyond sending a 
delegation to the IPR‘s Hot Springs conference in 1945.  Significantly, the group‘s 
executive secretary, Angadipuram Appadorai, asked IPR officials for contact information 
for other Asian associations and independent scholars before it could even send out 
invitations.  The Asian Relations Conference, Appadorai noted, was modeled on the IPR 
template, and he wrote to Institute colleagues that he hoped the gathering would live up 
to their ―highest standard,‖ a sentiment that reflected the strong regard he felt toward the 
Pacific organization.6   
The March 1947 Asian Relations Conference, with its all-Asian cast, did not 
represent a rebuke so much as a challenge to the IPR and indeed the West in general.  
The individual topics discussed—from anti-colonial nationalism to agricultural 
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development and public health—were less important than the fact that Asian nations were 
prepared to speak for themselves.  Westerners present were there to listen rather than 
guide.  Nehru, who recently had been appointed India‘s foreign minister in advance of 
formal independence, delivered an inaugural address to more than 10,000 people 
assembled in Delhi‘s historic Purana Qila (Old Fort), first in Hindi and then in English.  
―We stand at the end of an era and on the threshold of a new period of history,‖ Nehru 
began.  ―A change is coming over the scene now and Asia is again finding herself.  We 
live in a tremendous age of transition and already the next stage takes shape when Asia 
takes her rightful place with the other continents.‖  Nehru spoke of Asian unity as a 
natural condition, disrupted by centuries of Western imperialism that isolated countries 
from one another:      
Today this isolation is breaking down because of many reasons, political and 
other.  The old imperialisms are fading away.  The land routes have revived and 
air travel suddenly brings us very near to each other.  This Conference itself is 
significant as an expression of that deeper urge of the mind and spirit of Asia 
which has persisted in spite of the isolationism which grew up during the years of 
European domination.  As that domination goes, the walls that surround us fall 
down and we look at each other again and meet as old friends long parted.7 
The formulation of a natural Asian regional affinity, Nehru concluded, was only one step 
on the path toward overcoming ―narrow nationalism‖ and arriving at the larger ideal of 
world federation, based on universal human rights.  Nehru‘s broad internationalist vision 
tracked closely with traditional IPR ideals, and received broad support by the Western 
members in attendance.   
Delegates at the Asian Relations Conference quickly made clear that their purpose 
was to identify commonalities, not to pass any potentially controversial political 
resolutions, which mollified Western observers still further.  British policymakers, in 
particular, were struck by the relatively mild tone struck by the conference‘s delegates 
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regarding their past treatment.  While British imperialism in India may not have received 
any plaudits in New Delhi, it did not, in 1947, suffer particular scorn either.  One British 
observer at the conference, the Commonwealth historian Nicholas Mansergh, wrote a 
detailed report for the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) that 
circulated around the Colonial Office.  Mansergh was a cautious supporter of the 
conference that announced ―the awakening of a continent,‖ even if he felt the phrase to be 
cliché.  The Asian sense of confidence, he wrote, was great enough that the attitude 
toward British imperialism was one of condescension rather than anger toward a policy 
obviously in retreat.  Delegates therefore ―could afford to be tolerant and kind.‖8  For the 
British, this sentiment was a novel one. They had been admired, feared, and hated, but for 
the first time in generations, they were faced with a new attitude: relative indifference. 
Mansergh‘s optimistic conference report put British officials at ease concerning 
the potential formation of an Asian bloc.  Middle Eastern nations had assembled a similar 
kind of conference in Cairo in 1945, which led to the creation of the Arab League, a 
group that often criticized Western policies.  But Mansergh concluded that the assembled 
Asians displayed no such unity that could threaten the West; linguistic, religious and 
cultural divisions prevented a single Asian consciousness. Significantly, he noted, the 
only acceptable common language at the Asian Relations Conference was English.  
Furthermore, just beneath the surface of the conference bubbled tension between the 
India‘s delegates. The Muslim League led a boycott of the conference, claiming that it 
was merely a ploy for Congress Party officials to claim leadership over Asian affairs. 
Chinese members, meanwhile, were not prepared to concede the leadership of Asian 
affairs to Indians.  Southeast Asian countries, more than any other group, were beginning 
to develop a sense of political solidarity with one another, but maintained a deep 
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suspicion of both Chinese and Indian interest in their region.  In short, the continent-wide 
discussions at the Asian Relations Conference revealed fractiousness beneath the 
expressions of unity, and therefore should be ―cautiously but nonetheless sincerely 
welcomed in the West,‖ Mansergh concluded. 
Asian elites at the conference were determined to continue their efforts at regional 
solidarity, and thus designed institutional machinery to carry on their work.  To this end, 
delegates created the Asian Relations Organization (ARO), whose avowed purpose was, 
first, to promote the study and understanding of Asian problems; second, to foster 
friendly relations between the peoples of Asia; and third, to further their general well-
being.  This all-Asian international organization borrowed heavily (if not explicitly) from 
the Institute of Pacific Relations‘ governing ideals and organizational structure, with the 
significant exclusion of Westerners.  Individual national councils in each Asian country 
were meant to carry on scholarly, non-political work in international affairs, and 
periodically gather together for international conferences.  Bowing to pressure from their 
rivals for Asian leadership, the Indian organizers agreed to allow the Chinese to host the 
second ARO conference, scheduled for 1949.9 
British policymakers, on the cusp of relinquishing formal control over India, 
initially were concerned about losing their voice in the subcontinent if the Asian 
Relations Organization succeeded in excluding Western members.  India had a voice in 
the West through the Institute of Pacific Relations, the British argued, so why not allow 
Chatham House to affiliate with the Asian relations group?  Officials in the Foreign 
Office expressed concern, moreover, regarding the possibility that the Asian Soviet 
republics, like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, might use the ARO as a platform for Soviet 
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propaganda.  As one of the few Western observers at the Asian Relations Conference, 
Mansergh had the opportunity to have lunch with Nehru in mid-April, a few days after 
the conference, to express these British concerns.  The Indian leader did his best to 
placate British worries.  Nehru supported the idea of close association, if not 
membership, between Chatham House and the Asian Relations Organization. He 
remarked that Australia and New Zealand should be considered as full regional members, 
and that he did not anticipate an influential role for the Soviet republics in the Asian 
organization.  In the British High Commissioner‘s office in India, Sir Terence Shone 
reacted favorably to Nehru‘s remarks, and determined that Great Britain should abandon 
its bid for outright membership in the ARO ―and thereby avoid any step that might be 
interpreted as unwanted interference and might so alienate potential friends and allies.‖  
Shone had confidence that British supporters and surrogates in Asia such as Burma, 
Malaya, Ceylon, and Singapore could adequately represent a sympathetic point of view in 
any new Asian regional organization.10 
Within the leadership of the Institute of Pacific Relations, meanwhile, the 
challenge of the Asian Relations Organization was made abundantly clear a few months 
later at the September 1947 Stratford conference.  With only one Asian delegation from 
China and a handful of observers, the conference took on a decidedly Western aspect.11  
Americans and Europeans alike noted this problem, and pressed for greater representation 
among Asian nations.  ―There was a time when the IPR had a kind of monopoly in its 
field,‖ the American delegation said in a formal statement, but the Asian Relations 
Conference, and the creation of the ARO, had now changed this fact. ―The IPR can both 
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cooperate and compete with such developments, to the great profit of all concerned.  But 
in both cooperation and competition, unless we are prepared to adapt ourselves flexibly to 
changing circumstances, we shall be eclipsed.‖12  The American delegation proposed that 
the IPR should work to build up research programs in Asian countries, which would 
challenge the IPR‘s international secretariat to undertake more extensive translation and 
coordination responsibilities among the member councils.  The British and French 
delegations, meanwhile, saw an additional bonus in greater Asian representation, as it 
was yet another way of diluting American influence within the organization. 
Most national councils agreed, in principle, that the Institute of Pacific Relations 
should encourage greater participation of Asian voices in the Institute.  But how could 
they achieve this goal?  In the several months after the war, leaders of the IPR debated 
seriously whether to move the international headquarters from New York City to the 
Pacific Coast (San Francisco, Seattle, or Vancouver), or even to Asia (Shanghai or 
Manila).  Some simply wished to separate the American council and the international 
secretariat‘s headquarters, located within the same building on East 54
th
 St.  Others 
within the IPR believed that the leaders were far too close to American diplomatic 
machinery and governmental groups at the new United Nations rather than with the 
actual people of the Asia-Pacific region.  Still others thought that new Asian councils 
could be encouraged more directly with an IPR international headquarters close by.  In 
the end, however, the convenience of the New York office, with its proximity to 
foundation supporters, other international organizations and its easy contact with 
European members, won the day.  The IPR‘s central offices would remain on the 
American East Coast for the rest of its existence.  But the advent of the Asian Relations 
Organization had had its impact.  IPR leaders now looked with particular urgency upon 
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the Asian institutes of international relations as a way to maintain the Institute‘s status as 
a bridge across the Pacific—at once supportive of Asian nationalism, but ultimately 
committed to building a sense of Asian internationalism that could include Western 
participation.13  
 
EVANGELIZING THE IPR 
Although leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations decided not to move their 
international headquarters, they worked hard to bolster the Asian presence within the 
Institute during the years after World War II.  Asians, Europeans and even Americans 
themselves had been crying out for this change in IPR orientation for years, not least to 
cut away at the perceived U.S. dominance of the international group.  Between the years 
1947 and 1950 IPR leaders worked hard to develop and sustain new Asian councils, 
especially in countries that had recently emerged from Western colonialism.  But success 
at this effort was mixed.  One new Asian council—the Indian Council of World Affairs—
grew into a formidable Asian institute capable of vocalizing a strong, independent 
perspective within the Institute, while another council in Japan was reconstituted.  In 
most other cases, however, numerous difficulties, ranging from internal political 
divisions, lack of funds or personnel, or wider turmoil within the country prevented 
individual Asian councils from acting as a strong countervailing force to the Western 
presence in the IPR.   
Institute officials set about a new campaign to set up institutes of international 
relations as a kind of intellectual missionary work in the newly emergent countries of 
Asia. Edward Carter, the former IPR secretary-general, visited several countries in Asia 
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for a few months in 1948 in his capacity as a consultant for the United Nations Economic 
Commission to Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).  With his usual inexhaustible energy, 
Carter used his spare time to spread the IPR gospel, sending back several-page memos at 
a time on his progress.  His essential conclusion was that ―[w]e have not done nearly 
enough IPR propaganda in Asia,‖ Carter wrote his successor William Holland from Siam. 
―[I]n the newly organized countries and unorganized countries we have a clear field.‖  
Carter met with old YMCA friends, U.S. intelligence officials, and top Asian 
governmental leaders throughout the region, especially those with Western ties.  Carter 
waxed enthusiastically about the potential to ―educate‖ various Asian dignitaries, 
ambassadors and other international officials, especially those with extra cash, about 
lending their support for IPR activities.14 
But the prospect of setting up a strong IPR presence in these emergent countries 
was daunting.   Asian intellectuals may have wished to establish institutes of international 
affairs, but had little in the way of financial resources or qualified members willing to 
support such ventures.  The IPR, moreover, had standards for the creation of new national 
councils:  the national organization needed to demonstrate that it was a functioning 
research institute focusing on international affairs, with an active publication record; that 
it was independent and non-partisan, with no direct government funding for its 
operations; and finally that its membership was representative, with a healthy mix of 
scholarly and business interests.  Could smaller Asian countries hope to achieve this, and 
thereby gain entry into the IPR‘s international structure?  A meeting of top IPR leaders at 
the Rockefeller Foundation in early 1949 focused on this point, and participants 
acknowledged that ―concessions [on research standards] must be made if all-important 
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Far Eastern participation is to be secured.‖15  Holland, the IPR‘s new secretary-general, 
offered a plan to expedite membership for smaller countries, and then build up standards 
within the group as quickly as possible. 
Bolstering Asian membership proved to be no easy task, as the situation in Burma 
illustrated.  IPR officials targeted the Burma Council of World Affairs as a potential 
national council—a pre-existing group but with little outside support.  With Burma‘s 
formal independence from the United Kingdom in 1948, it appeared an ideal time to 
emphasize the need for greater study and cooperation in international relations.  Holland 
wrote J.S. Furnivall, a former British colonial officer, respected author, and advisor to the 
Burmese government, regarding the possibility of reviving the council.16  Furnivall 
succeeded in rounding up a handful of Burmese citizens—an accountant and a former 
judge, among them—to resuscitate the organization, but with mixed results.  When the 
head of Chatham House‘s Pacific Relations committee, A.S.B. Olver, visited the Burma 
Council of World Affairs in late 1950 he reported that more Indians than Burmese 
seemed to be running the meetings!17 In any case, the Burmese were unable to provide 
sufficient evidence of an active research agenda to justify their inclusion as an IPR 
national council for the next several years.18  
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Even in countries that showed a greater ability to establish institutes of 
international affairs, IPR leadership sometimes demurred from accepting them into the 
fold over questions of fair representation. In February 1946, a group of Koreans 
established a Korean foreign affairs association, and that summer sent a cable to William 
Holland asking to affiliate with the IPR.  Holland noted that while the proposed 
membership looked sound, the group appeared to consist solely of southern Koreans, who 
were living under American military government at the time. Any true Korean institute of 
international affairs must also include Koreans living in the north, he believed, even 
though reconciliation between the two was a distant prospect, at best.19  The setback was 
a blow to the Koreans, who had been marginalized from IPR activities for decades.20  But 
even in the postwar era, international recognition was slow in coming.  A single guest 
observer—Mr. Kim Woo Pyung, the executive secretary of the National Economic Board 
for the South Korean interim government—attended the IPR‘s Stratford conference in 
1947.  The Korean Institute of International Affairs continued to operate in the postwar 
years, but with little organizational help from the IPR.21  
A more established Asian council, the Philippines IPR, had its own internal 
problems, largely the result of political fallout from the war.  Conquered by Japan in 
early 1942, numerous prominent intellectuals in the Philippines worked under Japanese 
occupation for the duration of the war.  In the aftermath of Japan‘s surrender, the 
reckoning began.  Claro Recto published Three Years of Enemy Occupation in 1946, 
essentially an extended apologia for those who participated in the wartime military 
administration of the Philippines.  Conrado Benitez, the chairman of the Philippine 
                                                 
19 W.L. Holland to P.M. Corbett, July 26, 1946, in Box 204, ―Holland, W.L.,‖ Pacific Relations, COL.  
20 Korean delegates had been present at the IPR’s inaugural gathering in Honolulu in 1925, but they had 
been forced to withdraw in 1929 at the insistence of the Japanese, who insisted that the Koreans be 
represented by the Japanese empire.   
21 American delegation Stratford meeting notes, Sept. 14, 1947, in Box 220, ―International Secretariat—
Pacific Council,‖ Pacific Relations, COL. 
 132 
Council of the IPR, dean of the College at the University of the Philippines and a 
prominent supporter of President Manuel Roxas, wrote an introduction to the book, in 
which he extolled its virtues as part of a ―public obligation‖ to understand what happened 
during the war, a seeming endorsement of the so-called collaborationists.22  But William 
Holland saw only trouble when he received a signed copy of Recto‘s book.  Although he 
was personally friendly with Benitez, Holland noted that American governmental 
officials already had expressed their suspicions about the loyalty of Benitez and other 
Philippine IPR members supportive of Roxas for the latter‘s participation in the wartime 
government.23  
The issue of wartime collaboration and the Philippine IPR erupted into a full-
blown media circus in February 1947, when Holland made a routine visit to the 
Philippines as part of a larger Asian trip.  At a meeting of the Philippine IPR, Holland 
presented to Benitez a complimentary copy of a recent American IPR pamphlet, Cross 
Currents in the Philippines.  Holland had little idea, however, of the pamphlet‘s 
potentially incendiary contents.  Co-authored by Bernard Seaman and Laurence 
Salisbury, the American IPR-produced booklet was highly critical of President Roxas and 
declared his supporters to be ―collaborationist‖ and ―fascist-minded,‖ including 
prominent citizens like Abelardo Subido, editor of the Manila Post.24  Subido promptly 
filed suit against Holland for publicly ―exhibiting‖ the allegedly libelous pamphlet, and 
had the IPR secretary-general briefly detained by the police.  In the heat of the moment, 
                                                 
22 Claro M. Recto, Three Years of Enemy Occupation: The Issue of Political Collaboration in the 
Philippines (Manila: People’s Publishers, 1946), xii.  Conrado Benitez, a prominent English-language 
journalist and co-author of the 1935 Philippine constitution, was a long-standing supporter of the IPR. 
23 W.L. Holland to P.M. Corbett, April 26, 1946, in Box 204, ―Holland, W.L.,‖ Pacific Relations, COL.  
24 Both authors were American.  Seaman was on the staff of the Army Writers Project in the Philippines 
during the war, while Salisbury was with the State Department, attached to the staff of the American High 
Commissioner.  Julius C.C. Edelstein, Acting Director of Information and Cultural Relations, U.S. 
Embassy, Manila, Despatch 526, Feb. 13, 1947, in RG 59, Central Decimal File, 811.43, National Archives 
and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 
 133 
Subido even threatened to kill Seaman and Salisbury for accusing him of being a 
Japanese agent!  Adding to the embarrassment for Holland and the IPR was the 
publication of a story about Philippine Ambassador to the United States Joaquin Miguel 
Elizalde, who reportedly suggested that Philippine IPR members should resign their 
membership because of the pamphlet‘s accusations. Newspaper reports fanned the flames 
for several days before Subido agreed to drop the case, apologies were issued all around, 
and Holland was allowed to continue with his trip.  But tensions between the Philippine 
IPR and their American counterparts remained.  From this episode it was clear that 
Filipino intellectuals were still working their way through not only the aftermath of 
Japanese occupation, but also the larger legacy of American imperialism.  Nationalist 
sentiment therefore took on a particularly anti-American cast, and hampered full Filipino 
participation in the IPR during the post-war period.25 
More positive news came from Japan, still under occupation by the American 
military.  The Japanese national council had not participated in the Institute of Pacific 
Relations since early 1941, but emerged in the postwar period ready to renew its ties.  
American occupation officials apparently were eager as well; General Douglas 
MacArthur‘s advisers promoted the revitalization of the Japan Institute of Pacific Studies, 
which had served as the Japanese IPR council before the war.  With the resumption of 
international postal service in Japan on May 1, 1948, the Japanese Institute‘s longtime 
secretary, M. Matsuo, immediately sent a long letter to William Holland requesting 
renewed affiliation with the IPR.  Matsuo described the Japanese group‘s recent 
successes: the opening of a new regional committee in the Kansai district (including the 
cities of Osaka and Kyoto), a major research project on Japanese land utilization, and the 
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publication of a series of booklets on the economic and political problems confronting 
Japan.  But all this renewed activity could not hide the group‘s lack of international 
connections.  ―Having been isolated for all practical purposes for a decade or so, Japanese 
scholars feel sore lack of advanced Western intellectual achievements,‖ Matsuo wrote.  In 
1948, Japan had not yet been granted formal independence, but Matsuo and his Japanese 
colleagues were eager to return to the IPR community they had been separated from since 
the beginning of World War II.26 
Western IPR leaders were happy to see a strengthened Japanese council come 
back into the fold as a sign of growing Asian membership.  But they first needed proof 
that the old Japanese council had been thoroughly purged of its pre-war leadership.  
Charles E. Martin, a University of Washington professor, visited the Japan Institute of 
Pacific Studies in October 1948 and attended a meeting of its Board of Directors. Martin 
sent to New York a confidential memorandum that confirmed that the governing board—
comprised of presidents of companies, universities and news organizations—was well 
balanced and free from ―ideological machinations.‖27  In January 1949, the IPR‘s 
governing body, the Pacific Council, approved the Japanese Institute‘s application for 
affiliation.  Dr. Hyce Ouchi, vice president of the Japanese Institute and an economics 
professor at the University of Tokyo, submitted a statement to the IPR repudiating the 
past actions of the Japanese council and promising that their re-entry into the 
international organization would facilitate the democratic project in postwar Japan.28  In 
the fall of 1949, Holland made a personal visit to the Japanese Institute, where he 
formally welcomed it back into the IPR community.  Mr. K. Shidehara, the speaker of the 
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House of Representatives for the Japanese Diet, commended the IPR secretary-general in 
a special session of the Japanese council, and noted the ―supreme importance‖ of the 
renewal of Japanese contact with the international group: ―It will serve as a barometer for 
Japan to see how the wind blows in distant lands,‖ Shidehara predicted. ―I fervently pray 
for the smooth working of this commendable enterprise.‖29   
The speedy re-admittance of a Japanese council into the IPR family was a 
celebrated event in Japan, but the group‘s re-entry caused some unforeseen complications 
for the international IPR.  Despite Martin‘s protestations of a ―well-balanced‖ group, 
some intellectuals in Japan began to paint the Japanese IPR as a leftist organization.  
Masao Ichimata, a professor at Waseda University, brazenly claimed during a meeting 
with IPR leaders that the Japanese IPR was ―under Communist influence,‖ a highly 
inflammatory (and unsubstantiated) charge during the height of McCarthyist red-baiting 
in the United States.30  Matsuo, the Japanese council‘s executive secretary, hastily 
dismissed the charges as complaints by outsiders who felt excluded from the reconfigured 
Japanese IPR.  He cited the patronage of politically safe and prominent establishment 
figures like Shidehara, as well as Naoto Ichimada, governor of the Bank of Japan and 
Kumakichi Nakajima, president of the Japan Foreign Trade Association. ―As far as the 
present members of the Institute are concerned,‖ Matsuo wrote Holland, ―there is 
absolutely no split at all among our members and … there is no trend whatever of leftist 
influence.‖31  Mollified, if not put entirely at ease, Holland and other IPR leaders urged 
the Japanese to use caution and discretion in its future activities. 
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Ideological divisions in Japan paled in comparison to the political turmoil 
enveloping China in the postwar years.  As early as 1946 the Chinese IPR council was 
beginning to strain under the reopening of civil war between nationalist and communist 
factions.  During World War II, the council had maintained its strong ties to Chiang Kai-
shek and the nationalists, and complained vociferously whenever fellow IPR members 
attacked the government‘s policies.  The chairman of China‘s IPR council, the prominent 
philosopher Hu Shih, had served as wartime ambassador to the United States and was 
now the chancellor of Peking University.  Yet even Hu could do nothing to prevent the 
drift toward demoralization in the council, symptomatic of a larger malaise as nationalists 
lost ground to the growing communist movement.  Meanwhile, competitors to the 
Chinese IPR arose.  T.V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek‘s brother-in-law and incidentally no 
great friend of Hu Shih, sponsored the creation of a new organization, the China Institute 
of International Affairs, and enlisted some leading Chinese scholars to join, which only 
sapped the Chinese IPR still further.32  During a 1948 visit to China, Edward Carter 
found the Chinese IPR to be practically non-existent, and recommended that thousands of 
dollars be poured into the organization. ―Personally I think it would be healthier to have a 
strongly and militantly KMT China IPR than to have no IPR at all which almost is the 
case today,‖ Carter wrote his colleagues. 33 Instead, a kind of quiet despair settled over 
the group as the country slipped further into chaos.  
With the Chinese IPR essentially moribund, IPR officials increasingly relied on 
Americans in China to provide information and connections regarding news on the civil 
war.  In this regard no one could equal Dorothy Borg, a professor at Peiping National 
University who served as an American IPR staffer during the critical months of 
                                                 
32 William L. Holland to Percy Corbett, July 26, 1946, in Box 204, ―Holland, W.L.,‖ Pacific Relations, 
COL. 
33 E.C. Carter to assorted, Aug. 5, 1948, in Box 231, ―Edward C. Carter – general,‖ Pacific Relations, 
COL. 
 137 
revolution.  Borg, who later would become a mentor to generations of China scholars at 
Columbia University, was a ―tower of strength‖ for the Institute and a boost to its 
prestige, Carter reported after his 1948 visit.34  By February of 1949, Borg was convinced 
that the Chinese Communists would soon come into power, and advised IPR officials to 
adjust accordingly.  Borg noted that Hu Shih most likely would be placed in exile, along 
with the rest of the Chinese IPR board, but that IPR officials should welcome the 
opportunity to ―clean house—heaven knows it has been needed for many years.‖35  
Perhaps the revolution might force American scholars to make contacts with Chinese 
intellectuals beyond those favored by the East Coast elite, she concluded. 
A few stalwart members such as Liu Yu-Tang (Daniel Lew) worked to secure 
past-due contributions to the Pacific Council, and held out hope that perhaps the Chinese 
IPR council might reconfigure itself as a mixture of members in exile in Taiwan, and 
those who remained in Peiping and were amenable to the new regime.36  But the 
revolution soon rendered any coordination of Chinese intellectuals unworkable.  It fell to 
Lew, one of the secretaries-general of the Asian Relations Organization, to announce the 
cancellation of the second ARO conference, scheduled to be held in China in 1949.  
Months later, the Chinese IPR itself withdrew from the international IPR.  Hu Shih‘s 
formal, anodyne letter cited ―the cumulative effect of many years of disagreement on 
matters of policy and opinion‖ as the reason for the termination of their relationship.37  
Holland accepted the Chinese withdrawal with regret but without surprise.  Although IPR 
officials attempted to keep some unofficial Chinese contacts alive in the 1950s, the 
revolution effectively put an end to the IPR‘s 25-year-old presence in China.    
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THE LUCKNOW CONFERENCE, 1950 
The loss of the Chinese IPR council was a major setback for Pacific 
internationalists, but the re-admittance of the Japanese IPR caused more immediate 
problems regarding the next international conference.  The Australian Institute of 
International Affairs and the Philippines Institute of Pacific Relations had been vying to 
host the next international IPR conference, an occasion that promised to confer 
heightened prestige and publicity upon the selected national council.  But with memories 
of the war still fresh in the spring of 1949, neither country‘s government was prepared to 
issue visas to Japanese delegates.  The secretary of the Australian Institute, R.F.G. Boyer, 
indicated that any Japanese delegation would be persona non grata for the Australian 
government and its people, and advised holding the conference without the Japanese, a 
decision supported by the New Zealand council.  Conrado Benitez of the Philippine IPR 
similarly reported ongoing national feelings of ―deep resentment‖ and ―disgust‖ toward 
the Japanese, made worse by the recent decision by the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers (SCAP) to deny war reparations to the Philippines.  Benitez agreed with 
the assessment of Philippine Ambassador to the United States Carlos Romulo, who 
privately warned that the Philippine government could not guarantee the safety of 
potential Japanese delegates.  Faced with this opposition, other councils questioned 
whether the not-yet-independent Japanese should even have a council with full member 
status.38   
At a New York meeting of the IPR‘s Pacific Council in January 1949, leaders of 
the various national councils met to decide the troublesome issue of Japanese 
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participation in the next international conference.  Australia, supported by New Zealand, 
France and Britain, continued to press its case for hosting the meeting, saying that IPR 
members already had provisionally accepted the idea at Stratford in 1947.  Edward 
Carter, on the cusp of retirement from the American IPR, ostensibly pressed for the 
Philippines, with support from India and China.  Chatham House officials, however, 
already suspected that Carter‘s real aim was to promote India as an Asian host who 
would permit the Japanese—Carter‘s ―last kick,‖ as Ivison Macadam put it.39  Carter 
intimated that the failure of the IPR to secure a conference site in Asia would essentially 
put them out of business as an Asian regional organization, but that he was ―happy‖ to 
report that the Asian Relations Organization might be able to take up some of the work 
that the IPR had abdicated.  This mild rebuke worked, and Carter eventually got his way.  
Working behind the scenes throughout the summer of 1949, IPR officials successfully 
wooed the Indians to agree to host the next international gathering in the fall of 1950.  
The decision to have the IPR‘s international conference in India brought, once 
again, considerable international prestige and attention to the Indian Council of World 
Affairs.  By the eve of Indian independence in 1947, it became clear that the ICWA had 
consolidated its status as the pre-eminent institute of international affairs in India, 
confirmed by its successful coordination of the Asian Relations Conference.  The 
American IPR delegation to the September 1947 Stratford conference strongly urged 
fellow delegates to recognize the ICWA as the IPR‘s national council in India—a plea to 
which the British acquiesced only after hearing that members of the Indian Institute of 
International Affairs, the more Chatham House-friendly organization, largely had 
transplanted themselves to Pakistan, where they intended to carry on their work as the 
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs.  Both were thus accorded membership into the 
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IPR at the same time.  The more-powerful and better-organized Indians, however, made it 
clear that they now expected greater consideration; P.S. Lokanathan, the ICWA‘s 
executive secretary, wrote to William Holland that his group was now ―a tough adult 
product‖ and said Chatham House was ―unwise … to have treated it like an infant.‖40  
One American IPR member in India noted that the ICWA‘s burgeoning international 
reputation made them powerful enough that they did not need to woo the IPR for 
affiliation; rather, the IPR, in need of Asian membership and support, now must come to 
them.41 
As the October 1950 conference drew near, it became clear that this IPR gathering 
had the potential for much greater contentiousness and wider impact than the previous 
international conference in Great Britain in 1947.  For one, this IPR conference was the 
first to be held in an Asian country since 1931, reducing the numbers of Westerners 
prepared to travel for the 10-day gathering.  Despite the recent loss of the Chinese 
council, many more Asian voices now participated in the IPR: delegations arrived from 
India, Pakistan, and Japan, while guest observers came from Burma, Malaya, Vietnam 
and newly independent Indonesia.  Second, international circumstances heightened the 
drama: the Korean War erupted a few months before the conference began, crystallizing 
the debate over Western interference in Asia.  Third, IPR leaders decided to widen the 
scope of the conference to encompass not only economic development, but broader 
political considerations: the working theme was ―Nationalism in the Far East and its 
International Consequences.‖  Finally, in a departure from past IPR practice, Institute 
officials opened up many of the round-table discussions to reporters in an attempt to 
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garner greater publicity for the group. As a result the daily proceedings of the conference 
were well covered by the international press. 
More than three eventful years after the 1947 Asian Relations Conference, the 
IPR set itself the daunting task of evaluating the state of Asian nationalism over the two-
week conference in the northern Indian city of Lucknow. And just as he did three years 
before at the Asian Relations Conference, Jawaharlal Nehru, now India‘s prime minister, 
opened the proceedings at the IPR‘s eleventh international conference on the morning of 
October 3, 1950.  Nehru noted that he had been a long-time supporter of the IPR, and 
remarked that the international organization was ―particularly situated‖ to help enable 
Westerners to better understand Asia, as well as Asians to understand the West.  The core 
of much contemporary misunderstanding between these two groups was over the subject 
of nationalism, he noted.   If anything, Nehru himself appeared more, not less, concerned 
about the impact of nationalism in post-colonial Asia: 
In the case of a country under foreign domination, it is easy to describe what 
nationalism is.  It is anti-foreign power.  But, in a free country, what is 
nationalism? Certainly it is something positive, though opinions may vary.  Even 
so, I think a large element of it is negative, and sometimes we find that 
nationalism, which is a healthy force in a country, a progressive force, a liberating 
force, becomes—maybe after liberation—unhealthy, retrogressive, reactionary or 
expansionist and looks with greedy eyes on other countries, as did those countries 
against which it fought for its freedom. 
Nationalism was simply a fact in postwar Asia, Nehru concluded—a condition that 
politicians should do their best to control in order that larger feelings of empathy can 
result, as opposed to the encouragement of prejudice and exclusion.42 
Unlike the earlier Asian Relations Conference, which dealt with the problems of 
Asian nationalism in the context of wider regional affiliation, Nehru was speaking before 
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an IPR audience concerned about how to reconcile Asian nationalism and the West.  The 
problem had only been exacerbated by the onset of the Cold War.  Were Asian interests 
inherently different from those of the West?  Recent history had created something that 
could be defined as an ―Asian sentiment,‖ Nehru believed, but this masked enormous 
differences in history and culture among the peoples of Asia. Furthermore, he asserted 
that the flowering of an Asian sentiment did not necessarily mean that West and East 
were somehow natural antagonists.  ―Personally I do not set much weight on this belief of 
an Orient and an Occident as if there were a basic difference between what is called 
Occident and what is called Orient,‖ Nehru said.43  His speech underlined the basic 
philosophy that had girded the IPR for the past 25 years—that dialogue and reconciliation 
across the Pacific was possible, that Asia and the West could find common ground. 
The lofty idealism of Nehru‘s opening address came under attack in the several 
days of discussion that followed.  Early in the conference the British delegation dismissed 
the very notion of an ―international society‖ that existed outside the interests of 
individual nation-states, and preferred that the conference discussion be focused entirely 
on considerations of trade and power.  Appealing to Nehru-style internationalism, they 
claimed, was merely an ―illicit abstract‖ that served to confuse rather than clarify the very 
real difficulties between the nations of the world.44  This realist view of world affairs, 
based upon the recognition of clashing national interests, served as a cold splash of water 
on many of the older internationalists at the gathering.  Understanding differences was 
deemed more important than finding commonalities. 
Others claimed that in the fight against communism, promoting differences 
between nations might have greater utility than attempting to forge a common world 
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view.  Some argued that there was a basic intellectual problem confronting the 
democratic nations of the word: Communism had been left unchallenged as a world 
ideology.  Could intellectuals in Asia and the West work together to develop such a 
common ideology?  Perhaps this was not necessary, some delegates suggested.  While 
many Western countries had joined together in the fight against communism, Asian 
nationalism—directed primarily against Western imperialism—prevented any shared 
ideology from taking root.  Michael Straight, the editor of The New Republic who acted 
as a reporter for the IPR political roundtable, summarized one discussion: 
It was suggested that the objectives set for common action may be totally 
different for the nations of the West, and for the West and Asia.  Military and 
economic necessities make integration the task of the Western nations.  
Integration in turn compels a recognition of a common ideology.  In the relations 
of the West and Asia however the objective is cooperation rather than integration.  
The need for a common ideology is consequently less.  It may be that far from 
searching for a single doctrine of universal application, our task is to stress the 
diversity of those nations, and to attack communist ideology precisely for its 
insistence that there can be one doctrine, one state, one party, one method for 
organizing society which is right for all peoples.45  
The emphasis upon diversity as an argument against communism was becoming an 
effective rhetorical tool in the Western argument against Soviet-style imperialism, but in 
this case, it also served to undermine the larger project of reconciling East and West.   
If the Lucknow conference discussions confirmed the differences between ―East‖ 
and ―West,‖ it also confirmed a new representative of the West: the United States.  Asian 
delegates made clear that they no longer viewed the United States as the benevolent 
supporter of Asian independence, but rather as the inheritors of fellow Westerners‘ 
colonial policies.  So while some Western delegates urged newly independent Asian 
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countries to move beyond the legacy of their colonial past,46 Asian delegates pushed back 
and declared they simply did not believe that the age of imperialism was over.  Many of 
these delegates articulated a view of imperialism that included economic rather than 
formal control, and which implicated primarily the United States rather than their former 
colonial masters.47  Asian delegates at various times lobbed a series of accusations: the 
United States had extended its military bases too far into Asia, was preparing to fight the 
Soviet Union on Asian soil, was willing to use the atom bomb in Asia but not in Europe, 
and regarded Asian life as expendable in wartime.  Furthermore, Asian delegates accused 
the United States of leading the United Nations into Korea based on narrow strategic self-
interest, and that Americans were prepared to extend economic aid to Asia only if Asians 
subordinated their foreign policy to that of the United States.     
The blunt criticism of American policies clearly rattled the U.S. delegates, who 
found themselves in the novel position of attorneys defending ―the West‖ rather than 
promoting Asian freedom as they had done at previous IPR gatherings.  After one early 
session, an American delegate told a reporter: ―Back home I was considered something of 
a leftist, but here I feel as if I am on the extreme right.‖48  Another American during a 
political round-table discussion said that the West had been put unfairly into a no-win 
situation, and described the intertwined set of paradoxes for American policymakers: if 
the West gave aid, Asians would claim economic imperialism, but if it withheld aid, 
Asians would denounce indifference.  Likewise, if the West established military bases, 
Asians would complain about expansionism, but if it did not, other forms of aggression 
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might arise. Finally, if the West aided progressive Asian politicians, Asians would 
condemn such political interference, yet if it did nothing, the West would be accused of 
siding with the forces of repression and the status quo.  ―In other words,‖ the American 
delegate concluded, ―we are damned if we do and damned if we don‘t.‖49  Americans at 
Lucknow learned quickly the consequences of being the regional hegemon. 
Perhaps because of the frank exchanges among delegates, IPR officials and their 
backers alike expressed satisfaction with the results of the Lucknow conference. William 
Holland wrote several people that he felt that the conference had been the most successful 
IPR gathering since at least 1936 due to the equal numbers of Western and Asian 
delegates.  Holland felt that the debates, while sometimes contentious, were not as ill-
tempered as many news reports implied.50  Roger Evans, Willits‘ deputy at the 
Rockefeller Foundation, attended the conference himself and reported that given the 
emotional context of the ongoing Korean conflict, the IPR method ―rose to the test 
remarkably well.‖  Evans was also particularly hopeful that the Lucknow conference 
might give a lift to Asian councils in need of strengthening.51  Finally, one of the 
American delegates, Carl Spaeth, the dean of Stanford Law School, noted in a lecture 
upon his return to the United States that the conference‘s ability to air criticisms of the 
West in a tolerant atmosphere revealed the IPR‘s very strengths.  Spaeth quoted Ray 
Lyman Wilbur, the recently deceased Stanford University chancellor and longtime IPR 
supporter, who had spoken at the 1927 Stanford commencement about the effectiveness 
of such gatherings: ―To see yourself as others see you, to view your own country through 
                                                 
49 Holland, ed., Asian Nationalism and the West, p. 387. 
50 ―Mr. Holland’s Comments on the Lucknow Conference,‖ Minutes of Executive Meeting, American 
Institute of Pacific Relations, Dec. 6, 1950, in Box 324, ―AMCO – New York Minutes of Executive 
Meeting,‖ Pacific Relations, COL. 
51 Roger F. Evans to Clayton Lane, Nov. 1, 1950, in RF files, RG 1.1, Series 200, Box 352, Folder 4196, 
RAC. 
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the questioning eyes of foreign neighbors, is a chastening and wholesome experience and 
one that millions must undergo if we are to deal successfully across the great ocean.‖52 
  Twenty-five years after the founding of the IPR, however, many Americans 
preferred to be validated rather than chastened.  News reports during the Lucknow 
conference created a stir in the United States when they noted the IPR‘s facilitation of 
anti-American sentiment at a prominent international forum.  George Langdon, writing in 
the conservative periodical The Freeman, lambasted the conference as a ―sustained anti-
American orgy of oratory and debate.‖  Langdon asked, rhetorically: Why did Asians 
have such a distorted view of American motivations?  His unsurprising answer was that 
the IPR itself was to blame.  ―Asia has been learning about United States policy from the 
same ‗experts‘ who have been telling the American people what to think and do about 
Asia,‖ he wrote.  Langdon attacked the very root of the IPR‘s mission—to see beyond 
one‘s national perspective—by asserting that American experts on Asia should be 
obliged to express ―an American point of view, dictated by the interests of the security of 
the United States … .‖  But instead, these American experts on Asia appeared to enjoy 
the abuses rained down on the United States.  Perhaps it was time, Langdon suggested, 
that Asians tried harder to understand the ―wholly unmysterious‖ United States, rather 
than have Americans delving into the ―mysticism‖ of Asia.53  
Such complaints were not merely lodged in anti-communist magazines, but were 
brought to the front door of the IPR‘s principal backers.  The Lucknow conference 
proceedings in India had barely ended when Jay Lovestone—the former general secretary 
of the Communist Party USA in the 1920s who had become executive secretary of the 
staunchly anti-communist Free Trade Union Committee—scheduled a lunch with Joseph 
                                                 
52 Carl B. Spaeth, ―The Lucknow Conference – India and the U.S.,‖ Dec. 1950, in RF files, RG 1.1, Series 
200, Box 358, Folder 4249, RAC. 
53 George Langdon, ―At the Old Stand,‖ The Freeman, in RF files, RG 1.1, Series 200, Box 361, Folder 
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H. Willits, the social sciences director of the Rockefeller Foundation, in New York City.  
Lovestone showed Willits an anonymous report from Lucknow that called the conference 
an ―abysmal failure‖ because ―many of the Asian delegates, particularly our all-knowing 
Indian delegates, went out of their way to be rude to the American and Canadian 
representatives spitting out of the corners of mouth chants of ‗Wall Street capitalism,‘ 
‗American Imperialism,‘ ―Hands Off Korea‘ and what-not.‖ Lovestone reiterated his 
point in a note to the Rockefeller officer a few days later: ―No good can come out of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations in the future,‖ he warned Willits, who had just managed to 
negotiate financial support to the IPR for another two years.  ―Entirely as a friend I say to 
you that in continuing to support this institute, your Foundation is running a grave risk of 
losing considerable prestige.‖54  Friendly or otherwise, the prediction was sound. 
By 1950, the Institute of Pacific Relations had successfully transformed itself into 
an international body that balanced Western and Asian viewpoints at its conferences.  
The strong presence of Indian and Pakistani voices (and the reintroduction of the 
Japanese IPR) meant that critics no longer could claim the Institute was merely a 
propaganda tool for the West.55  The Lucknow conference, in particular, featured Asian 
delegates openly speaking out against American regional policies.  The fact that the 
conference took place amid the Korean War only heightened the stakes for finding frank 
and honest discussion.  But what the IPR gained in international stature was also a 
potential stumbling block in the United States.  Americans were little accustomed to 
accusations of ―imperialism,‖ especially at a conference that was largely supported by 
                                                 
54 Jay Lovestone to Joseph Willits, Oct. 16, 1950; Willits to Lovestone, Oct. 17, 1950; Lovestone to 
Willits, Oct. 24, 1950; all in RF files, RG 1.1, Series 200, Box 358, Folder 4247, RAC.  
55 The Soviet Union’s official news agency, TASS, claimed that IPR, ―one of the unofficial channels by 
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to ―hoodwink‖ the Asian peoples. ―Soviet reports on the Lucknow conference,‖ copies of translated TASS 
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U.S. philanthropic and corporate support.  Even more worrisome for the Institute was the 
fallout from the ―loss‖ of China to communism in 1949.  Asia specialists in the IPR had 
criticized Chiang for years, but their connections to the American diplomatic 
establishment made the independent organization a ripe target for Senator Joseph 
McCarthy‘s broader attacks on American policy in China.  For the rest of the IPR‘s life, it 
would be dogged by the accusations of communist sympathy, even as some of its leaders 
reiterated their mission to become potential allies in the struggle to win Asian minds. 
 149 
Chapter Five 
“Machinations”: The IPR and the McCarthy Moment, 1950-1952 
Over a quarter-century, the Institute of Pacific Relations had built a reputation in 
the United States as an objective and non-partisan research organization.  Within the 
course of a few months, this reputation shattered amid public accusations of communist 
infiltration.  In the wake of the ―loss‖ of China to the communists in 1949, Senator 
Joseph McCarthy (R-Wisc.) and his allies labeled the American IPR a communist front 
organization, and charged that the group, through its supposedly shadowy influence 
within the State Department, was largely responsible for the recent failures in U.S. Far 
Eastern policy.  In early 1951, Senate Judiciary Chairman Pat McCarran (D-Nev.) 
launched hearings into the IPR‘s alleged violation of the Internal Security Act, and 
overnight, the American council was thrust into the limelight, its programs and personnel 
dissected in the national media for evidence of subversive activity.  During the course of 
the McCarran subcommittee hearings, a few ex-staffers refused to answer questions 
regarding past association with the communist party—sufficient evidence for some to 
cast doubt on the entire Institute.  In the wake of the hearings, Senator McCarran went so 
far to conclude that ―but for the machinations of the small group … China today would 
be free.‖1  Individual American IPR members and prominent backers quickly retreated 
from public support, leaving the American council in a precarious state of affairs, a 
situation from which it would never fully recover. 
Scholars of postwar American politics have documented the way in which anti-
communist politicians used the IPR to bludgeon the State Department over its foreign 
                                                 
1 Quoted in John N. Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars and American Politics 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), p. 94. 
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policy in Asia.2  Studies have concluded that despite the charges, the Institute was not 
parroting a pro-communist line, nor did it directly influence American foreign policy in 
East Asia.  Most of the top leaders of the American IPR, moreover, were not especially 
sympathetic to the Soviet Union—or if they were, they did not let their personal feelings 
affect the Institute‘s work.  John N. Thomas, in the only book-length treatment of the IPR 
during the McCarthy era, concluded that there was no evidence that a communist cell 
operated in the IPR which might have influenced the Institute‘s research agenda, 
publication record or conference proceedings.  Thomas nevertheless was critical of IPR 
leaders for not being more sensitive to the changing political climate in the United States 
and asserting a stronger anti-communist stance—a contention that this chapter 
challenges.  Furthermore, although Thomas generally has exonerated the IPR from its 
senatorial inquisitors, he focused his study exclusively upon the American council, and 
thus failed to consider the IPR‘s larger international considerations in their response to 
critics. IPR leaders, presiding over a dozen national councils, had more than just an 
American constituency to satisfy.  This chapter thus places the McCarthyist moment in 
the context of the IPR‘s role as a liaison between institutes of international affairs in 
Europe, North America, and Asia, and asks broader questions: What implications might 
these charges have on the IPR as an actor in international relations?  And to what extent 
did the McCarthyist moment impact the Western struggle for Asian minds? 
Leaders of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, this chapter argues, were 
trapped in a double bind during the McCarthy era.  An embrace of strident anti-
communism may have placated some domestic critics, but it did nothing to convince 
Asian intellectuals to accept the IPR as a truly independent forum in international 
relations.  They were caught, in other words, between the need to bolster support in the 
                                                 
2 The best work on the McCarthy moment in American history is David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So 
Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (New York: The Free Press, 1983). 
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United States and the need to bolster Asian membership in the international Institute.  
Their troubles did not end there, however. To win support at home, the American IPR 
needed to assert its role in furthering the national interest, and at the same time convince 
the American public of the utility of free and open international exchange based on the 
IPR model—even if that exchange might lead to scathing criticism of the United States, 
such as that expressed at the October 1950 conference in Lucknow, India.  The American 
IPR‘s high wire act was precarious even before the McCarran hearings began; once the 
Institute lost its balance in the public eye, it found it impossible to climb back up.  
This chapter makes clear that Senators McCarthy and McCarran‘s attacks upon 
the Institute of Pacific Relations did not simply weaken the free exchange of ideas among 
American scholars, but also had the ironic effect of compromising the project of 
constructing a ―Free Asia.‖  By the late 1940s, Institute leaders in the United States 
recognized that they needed to project a stronger adherence to anti-communism in order 
to be considered a fully ―objective‖ research organization by State Department officials 
and the American public at large—a contradiction in itself that only a few older members 
noticed.  The Institute‘s belated move to the right, however, was insufficient to inoculate 
itself against the onslaught of the McCarthyist campaign during this period.  By focusing 
on the IPR‘s older record, Senators McCarthy and McCarran revealed themselves to be 
more interested in discrediting the U.S. State Department and its past policies toward 
Asia rather than truly understanding the IPR‘s potentially positive utility as a private 
organization with links to non-communist Asia. In falsely blaming the IPR for the ―loss‖ 
of China to the communists, McCarthy and McCarran undermined the Institute‘s ability 
to remain a robust international organization that could encourage and coordinate non-
communist Asian intellectuals.   
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ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE AMERICAN IPR 
One of the many ironies involved in the story of the IPR is that by the time of the 
McCarran hearings in 1951, the American council—as distinct from the international 
secretariat—already had transformed itself into a staunchly anti-communist entity.  It had 
done so largely as a matter of practical necessity.  As a private organization, the 
American IPR was beholden to the support of financial contributors—foundations, 
corporations and individuals—who of course were not immune to the onset of the Cold 
War.  American IPR officials also were aware of the need to maintain dialogue with the 
U.S. foreign policy establishment, which grew ever more anti-communist in the several 
months after the close of World War II.  The postwar perception of the American council 
may have been that of an unrepentant, wooly-minded internationalist organization from 
the 1930s, but in important ways, it had grown to reflect the dominant ideas in American 
society by the end of the 1940s.  
As relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, American IPR leaders began to 
recognize that their non-judgmental approach to foreign affairs might have serious 
consequences for their viability within the new Cold War climate.  At the American 
council‘s national conference in April 1947 in Coronado, California, about 100 
participants, including State Department specialists in Asian and Pacific affairs, spent 
time evaluating American foreign policy in Asia. The government officials were highly 
dubious of the American IPR‘s openness in its research agenda and conference debates, 
which they felt might be vulnerable to communist infiltration.  In a memo to State 
Department colleagues, conference attendee Robert Barnett (a former IPR member 
himself) questioned whether the American group was an ―objective, disinterested, 
competent‖ organization that could hold an ―honest discussion of the facts of the Far 
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East, upon which American foreign policy must be based.‖3  One of Barnett‘s colleagues, 
J.M. Allison, noted that some American council members were openly critical of the 
recently issued Truman Doctrine, and thus ―adopted a line which could only have been of 
‗aid and comfort‘ to the Soviet Union … there was little or no effort to support the 
established policy of our Government.‖4  Barnett and Allison‘s memoranda implied the 
new rules of the game: failure to praise American foreign policy objectives, even by an 
independent organization such as the American IPR, would be considered a potentially 
subversive activity.  Well before Senators McCarthy and McCarran launched their 
investigations, the American diplomatic establishment already was beginning to question 
the IPR‘s commitment to the anti-communist cause.  
State Department officials were not alone in their worries about the relative lack 
of strident anti-communism within the American IPR; West Coast branches of the 
national council pressed hard at the April 1947 meeting for the purging of all ―red‖ 
elements within the New York leadership.  Their ire largely fell upon one man: Frederick 
Vanderbilt Field, the wealthy leftist described a few years later by a Saturday Evening 
Post profile as ―America‘s Millionaire Communist.‖5  Field, a direct descendent of the 
railroad magnate Cornelius Vanderbilt, had served as the executive secretary of the 
American council in the 1930s and was a major financial contributor to the IPR, but his 
increasingly radical political affiliations had become a growing distraction for the 
Institute.  In 1940, Field became executive director of American Peace Mobilization, a 
leftist group that picketed the White House against U.S. involvement in World War II but 
then dropped its concerns after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.  
                                                 
3 R.W. Barnett, ―Coronado National Conference of American IPR,‖ April 15, 1947, in RG 59, Central 
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4 Barnett, Memorandum; J.M. Allison, Memorandum, April 18, 1947, in Ibid. 
5 Craig Thomson, ―America‘s Millionaire Communist,‖ The Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 9, 1950. 
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During the war Field left his position as an AIPR staff member but continued to serve on 
the Board of Trustees, even as he wrote regular articles in the publications New Masses 
and the Daily Worker.  Then-IPR secretary-general Edward Carter, however, considered 
Field a friend, and defended his participation in the Institute as a sign of the group‘s 
open-mindedness.  But as grumblings from conservative West Coast members grew 
louder, Field reluctantly offered his resignation from the American council‘s board in the 
summer of 1947.6  The most notable communist sympathizer in the American IPR thus 
departed from the organization. 
Another dramatic personnel change came in the summer of 1948 with the 
selection of a known anti-communist, Clayton Lane, as the new executive secretary of the 
American council.  Carter had served as temporary head of the American group since his 
1946 ouster from the international secretariat, but the American IPR executive committee 
now decided it wished to appoint the less controversial Lane, a former mid-level State 
Department official, as the top officer on the American council.  In conversations with 
leading American council members, former top State Department figures like Leo 
Pasvolsky7 endorsed Lane with enthusiasm, while Dean Rusk, then deputy undersecretary 
of state in charge of Far Eastern Affairs, assured AIPR officials that Lane was not only 
capable and reliable but thoroughly ―secure.‖8  The implication was clear: American IPR 
members did not need to worry about the possibility of critics tarring Lane with 
communist sympathy as they had with Field and even Carter.  The selection of Lane also 
                                                 
6 Field‘s resignation letter was both angry and prophetic about the AIPR‘s coming difficulties: ―As I have 
said before, I do not think that my resignation will solve the organization‘s problems, and I am quite certain 
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University archives (COL), New York. 
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Post-War Policy during World War II, and was head of the State Department‘s Division of Special 
Research. 
8 W.L. Holland to E.C. Carter, July 9, 1948, in Box 231, ―Carter, Edward – General,‖ Pacific Relations, 
COL. 
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meant that the American IPR would strengthen ties with the Cold War Washington 
diplomatic community.  Rusk went so far as to suggest that Lane might undertake joint 
short-term assignments in Asia on behalf of the State Department and the IPR, thereby 
saving the Institute travel money and making double use of Lane‘s time ―in the field.‖  
Although no evidence has been found to suggest that such trips took place, the suggestion 
alone indicated the restoration of confidence and even coordination between top 
governmental leaders in Washington and the American council, not seen since the close 
of the war.9 
Upon his elevation to the top administrative post within the American IPR in the 
fall of 1948, Clayton Lane decided to go on the offense.  He began to reassure critics not 
only that the Institute was clear of any communist influences, but also that it was in fact 
actively working against communism.  Lane sent an open letter to the editors of 
Counterattack, an anti-communist newsletter previously critical of the American IPR, in 
which he baldly courted the approval of the red-baiting publication. ―Your emphasis is on 
defeating Communist and Soviet purposes in the United States,‖ Lane wrote.  ―Our 
emphasis will be on Asia with the same end in view.‖   But upon reading this letter, some 
American IPR members were taken aback by Lane‘s desire to use the Institute as a 
political weapon.  Laurence Salisbury, the former editor of the American IPR quarterly 
journal Far Eastern Survey, promptly resigned his membership, noting that he especially 
objected to Lane‘s characterization of the Institute‘s work as a form of ―combat‖ in the 
Cold War. Salisbury wrote to the now-retired Edward Carter, explaining his decision to 
resign.  ―The only way to ‗combat‘ communism, as far as AIPR is concerned, in my 
opinion, is to spread accurate knowledge of the Far East, but ‗combat‘ is scarcely a word 
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to be used in relation to a research organization,‖ Salisbury fumed. ―It associates the 
organization with the bias of the extreme right which is riding successfully for the 
moment on the bad relations of the US and the USSR.‖10  Lane‘s efforts to shore up 
conservative support for the American IPR risked alienating older liberal stalwarts of the 
group like Salisbury and Carter.  In fact, the following lines of unsigned doggerel found 
among Edward Carter‘s papers suggest that the former leader himself was becoming 
disaffected with the American group‘s open embrace of anti-communism: 
 
Here rests its elbow on the quaking ground 
An Institute, to fame (not fortune) known; 
Upon its humble birth some people frowned 
And having come to frown, remained to groan. 
 
Large was its purpose and its balance deft 
Until at length it was too sorely tried – 
When someone cried, ―You‘re leaning to the left‖ 
It toppled down upon the other side. 
 
Seek not its future further to disclose 
Nor prophesy its most untimely end; 
Await what trust its members may impose 
And what Carnegie thinks it fit to send.11 
 
The American IPR‘s move to the right may have frustrated some older liberal 
members, but Lane understood that it was critical to regain the backing not only among 
Washington‘s foreign policy elite, but also among financial supporters, especially the 
Carnegie Corporation and Rockefeller Foundation, to reassure them that the American 
council had completed its ―house cleaning‖ of resident leftists.  In this spirit, Lane 
authorized special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct a 
                                                 
10 Carter confidentially passed along Salisbury‘s letter to William Holland, who returned it with a brief but 
telling reply: ―Thanks. I‘d heard about his decision. I don‘t blame him.‖  Larry Salisbury to Edward Carter, 
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comprehensive examination of the American IPR‘s records and publications found in the 
New York headquarters, while secretary-general William Holland agreed to a parallel 
FBI examination of the international secretariat‘s files.  During the course of three weeks 
in the summer of 1950, Lane reviewed all of the extracted material and participated in 
several voluntary interviews with six FBI agents.  From this experience he wrote up a 
confidential report to the Rockefeller Foundation with his candid appraisal of the 
Institute‘s past. In his report Lane noted that while the IPR had been dominated by 
leaders with ―left-liberal‖ views, he concluded that the group had not been used as an 
instrument of communist or Soviet propaganda.  Lane confided that he would have 
dropped Field from the American IPR‘s Board of Trustees well before 1947, but he found 
no indication that Field used his position for subversive purposes.  Lane also commented 
on Edward Carter, and concluded that the former secretary-general was not a communist, 
but simply ―naïve about the Russians, and a persistent and sentimental advocate of 
fuzzily liberal views … unwise, but not disloyal.‖  Carter‘s successor, Holland, on the 
other hand, had ―vastly more stability and common sense … without him, there would be 
no IPR.‖  Lane finally noted that IPR personnel in general fell within the same 
ideological spectrum of any other research-oriented group; if the IPR were ―unsound,‖ he 
wrote, then so too must be the majority of American newspapers, magazines and 
universities.12 
With Lane and Holland at the helm, foundation officials were reassured of the 
IPR‘s loyalty, but the larger question of the Institute‘s value confronted them as they 
evaluated its funding appeals in 1949 and 1950.  On this front, the IPR was fighting an 
uphill battle; the Carnegie Corporation and Rockefeller Foundation, which often had 
                                                 
12 Clayton Lane, Memorandum on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Sept. 5, 1950, in Rockefeller 
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comprised more than half of the IPR budget, had announced at the end of World War II 
that they were beginning to scale back their general support of independent institutes of 
international relations and instead concentrate their efforts on university-based 
programs.13  As large foundations became more hesitant to offer funds, so too did 
corporate backers.  This situation developed to a point that by 1950, the American IPR 
was facing critical financial peril.  Lane urged the Rockefeller Foundation to make an 
exceptional grant in order to give the IPR time to broaden its base of support. Dozens of 
letters poured in to the Rockefeller Foundation attesting to the IPR‘s value, including 
from Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup, Deputy Undersecretary of State Dean Rusk, 
Great Britain‘s Lord Hailey, Ralph Bunche of the United Nations, Indian Ambassador 
Madame Pandit, as well as several university presidents.14  The American council pointed 
to new $2,500 grants from corporations like Chase Bank, National City Bank, Standard 
Vacuum Co. and International General Electric, as well as significant individual 
contributions.  The effort finally paid off.  At a meeting of the Rockefeller Foundation‘s 
executive committee on September 22, 1950, officers agreed to a $60,000 one-year grant 
to the American IPR, as well as $50,000 to the international IPR to be used over the 
course of two years—a life-preserver that would sustain the group as its political troubles 
deepened.15   
Significantly, it was the IPR‘s unique international role that appeared to serve as 
the pivotal argument in keeping the American group alive.  Rather than create an entirely 
new organization, Rockefeller Foundation officials concluded that ―it is better to utilize 
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the mechanism that exists and which has working cooperation from many countries rather 
than to have to rebuild from the ground up. … If the IPR is killed, there is no insurance of 
essential cooperation from Asiatic countries.‖16  With this latest show of support, 
Rockefeller officers demonstrated their hope that the IPR would remain an important 
medium for private intellectual exchange across the Pacific.  While their statement may 
not have exuded much confidence, the Rockefeller Foundation‘s decision to make this 
extraordinary grant was particularly courageous in the fall of 1950.  By that time, the IPR 
was being placed directly in the crosshairs of an effort to discredit them and the entire 
diplomatic establishment over the troubled American policy in Asia. 
 
MCCARTHY AND THE “CHINA LOBBY” 
On February 8, 1950, in a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, Senator Joseph 
McCarthy boldly charged that political radicals had infiltrated the U.S. State Department 
over the previous decade and conspired to aid and abet the Chinese Communist Party. 
McCarthy falsely claimed to have in his hand a list of 205 known communists who were 
still working for the State Department—a number that would fluctuate wildly in the 
coming weeks, as journalists pressed him for evidence.  The Republican senator‘s 
charges may have been broad and undefined, but they struck a nerve with the American 
public, who had watched in dismay as the Chinese Communist Party overran mainland 
China in the summer of 1949.  Not wishing McCarthy to control the anti-communist 
issue, the Democratic leadership of the Senate announced that they would form a special 
subcommittee to investigate whether or not the State Department was employing 
―disloyal‖ Americans as advisors.  The resulting body was known as the Tydings 
Committee, led by Democratic senator Millard Tydings of Maryland, a strong anti-
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communist but no McCarthy supporter.  It was during the Tydings hearings in the spring 
of 1950 that many Americans were first made aware of the IPR‘s existence, cast through 
the conspiratorial lens of McCarthy and his supporters. 
McCarthy‘s public accusations of communist subversion gave new life to the 
campaign of Alfred Kohlberg, the disgruntled former American IPR member who had 
previously pressured the Institute to investigate supposed pro-communist bias in its 
wartime publications.  Ever since the American IPR formally denied his allegations of 
institutional political bias in the spring of 1947, Kohlberg nursed his grievances.  Now 
that McCarthy had gone out on a limb, the senator needed specific evidence to support 
his claims.  Kohlberg pointed out the IPR to McCarthy, indicating that this group should 
be considered the linchpin of any Far Eastern conspiracy.  In a series of meetings in 
March 1950, Kohlberg provided McCarthy with reams of material on the IPR, furnishing 
the senator with names as well as selected quotations that suggested a communist ―line‖ 
by prominent experts on China.  McCarthy had been wary of accepting money from 
Kohlberg, as the latter was already known in the press as the head of the so-called ―China 
Lobby,‖ an informal collection of individuals who had pushed for greater American 
support of Chiang‘s nationalist Kuomintang Party.  McCarthy did not want to appear 
beholden to such a group, but behind the scenes, he was happy to use Kohlberg‘s 
material, as well as the latter‘s ideas about the ―four stages‖ of the Communist line on 
China, to inform his public statements.17  
During the hastily organized Tydings hearings in late March 1950, McCarthy 
cited two former IPR leaders—Philip Jessup, the wartime leader of the American council, 
and Owen Lattimore, the wartime editor of the international IPR journal Pacific Affairs—
as central figures in his case for a Far Eastern conspiracy.  In addition to their IPR duties, 
                                                 
17 Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 68. 
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Jessup and Lattimore had served as advisors to the State Department on Far Eastern 
policy during the war.  With sly insinuation, McCarthy claimed Jessup, now serving as 
U.S. ambassador-at-large, had ―an unusual affinity for Communist causes.‖18  McCarthy 
made a much stronger and more direct accusation against Lattimore, the director of the 
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University, the 
former editor of Pacific Affairs, as well as Chiang Kai-shek‘s American advisor in 1941 
and deputy director of Pacific operations for the Office of War Information during World 
War II.  McCarthy now called Lattimore ―the top Russian espionage agent‖ in the United 
States, and the ―boss‖ of Alger Hiss and other Soviet spies.19  McCarthy later backtracked 
slightly, indicating that Lattimore was merely ―one of the top‖ agents, but he nevertheless 
made it clear that he was willing to ―stand or fall‖ on the outcome of the case against the 
professor.   
In the end, Jessup and Lattimore escaped censure by the Democratic-led Tydings 
Committee.  The well-connected Jessup produced supportive letters by Generals George 
C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, and effectively rebutted the allegations of his 
supposed membership in communist-front organizations.  Lattimore, for his part, lashed 
out against his accuser, drawing applause from the gallery when he said McCarthy was 
responsible for ―instituting a reign of terror‖ in the State Department.  Lattimore charged 
that the Wisconsin senator was merely ―the dupe of a bitter and implacable and fanatical 
group of people who will not tolerate any discussion of China which is not based on 
absolute, total and complete support of the Nationalist Government in Formosa‖—people 
like Alfred Kohlberg and others who were at the core of the so-called China Lobby.20  
                                                 
18 Quoted in Ibid., pp. 67-68. 
19 Quoted in Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, p. 136. 
20 Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, 147-149.  Lattimore‘s account of his time before the Tydings 
Committee was published later that year.  Owen Lattimore, Ordeal by Slander (Boston, Little, Brown, 
1950).  Also see Robert P. Newman, Owen Lattimore and the „Loss‟ of China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992). 
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The final Tydings report, issued on July 20, 1950, exonerated Jessup and Lattimore of 
charges of espionage, or even of following a communist ―line‖ in their writings, and 
repudiated McCarthy‘s charges.  McCarthy clearly had lost the first round in his 
campaign against these alleged communist conspirators. 
Despite the Tydings Committee‘s official clearance of Jessup and Lattimore, it 
was not a complete failure for McCarthy; the senator now merely refined his strategy, 
using information gleaned from the investigation.  One witness in particular offered new 
evidence linking the IPR, Lattimore and the communists:  Louis Budenz, a former mid-
level member of the Communist Party in the 1930s and 40s. Budenz testified at the 
Tydings hearings that a communist ―cell‖ had existed in the American Institute of Pacific 
Relations, and that Lattimore was one of its key members.  Jessup, as head of the 
American IPR during the war, thus either actively or tacitly must have approved of their 
influence on the Institute‘s activities.  Budenz offered himself to McCarthy as a former 
party insider who could link Lattimore to a communist conspiracy in a way that Kohlberg 
could not.   
Budenz was a flawed and complicated witness in his own right, with a torturous 
life story that brought him to be an informant.  Born into a Catholic family, Budenz had 
married a divorced woman as a young man and was subsequently excommunicated from 
the Church.  His dabbling in radical causes over a number of years finally led him to join 
the Communist Party in 1935, and following a journalistic bent, he eventually served as 
managing editor of The Daily Worker during World War II. But at the end of the war, an 
emotional encounter with Bishop Fulton J. Sheen inspired him to rejoin the Catholic 
Church and renounce his former comrades with the religious zeal of the reconverted.  
Thousands of hours of testimony to the Federal Bureau of Investigation had helped 
implicate several notable Americans, including the State Department‘s Alger Hiss.  
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Although Lattimore‘s name never appeared in his previous voluminous testimony, 
Budenz now suddenly placed him at the center of the Far Eastern conspiracy and 
amplified rumors that this operation was run out of the Institute of Pacific Relations—a 
gift to the Wisconsin senator.21  
McCarthy had a star witness in Budenz, but he still lacked concrete evidence of 
perfidy within the IPR ranks.  His staff now sprang into action.  Sometime in January 
1951, one of McCarthy‘s top investigators, Donald Surine, heard from a source about 
some old IPR files stored in the barn of Edward Carter, the retired IPR secretary-general.  
Sensing an opportunity, Surine didn‘t bother with legal formalities; he simply drove up to 
Carter‘s farmstead in Lee, Massachusetts, broke into the barn, and carried off several 
thousand documents, which he promptly handed over to McCarthy.22   The senator 
looked over these documents with his colleague, Senator Karl E. Mundt (R-S.D.), and 
while neither registered concern over the blatant illegality of the files‘ procurement, they 
did recognize that to pursue the matter, they needed to involve another important 
Washington legislator: Senator Pat McCarran (D-Nev.).   A fellow anti-communist who 
had just overseen the passage of the Internal Security Act, McCarran was serving both as 
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee as well as that of the new Senate Internal 
Security Subcommittee charged with investigating communist subversion.  Upon seeing 
the illegally procured IPR files, McCarran agreed with his Republican counterparts that 
further investigation was warranted, and quickly issued a subpoena for the rest of the IPR 
files.        
On February 8, 1951, amid a heavy snowstorm, four men in a rented truck drove 
onto Edward Carter‘s Massachusetts farm and served McCarran‘s subpoena for the IPR 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 153. 
22 This account of the seizure of the files is taken from a Sept. 18, 1951 article by Oliver Pilat and William 
V. Shannon in the New York Post, and quoted in U.S. Senate, McCarran Hearings, p. 5353. 
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documents to the farm‘s caretakers, Mr. and Mrs. James Markham.  The Markhams, 
unable to reach the Carters by telephone and unaware of the previous break-in by Surine, 
surrendered the key to the barn, despite the lack of a search warrant. By that afternoon, 
the men took about 75 filing cabinets worth of material, loaded them into the truck, 
sealed the contents, and drove them directly to the Senate Office Building in Washington, 
D.C.  The seizure of the files effectively covered up Surine‘s earlier theft, and made for 
breathless headlines regarding the supposedly ―startling‖ material waiting to be 
discovered in the hidden cache of ―barn files.‖23  Over the next few weeks, Senate 
investigators stoked the speculation by feeding damning document ―leaks‖ to sympathetic 
newspaper columnists at the Hearst press, including George E. Sokolsky.24  Not all media 
outlets were taken in by this ploy; the San Francisco Chronicle, for instance, correctly 
noted that these very files had been made available by Clayton Lane to FBI investigators 
the year before, with Carter‘s full permission, and had been pored through without 
dramatic revelations.25  Such notes of caution were drowned in the tide of hysteria, 
however, and the public tarring of the Institute had begun in earnest. 
 
THE MCCARRAN HEARINGS 
Senator Pat McCarran grew up a poorly educated Nevada farm boy but now, at 75 
years old, he wielded power in the Senate commensurate with his great physical bulk.  
McCarran was no less obsessed by communists than his Republican colleague McCarthy, 
and no less willing to pursue them at all costs.  McCarran himself openly admitted that 
                                                 
23 Frank Holeman, ―Seized Data From Pacific Institute Reported to Yield ‗Startling Leads‘,‖ The News, 
Feb. 12, 1951.  Among the fodder for the tabloid press was the fact that prominent heiress Doris Duke was 
considered a ―possible ‗soft touch‘ for leftist-inspired causes,‖ including the IPR. ―Pacific Group Sought 
Cash from Doris Duke,‖ New York Daily Mirror, Feb. 14, 1951.  
24 Box 10, Folder 11, Carter papers, UVM. 
25 Editorial, ―The McCarthy Trail Again,‖ San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 27, 1951. 
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his wide-ranging investigations necessarily would sweep up innocents along the way, but 
saw no reason to modify his approach.  He once told a friend: ―If I throw up a hundred 
false balloons, if I make a hundred efforts that fail, if I make a hundred mistakes, and do 
eventually find that one, I will have served my country well.‖26  This kind of scattershot 
approach obviously had little concern for potential victims along the way.  Writing in his 
memoirs, Frederick Vanderbilt Field lashed out at his tormentor, concluding that ―if 
McCarran wasn‘t the devil himself, he was his surrogate.‖27  Presented with the 
opportunity to throw up a balloon at the IPR, and always relishing a fight, McCarran did 
not hesitate to launch hearings into the Institute‘s activities.   
After making an independent examination of the IPR‘s files and taking secret 
testimony from several witnesses throughout the spring, the McCarran Committee‘s 
public hearings into the IPR finally began in July 1951.  McCarran pledged to make the 
hearings a respectable, fact-finding mission, but scholars have since concluded that 
McCarran‘s proceedings were anything but.28  It is clear from McCarran‘s line of 
questioning and his public statements that his opinion of the IPR already was set in place 
at the outset of the hearings.  Before top IPR officials had even been given a chance to 
rebut the primary charges, McCarran told a magazine reporter: ―The IPR was originally 
an organization with laudable motives.  It was taken over by Communist design and 
made a vehicle for American policy with regard to the Far East.  It was also used for 
espionage purposes to collect and channel information of interest or value to the Russian 
Communists.‖29  Budenz reprised his earlier role as the IPR‘s chief antagonist, and now 
                                                 
26 Quoted in Michael J. Ybarra, Washington Gone Crazy: Senator Pat McCarran and the Great American 
Communist Hunt (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2004), p. 8. 
27 Quoted in Ybarra, Washington Gone Crazy, p. 574. 
28 The best account of the McCarran hearings can be found in Ybarra, Washington Gone Crazy, pp. 569-
605.  Ybarra, however, is less interested in their impact on the IPR itself, calling the Institute ―the nominal 
subject‖ of the hearings, which really were geared to target high-level diplomats in the State Department.  
29 U.S. News and World Report, Nov. 16, 1951. 
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he was joined by several other professional ex-communists without any formal 
connection to the IPR but nevertheless willing to provide hearsay testimony the view that 
the IPR had been infiltrated by communists.30  Their accusations were bolstered by the 
unwillingness of a handful of former American IPR staffers to deny categorically that 
they had ever been members of the Communist Party.31  One current staffer, Lawrence 
Rosinger, invoked his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, shocking and 
dismaying his colleagues.32  Some of the most damning charges against the IPR, 
however, came not from ex-communists but from a handful of Asian specialists in 
universities—political scientists who had become disenchanted with some of the 
Institute‘s leaders.  The IPR, these scholars claimed, had indeed abandoned an objective, 
neutral viewpoint and had allowed the Institute to become an organization with a barely 
concealed political agenda. 
McCarran Committee members believed they could find evidence for a 
communist ―line‖ through a selective, close reading of private IPR correspondence.  One 
of the documents they fastened upon was a June 10, 1938, letter written by Owen 
Lattimore to Edward Carter, in which Lattimore referred to the ongoing IPR ―Inquiry‖ 
series into the Sino-Japanese War, and apparently urged the abandonment of neutrality on 
the subject.  ―For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese 
Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the same label—but enough ahead 
of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable,‖ he wrote.  Lattimore also praised Carter 
in 1938 as ―pretty cagey‖ in giving research projects to known communist writers in 
China: ―They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended 
                                                 
30 Such people included Nathan Silvermaster, Noel Field, Elizabeth Bentley, and Theodore Geiger. U.S. 
Senate, McCarran Hearings, p. 1218. 
31 Besides Frederick Field, former AIPR staff members who declined to comment on Communist 
connections included Harriet Moore and Kathleen Barnes. 
32 Rosinger denied to IPR officials that he had ever been a Communist, but he was told that former 
Communists were willing to testify that he was a member, thus setting up a possible perjury trial. 
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on to do it with the right touch.‖33  McCarran Committee members referred again and 
again to this so-called ―cagey letter‖ as evidence of a pro-communist conspiracy within 
the Institute.  IPR leaders countered that the people favorably mentioned by Lattimore—
Chen Han-seng, Chi Chao-ting, and ―Asiaticus‖ (an anonymous German writer living in 
China)—never contributed to the Inquiry series.34  But Lattimore‘s letter allowed IPR 
critics to claim that the Institute was at compromised in its avowed dedication to 
scholarly objectivity.  ―That … seems to me to be one of the most intellectually dishonest 
academic documents that I have ever seen,‖ testified Kenneth Colegrove, a Japan expert 
at Northwestern University who had squabbled with Lattimore for many years.35  
Colegrove had been one of the few AIPR members who had voted for a further internal 
investigation of Kohlberg‘s charges in 1947, an effort that failed.  Four years later, 
Lattimore‘s now-revealed letter merely seemed to confirm Colegrove‘s suspicions of 
leftist bias: ―This is a complete negation of what the IPR said to professors and teachers 
all over the country that it was.‖36 Coming from a fellow academic and former IPR 
member, Colegrove‘s denunciations inflicted extra damage upon the Institute‘s 
reputation.   
Colegrove‘s testimony also revived scrutiny of Philip Jessup, the former 
executive secretary of the American IPR and Board of Trustees member who later went 
on to serve as Ambassador at Large for the United States in the late 1940s.  In the fall of 
                                                 
33 Quoted in U.S. Senate, McCarran Hearings, pp. 915-916. 
34 William Holland, ―Documents on Mr. Lattimore‘s ‗Cagey‘ Letter,‖ April 23, 1952, in Box 10, Folder 8, 
Carter papers, UVM. 
35 Colegrove had served on the editorial advisory board of Amerasia, a journal devoted to American-Asian 
relations, but resigned in 1943 when the journal began publishing articles attacking British and Dutch 
colonialism during the war, a position that Lattimore shared.  In a subsequent private conversation with 
Colegrove, Lattimore allegedly asserted his support of the extermination of the Japanese Emperor and his 
family.  When Lattimore offered Colegrove a position with the Office of War Information in San 
Francisco, Colegrove declined for ―personal‖ reasons: ―I did not trust Owen Lattimore. I did not care to be 
associated with him.‖  U.S. Senate, McCarran Hearings, pp. 907-914.     
36 Ibid., pp. 915-916. 
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1949, as the Chinese Communists forced Kuomintang forces off the mainland, 
Ambassador Jessup called together roughly 25 experts on Asia to assess their opinion on 
American policy toward China.  Colegrove, one of the participants at this three-day State 
Department-sponsored gathering, recalled that IPR associates such as Lattimore and 
Rosinger were largely in favor of the immediate diplomatic recognition of Communist 
China, and that this faction ―dominated‖ the conference.37  Colegrove noted that Jessup 
did not indicate his inclination on the subject, but that the participants were well known 
to him, and that he could have anticipated their overall conclusions.  The Northwestern 
University professor claimed to be ―surprised‖ and ―disappointed‖ at the actions of the 
eminent scholar and jurist, but noted it was not the first time Jessup had shown his 
political leanings.  In late 1948 and early 1949, Jessup gave speeches to the U.N. Security 
Council critical of Dutch rule in Indonesia and in favor of intervention—speeches that 
may have exceeded his instructions, according to ―a rumor around the State Department,‖ 
Colegrove said.  Criticism of European imperialism, McCarran Committee members 
noted, tracked with the communist ―line.‖38       
The testimony regarding Jessup revealed the dishonest line of reasoning on the 
part of McCarran and his allies in their effort to malign the Institute of Pacific Relations. 
The personal views of these men could in no way reflect an IPR institutional bias any 
more than the views of Kohlberg and Colegrove, former American IPR members 
themselves.  But even more troubling was the attempt to elide all differences between 
expressions of anti-colonialism and espousals of pro-communist ideology.  A critique of 
imperialism was indeed one of the tenets of communism; but those expressing such 
criticism were not necessarily sympathetic to communism. Could not Jessup and others 
                                                 
37 Ibid., pp. 917-922. 
38 Ibid., pp. 923-924. 
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have advocated Asian liberation from colonialism with the prospect of a non-communist, 
democratic future?  The Institute‘s critics rarely considered the possibility.  Logic was 
strained even further when committee members delved into the IPR‘s correspondence 
during the war, well before the onset of the Cold War.  But while the McCarran 
Committee did not extend the benefit of the doubt to Lattimore or Jessup, they 
consistently indulged the conspiratorial fabrications of Budenz and his fellow ex-
communists.       
Not until October 10, 1951—more than three months after the McCarran hearings 
began—were IPR officials themselves allowed to defend themselves at length, but even 
then they still did not have access to their own files.  Secretary-General William Holland 
was the first to respond to his accusers.  To supplement his testimony, Holland prepared a 
30-page document, ―Fact and Fiction about the Institute of Pacific Relations,‖ in which 
he systematically reviewed the allegations and summarily rejected the idea that it was 
even possible to have a ―line‖ (communist or otherwise) within an organization that 
boasted a dozen autonomous national councils that differed sharply with one another, as 
often revealed at international conferences.  ―It should never be forgotten that the 
international IPR is not a unitary, monolithic organization, with national ‗branches‘ 
controlled by headquarters,‖ Holland wrote.  ―Any attempt to force this great diversity of 
views into one philosophical mold or conceptual scheme would be fruitless and 
ridiculous.‖39  He also denied that IPR officials attempted to influence American foreign 
policy, citing a statement to that effect from Joseph W. Ballantine, the former director of 
the State Department‘s Office of Far Eastern Affairs.40 Holland refuted the central myth 
                                                 
39 William L. Holland, ―Fact and Fiction About the Institute of Pacific Relations: Statement Presented to 
the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security at a public hearing on October 10, 1951,‖ in Box 
10, Folder 1, Carter papers, UVM. 
40 Ballantine‘s full statement: ―During the period that I served in the Department of State I never sought or 
received any advice on United States Far Eastern policy from the Institute of Pacific Relations; nor am I 
aware of any attempts being made during that period by the Institute of Pacific Relations to influence 
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developed by the so-called China Lobby—that a ―powerful combine‖ of interests worked 
to spread Maoist propaganda in the press, and undermined the nationalist cause in 
China.41  Insofar as a general consensus might be discovered in past IPR publications, 
Holland claimed, it would represent the scholarly opinion of the day, rather than a 
conspiracy: ―The institute reflects such currents; it does not create them.‖42  
In the matter of influencing specific American policies in Asia, the Institute of 
Pacific Relations was a marginal player.  But in the larger concern over winning over 
Asian minds, the group could be of considerable service.  The McCarran Committee‘s 
hearings, however, threatened to hamper the IPR‘s ability to keep non-communist Asians 
in dialogue with the West, as Holland pointed out: 
In most Asian countries [the IPR‘s] reputation today stands high because it has 
refused to become a platform for the prevailing views of any one nation, but has 
tried to remain a forum for the expression of different national attitudes.  Strange 
as it may seem to Americans today, one of the risks that the Institute runs is that 
its repute among leading non-Communists in Asia may suffer because it is 
becoming subject too much to the pressures of party politics and to the pressure of 
pro-Chinese Nationalist groups in the United States.43 
Holland had seen first-hand the difficulties of convincing Asians that a Western-funded 
group like the IPR was truly an independent entity.  At the October 1950 IPR conference 
in Lucknow, Indian journalists presented Holland with local newspaper headlines that 
claimed to offer ―irrefutable evidence‖ that the IPR was a paid agent of the FBI, and that 
the conference was merely a cover for secret agents to compile dossiers on leading Indian 
and Pakistani delegates.  Holland laughed off the incident at the time, sarcastically 
remarking that he should send J. Edgar Hoover a bill for $5,000 for the IPR‘s ―invaluable 
                                                                                                                                                 
United States foreign policy.  May I add that over an even longer period covering my acquaintance with the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, so far as I know it has consistently adhered to its avowed aim of serving as a 
non-partisan research agency and to a policy of not engaging in action movements or in sponsoring any 
particular doctrine or policy.‖  Ibid. 
41 The ―powerful combine‖ metaphor was used by Freda Utley, The China Story (Chicago: Regnery, 1951). 
42 ―Fact and Fiction about the Institute of Pacific Relations,‖ Box 10, Folder 1, Carter papers, UVM. 
43 Ibid., p. 30. 
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services.‖44  One year later, however, the specter of the IPR‘s compromised reputation 
now was a much graver prospect.   
 
MCCARRAN REPORT AND REACTION 
After almost a full year of hearings, the McCarran Committee issued its final 
report on July 2, 1952.  The committee report essentially repeated the accusations of 
McCarthy and the litany of ex-communists who testified, and predictably ignored 
Holland and other IPR leaders‘ statements on their own behalf.  The report maintained 
that the IPR had been ―controlled‖ by a small core of communist sympathizers; that 
Owen Lattimore and Frederick V. Field used their positions to further Soviet policy; and 
that the Institute attempted to influence American foreign policy ―to affect adversely the 
interests of the United States.‖  Senator McCarran, when presenting his report to the 
Senate, went still further, making the breathtaking assertion that ―but for the 
machinations of the small group that controlled and activated that organization, China 
today would be free and a bulwark against the further advance of the Red hordes into the 
Far East.‖45  Newspaper editorials across the country were divided between those who 
saw the hearings as pure political theater and others who believed they revealed a cancer 
at the heart of America‘s East Asian foreign policy. 
Some in the American IPR believed that with the end of the hearings, the Institute 
could resume its normal functions.  Important financial backers remained, such as 
Standard-Vacuum Oil, General Electric, National City Bank of New York, and the 
International Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, among others.  An appeal to Time, 
Inc., in late 1951 resulted in a $1,500 donation to the American group, and even Time-
                                                 
44 William L. Holland to Arthur Coons (President, Occidental College), Nov. 21, 1950, in Box 332, ―Board 
of Trustees—Nomination,‖ Pacific Relations, COL. 
45 Quoted in Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 94. 
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Life‘s publisher Henry Luce, a long-standing friend of China and former American IPR 
trustee, personally donated $1,000.46  The ever-optimistic Edward Carter, long retired 
from IPR service but still active in its defense, wrote to an old IPR friend that the 
McCarran hearings perhaps weren‘t all bad, as the experience had provided the Institute a 
―status‖ that former leaders would have gladly paid thousands of dollars to achieve in 
earlier years.  Carter took particular pleasure in hearing about the so-called shared ―IPR-
State Department line‖ after he had spent so many years tangling with the American 
diplomatic community: ―It may make Stanley Hornbeck, who is still living, gulp.‖47  Ever 
the promoter, Carter subscribed to the belief that some publicity, however bad, was better 
than none at all, and said that regardless of its critics, the IPR was now widely considered 
―an institution of first-rate importance.‖  The hearings, Carter predicted, would cause the 
American public to rally around the Institute under the assumption that ―if McCarthy and 
McCarran are against it, it must have been rendering an important national and 
international service.‖48  
In one sense, Carter was right: regardless of its controversial reputation, the IPR 
was still recognized as important by prominent Asian specialists.  Even in the wake of the 
McCarran report, State Department officials dealing with East Asia and the Pacific 
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refused to give up subscriptions to Pacific Affairs and other IPR-published materials.  
One noted that ―it was simply impossible to avoid the use of their publications without 
serious damage to the program.‖49  The same applied to State Department participation in 
IPR conferences.  Despite the distractions of the Senate hearings, the American IPR had 
proceeded with plans for two conferences on Japan—one in Princeton, New Jersey, in the 
fall of 1952 and one in Hawaii in January 1953, the latter co-sponsored with the Japanese 
Institute of Pacific Relations.  Here, too, State Department officers recommended that 
they be allowed to attend, even if they might suffer adverse publicity.  ―For our part, we 
believe that there are solid advantages to be gained by participation,‖ one official wrote.  
―The Department cannot afford to cut itself off from discussions of the complex relations 
of the United States and Japan with prominent members of the public who are especially 
interested in such problems.‖50  The willingness of American officials to maintain 
relations with the IPR, however quietly, signaled the ongoing significance of the 
Institute‘s work.     
In another sense, Carter‘s sunny outlook seemed practically delusional when 
considering the dire financial conditions the American IPR faced by late 1952.  
Membership in the American council, which had once numbered in the low thousands, 
had dwindled to a several hundred.  The Rockefeller Foundation, whose extraordinary 
grant in 1950 largely sustained the IPR through the hearings themselves, now privately 
indicated to IPR leaders that the chances for a renewal of general funds were ―practically 
nil,‖ in the words of Dean Rusk, the recently appointed Foundation president.51  The 
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Carnegie Corporation, which had indicated to the IPR as early as 1946 that its long-term 
grants would taper off, now made clear their intention to hold to that promise.52  With the 
heightened controversy around the Institute, and with Congressional inquiries into the 
activities of tax-exempt foundations, the decision to back away from funding private 
international organizations was understandable.  But the foundations‘ retreat was 
nevertheless a bitter pill for the IPR to swallow. Writing the Carnegie Corporation in late 
1952, William Holland wrote that future historians ―may find it ironical‖ that the 
foundations were so willing to support the IPR when under the leadership of 
controversialists like Carter, Field and Lattimore, but then ceased support while under the 
guidance of less political figures like himself and Clayton Lane.53 
In the months following the McCarran hearings, American IPR leaders 
recognized that they must reevaluate their entire program from the ground up.  With 
university area programs producing more original research on Asia than ever before, the 
American IPR needed to redefine its mission if it hoped to attract a new base of support.  
Recognizing that the American council simply could not simply go back to business as 
usual, Holland now began to circulate ideas for a Planning and Review Committee to 
assess the American IPR and offer suggestions for the future.54  Proposals were 
                                                                                                                                                 
more detailed evaluation of this relationship, see Lawrence T. Woods, ―Rockefeller Philanthropy and the 
Institute of Pacific Relations: A Reappraisal of Long-term Mutual Dependency,‖ Voluntas: International 
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1999): 151-166. 
52 In a statement to congressional investigators, the Carnegie Corporation acknowledged that there were 
early rumblings of charges by Kohlberg in 1946, a fact that was ―disquieting‖ to some in the deliberations 
to offer a final five-year grant.  Nevertheless, ―in view of the long history of relations with the Institute and 
the close connections of previous years, as well as the fact that many people still believed strongly in its 
value, it would have taken very substantial evidence to have convinced the officers and trustees of the 
Corporation that it would be justified in departing from its established policy in providing a terminal grant.‖  
J.P.G., ―Memorandum for Counsel: Record of the Carnegie Corporation and the Institute of Pacific 
Relations,‖ Aug. 12, 1952, in Box 182, ―Institute of Pacific Relations—Congressional investigations, 51-
52,‖ Carnegie Corporation grant files, COL. 
53 W.L. Holland to Charles Dollard (Carnegie Corporation of New York), Dec. 29, 1952, in Box 23, Folder 
11, IPR fonds, UBC. 
54 Holland had been serving as both secretary-general of the international IPR as well as temporary 
executive secretary of the American IPR since Clayton Lane‘s resignation in 1950. 
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entertained to scrap the existing American council and replace it with some sort of 
―Coordinating Council on Asian Affairs‖ that could work as a liaison between scholars in 
university programs and contacts in business, journalism and the major foundations.55 
Holland convinced Harold H. Fisher, the distinguished chairman of the Hoover 
Institution and Library in Stanford, California, to become executive director of the 
American IPR. Holland made clear that he was not wedded to the American IPR for its 
own sake, but rather for its role in the international IPR structure.  In one moment of 
frustration, Holland made his priorities clear to Fisher: 
As you undoubtedly realize, my main concern in all this is not to preserve the 
name of the American IPR (which I often wish could be wiped out of existence!) 
but to add as little as possible to the problems of carrying on the international IPR 
in the U.S., and if possible to ensure that any new American organization will not 
only be strong and representative but also prepared to participate actively in the 
international body.56 
The name of the American IPR might have been irreparably tarnished in the United 
States, but the international IPR was carrying on important work in bringing Asian 
intellectuals into contact with Western scholars and businessmen—work that Holland 
desperately wanted to see continue. How this work would be affected by the McCarran 
hearings was still an open question.  
During the McCarthy era, the American IPR had been sorely tested as an 
organization, and its future remained uncertain at the close of 1952.  Its members and 
financial supporters had wilted in the wake of negative publicity surrounding the 
McCarran hearings.  The consequences for free debate in the United States would linger 
for years, as scholars focusing on Asia became reluctant to engage in contemporary 
                                                 
55 Miriam Farley, ―Notes on a possible Council for the Study of Asia,‖ Feb. 29, 1952, in Box 25, Folder 3, 
IPR fonds, UBC.  Also see W.L. Holland, ―Memorandum on a More Coordinated Approach to the Study of 
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56 Underlined in original.  W.L. Holland to H.H. Fisher, Nov. 23, 1953, in Box 25, Folder 14, IPR fonds, 
UBC. 
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political questions, and instead retreated into less controversial subjects.  But beyond the 
impact upon American experts were the consequences for the international functions of 
the IPR.  Holland and the other leaders of the IPR had some immediate concerns about 
how to keep the international Institute functioning as a common enterprise that linked 
Asian and Western intellectuals.  Many questions remained: Were Asian minds still 
undecided, or had they been lost during the recent anti-communist hysteria in the United 
States?  Would Asian intellectuals still be willing to sign up to a group whose top 
American officials were more convinced than ever that ―objectivity‖ in research 
necessitated an avowal of anti-communism?57 And would these Asian institutes still find 
value in reaching across the Pacific to the West, given the ongoing effort by former 
colonial peoples in Asia and Africa to create a very different kind of solidarity?  In the 
coming years, Holland and fellow IPR leaders would struggle mightily to create an 
international space to encourage Asian intellectuals‘ friendly association with the West, 
but it was a struggle now made infinitely more difficult because of the machinations of 
Senators McCarthy and McCarran. 
                                                 
57 Arthur H. Dean, a prominent Wall Street lawyer who served as chairman of the IPR‘s Pacific Council 
during the McCarran hearings, sent out the following advice to leading members of the various national 
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it is absolutely imperative that all of the publications of the IPR must be able to stand up to a searching 
examination.‖  Arthur H. Dean to Members of the Pacific Council, Sept. 29, 1952, in Box 24, Folder 15, 
IPR fonds, UBC. 
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Chapter Six 
“A Body We Cannot Afford to Lose”: The IPR and the Bandung Spirit, 
1953-55 
On the eve of the first Afro-Asian Conference, held in Bandung, Indonesia in 
April 1955, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles confided his concern about a 
―Pan-Asian movement‖ to the British Foreign Office, saying that there was ―serious 
danger of a line up of the Asian Powers against the West based on anti-colonial and racial 
grounds.‖1  Dulles‘ fears reflected many Western officials‘ views at the time.  His 
perception is significant in the degree to which he equated Asian solidarity with the threat 
of harm to the West.  The conference at Bandung struck Dulles and other Western 
officials as the culmination of a worrisome trend among the newly independent countries 
of Asia and Africa.  This conference, which drew government officials from 29 countries 
in Asia and Africa to discuss common problems, served as a global announcement that 
Asian and African nations were prepared to make their own mark as international actors.  
Ever since, the Bandung Conference, and the subject of Asian regionalism more broadly, 
has been cast into the polarizing political arena of the Cold War.  Western officials 
viewed Afro-Asian partnership as a blow against U.S. Cold War policies; supporters of 
this regional grouping saw it as a necessary antidote to Western imperialism and single-
minded anti-communism.2 
                                                 
1 Sir R. Makins, April 7, 1955, Washington to Foreign Office, in DO 35/6098, The National Archives 
(TNA), Kew, United Kingdom. 
2 For many years the most prominent carrier of the Bandung flame has been the Afro-Asian People‘s 
Solidarity Organization, a group whose members are committed to the ideology of shared grievance against 
Western imperialism in all its forms.  Thirty years after Bandung, the Afro-Asian Peoples‘ Solidarity 
Organization pointedly called the 1955 gathering ―the beginning of an era of collective resistance to 
imperialism.‖ Chitta Biswas, The Relevance of Bandung: Thirtieth Anniversary of the Bandung Conference 
(Cairo: Afro-Asian Peoples‘ Solidarity Organization, 1985).  The AAPSO had strong ties with Communist 
groups, and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev extended greetings to the International Bandung and Afro-
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But even as officials like Dulles viewed Asian regionalism solely through the 
context of the Cold War, many others had a far more nuanced outlook toward this 
movement.  This chapter aims to grapple anew with the advent of Asian regionalism in 
the context of Bandung.  This requires a perspective beyond the contemporary diplomatic 
obsession over the Cold War and into the conversations of the time, discussions that took 
place especially among Pacific internationalists.  At this level of private ideas and 
institutions, one gains a far different picture of the context surrounding the Bandung 
moment.  Rather than displaying a growing sense of Asian exclusivity, many of the Asian 
intellectuals who organized and supported the Bandung conference also worked to 
emphasize West-East ties.  One of the primary efforts in this regard was a demonstration 
of support for the Institute of Pacific Relations, by now at risk of failing in the wake of 
the McCarran hearings in the United States.  Time and again, prominent Asian thinkers 
came to the aid of this American-based group, and signaled their eagerness to support one 
of the few organizations that fostered private communication across the Pacific.  ―This is 
a body we cannot afford to lose,‖ an Indonesian delegate declared upon their acceptance 
as an IPR national council in 1953.3  This chapter argues that Asian support for the IPR 
during this period should serve to revise our notion of the underlying spirit that animated 
Bandung,4 and expand our understanding of the possibilities of international affiliation 
during the Cold War.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Asian Solidarity Meeting in Cairo in commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the original Afro-
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3 Pacific Council Minutes No. 4, Feb. 7, 1953, in Box 472, ―Pacific Council Minutes and Documents—
New York, 1953,‖ Pacific Relations, Columbia University archives (COL), New York. 
4 Upon the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Asian-African conference at Bandung in 2005, a new 
organization calling itself  ―Bandung Spirit‖ was founded as a call for ―peaceful coexistence, for 
independence from the hegemony of any superpower and for building solidarities towards the weak and 
those being weakened by the world order of the day.‖  See http://www.bandungspirit.org. 
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American policymakers like Dulles displayed a ―with us or against us‖ attitude 
regarding Asian regional organization in the 1950s.  The American-backed defensive 
treaty in 1954 that created the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) attempted 
to replicate the kind of defense alliance that had linked Western Europe and North 
America since 1949.  But many Asian thinkers had a more subtle view of international 
ties, especially among private groups.  Leaders of Asian institutes saw the development 
of Asian regionalism and ongoing intellectual connections with North America and 
Europe as parallel but not necessarily competing trends, a fact seldom mentioned by 
Bandung scholarship.5  Asian intellectuals had many occasions before the Bandung 
conference in which they could have downplayed or dismissed the IPR; it had been 
weakened by the McCarthy and McCarran attacks in the United States, and its financial 
resources were dwindling.  British members were divided over the continued efficacy of 
the international organization, and some even tried to terminate it entirely.  Yet Asian 
delegates came to the aid of the IPR and defended its larger mission of East-West 
partnership.  They made it clear that an absent IPR would result in their turning away 
from Western institutional connections—an outcome they anticipated but did not 
welcome. 
Far from the anti-Western prejudices ascribed by Western policymakers, many 
Asian intellectuals actively worked to overcome the divisions brought about through the 
legacy of colonialism.  Joining an organization like the Institute of Pacific Relations 
expressed a willingness to engage with Western scholarship and share wisdom and 
perspective on contemporary political and economic challenges. One noteworthy 
example of this ideal was the case of Indonesia.  In 1949, upon Indonesian independence, 
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the cumbersomely named ―Netherlands-Netherlands East Indies‖ council based in 
Amsterdam had formally dissolved, but within a few short years Indonesians and Dutch 
alike had formed new institutes of international affairs in their respective countries and 
both sought renewed affiliation with the IPR.  The Indonesian Institute of World Affairs, 
led by Prof. R. Supomo of the University of Indonesia, applied to be an IPR national 
council in the fall of 1952.6 Within a matter of weeks, IPR Secretary-General William 
Holland received similar notice of the creation of the Netherlands Institute of 
International Affairs.  After working through various delicate matters to prevent potential 
conflict between the two national groups, Holland was prepared to put their applications 
before the Institute and admit them both as full members.7   
However eager Asians and Westerners may have been to keep private ties across 
the Pacific, the exact nature of that exchange was open for debate.  This chapter follows 
this discussion across the critical months and years of the mid-1950s, when it was no 
longer certain that the Institute of Pacific Relations would remain a viable international 
organization.  The aftermath of the McCarran subcommittee hearings in the U.S. Senate 
had marred the group‘s reputation and dried up the bulk of its American financial 
support.  Some in Britain, meanwhile, touted the Commonwealth of Nations as the most 
fortuitous channel for private discussion between Asia and the West, and viewed the IPR 
                                                 
6 W.L. Holland to R. Supomo, Aug. 20, 1952; R. Supomo, ―Memorandum the Indonesian Council of 
International Affairs,‖ n.d.; Holland to Supomo, Nov. 28, 1952, all in Box 43, Folder 2, Institute of Pacific 
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7 The Dutch and Indonesian representatives at the IPR‘s Pacific Council meeting in February 1953 were 
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that his group ―would welcome the membership in the IPR of a non-political Netherlands organization 
concerned with cultural, social and economic problems rather than with political matters.‖  The 
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as a hindrance to a potential London-based scholarly organization that could reinvigorate 
British informal influence in Asia.  Squabbles between British and American members 
made it difficult to generalize about a single ―Western‖ position in the IPR.  The 
Institute‘s twelfth conference, held in Kyoto in 1954, revealed a growing sense of 
―Asian‖ sentiment among many of its members, but at the same time a strong desire to 
support intellectual projects with the West.  Delegates signaled a commitment to the kind 
of international community represented by the IPR, one that was beholden neither to Cold 
War politics nor third-world solidarity. Pacific internationalism may have been 
constrained during these years, yet it was buoyed by strong Asian support.  
 
MACADAM’S SURPRISE 
Ivison S. Macadam, the longtime director general of Chatham House, watched 
with growing concern as the McCarran Committee‘s investigation into the activities of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations wore on through 1951 and into 1952.  The American 
IPR was the main target of the senatorial inquisitors, but Macadam worried that the 
reputation of the international IPR—and its constituent national councils, including 
Chatham House—would suffer as well.  For many years after his elevation to the head of 
Chatham House in 1929 and the age of 35, Macadam not only had served as the chief 
British representative to the IPR, but also one of the group‘s chief internal critics.  He 
particularly objected to the leadership of Edward Carter as being overtly anti-colonial in 
nature, and had successfully marshaled other European national councils to force Carter‘s 
ouster as IPR‘s secretary-general in 1946.8  The succeeding years, however, had 
apparently brightened his view of the Institute.  By the time of the McCarran hearings, 
Macadam expressed confidence in the IPR‘s objectivity.  Roger Evans, the Rockefeller 
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Foundation‘s assistant director for social sciences, pointedly asked Macadam in the fall 
of 1951 whether he believed the IPR was now ―clean‖ of leftism.  Macadam replied: 
―Absolutely, and I say that with such authority as my 22 years service as UK National 
Secretary may give.‖9 He pledged to do whatever he could to help the Institute during its 
time of trouble.  
 But even as Macadam publicly pledged confidence in the IPR, he privately began 
to develop ideas about how to hasten its dissolution.  For someone who had often 
complained about Carter‘s devious leadership, Macadam was an expert in his own kind 
of subterfuge.  In the wake of the McCarran hearings, Macadam increasingly began to see 
the weakness of the American IPR as an opening for Asian specialists in Britain to create 
a new British-led organization along the lines of the Commonwealth Relations 
Conference.  Macadam‘s efforts highlighted a growing feeling within Chatham House 
that they were the only people who could effectively run such an organization along 
―scientific‖ and ―objective‖ lines.10  They had been forced to play second-fiddle to the 
Americans for decades in the IPR, but British members now realized that the McCarran 
charges had left an opening in the international leadership of Asian studies.  British 
diplomatic recognition of the Communist Chinese government, moreover, made British 
foreign policy in Asia appear more tolerant than the American insistence on regarding the 
nationalist forces in Taiwan as the true Chinese government.  The British Empire in Asia 
may have dissolved, but Macadam and his fellow Chatham House colleagues were 
determined to guard and even enhance their intellectual influence among Asian 
specialists.   
                                                 
9 ―RFE Interview: Ivison S. Macadam,‖ Oct. 9, 1951, Box 358, Folder 4252, in Rockefeller Foundation 
files, RG 1.1, Series 200, Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), Tarrytown, NY. 
10 See A.S.B. Olver to I.S. Macadam, Jan. 8, 1953, in CHA 6/2/37, Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(RIIA), London. 
 183 
The Commonwealth of Nations appeared to be the ideal avenue whereby 
Chatham House could assert its ongoing relevance in Asia.  For many years the British 
Commonwealth had been associated with the ―Old Dominions‖—Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and South Africa.  But with the inclusion of India, Pakistan and Ceylon in the 
wake of their independence, the post-war Commonwealth had dropped its ―British‖ 
prefix and was now a multi-racial club.  Beginning in 1933, Chatham House had 
organized a series of British Commonwealth Relations Conferences (BCRC), which 
periodically assembled the member nations‘ respective institutes of international affairs.  
While the personnel in these gatherings often resembled IPR conferences, their tone 
stressed the commonalities of heritage and outlook rather than sharp disagreements.  The 
1949 Commonwealth conference, held in Ontario, Canada, witnessed real enthusiasm 
among the Asian participants for closer ties within the Commonwealth.  Having entered 
voluntarily into the Commonwealth, the argument went, these countries now wanted to 
see just how much it could mean to them.11  British governmental officials were thrilled 
with the prospect of deepening private relations with Asia, and did all they could to foster 
them.  When Indian delegates at the 1950 IPR conference in Lucknow criticized 
American foreign policy, British members were quick to stress the relative comity of 
Indian-British relations.  J. Mitcheson of the British Consulate office in San Francisco 
explained the strategy in a memorandum to the British Embassy in Washington: 
We ourselves of course are at pains to stress, whenever we see an opportunity like 
this that the best approach to the problem of winning the Asians to the side of the 
West lies in the British Commonwealth, which, containing as it does such a large 
proportion of Asians, is the natural bridge between the East and the West.12 
Such a statement could be seen as a challenge to American-led private efforts to do just 
this, especially the Institute of Pacific Relations.  British officials touting the 
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12 J. Mitcheson to H.A. Graves, Nov. 15, 1950, in FO 371/84700, TNA. 
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Commonwealth as the ―natural bridge‖ between Asia and the West, however, were less 
than clear about what role the American-centered IPR might play in this vision of 
international relations.  Would the IPR help solidify relations between these 
Commonwealth nations, or was the Institute an impediment to this vision?  And with the 
IPR now politically marginalized in the United States, how should the British respond?  
Such questions for the moment were left unanswered as the IPR‘s viability remained in 
flux. 
Macadam‘s initial offer to help the Institute of Pacific Relations consisted of a 
proposal in the summer of 1952 to create a new temporary international headquarters in 
London.13  For years, top IPR leaders had discussed the desirability of moving the 
international secretariat out of New York City, but the preferred move was into Asia.  
The McCarran hearings and the resultant difficulties made the idea of a ―caretaker 
regime‖ even more pressing for both the American IPR as well as the international office.  
Melvin Conant, an old IPR colleague in Hawaii, expressed willingness to operate the 
American IPR from the U.S. island territory, as needed; Macadam‘s similar offer on 
behalf of the international IPR was taken in the same generous spirit.  Funds did not exist 
to establish a new Asian headquarters, after all, and with the weakening of the American 
council, Chatham House was now the strongest IPR national unit.  Ultimately, however, 
IPR Secretary-General William Holland decided against making any drastic moves, 
preferring instead to bring up these proposals up for a fuller discussion at a later date. 
Matters came to a head at the IPR‘s Pacific Council meeting in early February 
1953 in New York City, where representatives from national councils gathered to discuss 
the future program of the organization.  It was here, in the presence of the top IPR 
leaders, that Macadam dispensed with his offer to sustain the Institute and instead 
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unloaded a bombshell:  he now proposed that the international IPR be dissolved 
immediately.14  Macadam said that the McCarran hearings had irreparably harmed the 
reputation of the Institute, and that the American public would no longer support it.  
Conversations with foundation officials, moreover, had convinced Macadam that future 
financial support was a dim prospect.  Furthermore, he suggested that there was little 
point in trying to rehabilitate the IPR‘s name, when even former friends of the Institute 
had failed to stand up on its behalf; its past record made it ―not a good wicket to take a 
stand on.‖15  He concluded that it was better to leave the playing field entirely and hope 
that an unspecified new organization, under new leadership, might win over support.  
Macadam knew that the next gathering of many of the national institutes of international 
relations would be the Commonwealth Relations Conference, scheduled for the spring of 
1954.  Left unsaid was that the Commonwealth gatherings certainly would gain greater 
international attention and clout with the IPR out of the way. 
 Fellow Institute leaders at the New York meeting were stunned.  The IPR had had 
a difficult couple of years, certainly, but none had suggested that the international body 
be discontinued.  Only one other member, a Canadian, was willing to support the plan.  
Not even Macadam‘s fellow Europeans, who had been critical of the IPR in the past, 
were prepared to take such a pessimistic view of the situation.  The Netherlands observer, 
Crena de Iongh, said that without any concrete alternative to the IPR, he thought ―it was 
very bad to quit.‖  The longtime French representative, Roger Levy, demurred as well, 
and said leaders should focus instead on resuscitating the IPR‘s international reputation.  
Perhaps someone should nominate the Institute for the Nobel Peace Prize, Levy offered.  
William Holland, representing the international secretariat, held in check both his 
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New York, 1953,‖ Pacific Relations, COL. 
15 Ibid., p. 2. 
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surprise and anger at Macadam‘s suggestion, saying simply that the organization had 
sufficient funds for the immediate future, and that it must be given a chance to reverse its 
recent fortune: ―The IPR has had its Dunkirk, though it has not yet reached its El 
Alamein.‖  Even Laurence Heyworth, Macadam‘s fellow British representative at the 
meeting and the Institute‘s international finance chairman, failed to back his compatriot. 
Heyworth, like the others, recommended rehabilitation over a death sentence.16 
 
ASIAN SUPPORT 
If most European and American leaders were generally skeptical of Macadam‘s 
proposal to dissolve the Institute of Pacific Relations, Asian members were openly 
critical of the idea.   To lose the IPR was to lose a major benefactor for research and 
publication.  Institutes of international affairs in Asia often had no other formal affiliation 
with other foreign groups.  Attaching themselves to the IPR gave them considerable 
prestige in the eyes of the international scholarly community, and often bolstered their 
position among rival institutes at home.  Most critically, the IPR had proven itself to be 
an independent and open-minded group of experts in the field of Asian studies, with 
personal connections in Asia dating back to the 1920s.  The recent attacks on the Institute 
in the United States merely reinforced the Institute‘s reputation as a fair and honest body.  
Whereas confidence in the West in general was lagging, the IPR still maintained its good 
standing among the Asian councils.  If the IPR were to disappear, however, there was no 
guarantee that Asians would continue to affiliate with other Western groups, which in the 
postwar years were increasingly focused on purely anti-communist objectives. 
Asian members at the New York meeting spoke up in defense of the organization.  
The Japan council already had extended invitations to IPR members for the next IPR 
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conference, scheduled for the fall of 1953 in Kyoto; Japanese representatives complained 
that canceling might have dire effects upon their national institute‘s future.  The Indian 
representative P.S. Narasimhan meanwhile asserted that ―a majority of Asians attach 
great value to the IPR,‖ and thus to scrap the name thus would be ―most unfair‖ to those 
who were committed to the group.17  Narasimhan predicted that the upcoming Kyoto 
conference would have a positive effect on the IPR as a whole, and perhaps could serve 
as the basis of a revival.  The two Indonesians at the meeting, Sujono Surjotjondro and 
Agus Salim, stated that their countrymen had applied to join the IPR ―in the sound 
conviction that this is a body we cannot afford to lose,‖ and that having just joined, they 
were certainly not prepared to abandon the Institute at this juncture.18  As a result of these 
testimonials, the Pacific Council rejected Macadam‘s idea, agreeing merely to monitor 
the IPR‘s health and revisit the issue as needed.    
News of the meeting quickly spread, and provoked other statements of Asian 
support for the group.  One of the most significant statements came from D.R. Gadgil, 
director of India‘s Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics and one of Asia‘s top 
economists and public servants.19 Gadgil served as the chairman of the IPR‘s 
international program committee, and he now leapt to the defense of the IPR as a critical 
body in East-West relations.  In a letter filled with both passion and clarity, Gadgil wrote 
Holland about the faults in Macadam‘s argument, and the implications of his proposal for 
trans-Pacific contact more broadly.  Gadgil first took issue with the notion that the 
politically motivated McCarran attacks had damaged the IPR‘s international reputation: 
It should be realized that this fact by itself not only does not discredit the IPR in 
Indian or Asiatic eyes, but rather increases the sympathy felt for that organization 
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(and may I add admiration for the spirited stand made by its officers).  The 
alleged left sympathies of the IPR do not shock us; in fact, one might almost 
venture on the broad generalization that anything which is not at least a little left 
of centre in US will be out of focus for the bulk of intelligent people in India and 
most other Asiatic countries. 
If American corporate and philanthropic interests were no longer willing to support the 
Institute‘s work for political reasons, Gadgil continued, there was no guarantee that 
Asians would acquiesce in a replacement organization.  ―It is very premature for 
[Macadam] to think that all National Councils are merely waiting to be gathered into a 
new net,‖ he wrote.  Why would Asian councils be willing to join a new group whose 
origins were a capitulation to political pressure, and whose very nature would thus be 
compromised? Gadgil concluded by issuing a stark warning to his fellow IPR members 
about the consequences of dissolution for East-West partnerships: 
If the actions of [Macadam] are to govern decisions relating to the US 
Organization and to govern the inclinations of the British and Canadians, I can see 
neither virtue nor profit in associating in a new International Organization with 
them.  It would then, in my opinion, be better for the Asians to think in terms of 
an Asian Organization, which may later be adhered to, if possible, by African 
Councils creating in this way an international group with a comparatively 
homogenous approach to world affairs.   
Here, in brief, was the clearest possible statement regarding the consequences of a 
weakened trans-Pacific community.  Gadgil clearly anticipated that the impact of an 
absent IPR would result not in a reconfigured Western-oriented group, but rather in the 
kind of Afro-Asian affiliation that would form the basis of the Bandung conference two 
years later, as well as the Cairo conference of late 1957.  Holland immediately recognized 
the value of Gadgil‘s prophetic note, and forwarded copies of his letter to top Institute 
leaders around the world.20  
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Other national council representatives were more directly suspicious of 
Macadam‘s motivations for suggesting the dissolution of the Institute.  The French were 
among the first to question whether Macadam was being entirely objective when the 
British representative panned the IPR‘s utility.  Three days after the conclusion of the 
Pacific Council meetings in New York, Roger Levy paid a visit to the Rockefeller 
Foundation, where he reported on Macadam‘s failed effort to break up the IPR.  
According to an account of the interview, Levy said that upon reflection, he believed 
Macadam‘s ―real concern was that a continuance of an American-dominated IPR would 
be prejudicial to British interests in the Orient—hence his desire to let the IPR go, and 
continue the functions under a new international organization with a new name, heading 
up to London.‖21  Levy‘s suspicions quickly found their way to top French governmental 
officials, who were actively following the drama in New York City.  On February 9, 
1953, Henri Bonnet, the French ambassador to the United States, wrote to Foreign 
Minister Georges Bidault that it was highly unlikely that the American people would 
stand for the transfer of the center of gravity of Asian studies from New York to London.  
British political views toward Asia were—to say the very least—suspectes in American 
eyes, Bonnet concluded.22 
Macadam may have correctly read the mood of British diplomatic officials, and 
he no doubt saw an opportunity to strike a blow for the Commonwealth at the expense of 
the American-dominated IPR,23 but his proposal irked even many of his colleagues at 
                                                 
21 Roger F. Evans interview with Roger Levy, Feb. 10, 1953, in RF files, RG 1.1, Series 200, Box 359, 
Folder 4259, RAC. 
22 Henri Bonnet to Georges Bidault, Feb. 9, 1953, in Vol. 9, Direction Asie-Océanie (1944-1955), Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangères (MAE), Paris. 
23 The French were not the only ones to notice the power-play.  Shiroshi Nasu, a Japanese delegate at the 
Pacific Council meeting, met with the State Department‘s acting director of northern Asia, Robert J.G. 
McClurkin, and told him that he felt ―the British IPR favored a Commonwealth IPR conference in Pakistan 
next spring and that they were perhaps seeking to undermine the Kyoto conference as it would detract from 
the importance of the proposed Commonwealth Conference.‖  Memorandum of conversation, Feb. 16, 
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Chatham House who were not consulted in advance.  Macadam‘s reputation at the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs in the early 1950s, in fact, was somewhat analogous to 
Edward Carter‘s position within the IPR at the end of World War II: both were strong 
personalities who had directed their respective organizations for years, and were used to 
leading from the front.  But Macadam increasingly found himself isolated and resented 
by others in the British Institute.24  Victor Purcell, the Malayan specialist who had 
clashed with Macadam over previous research projects, privately had warned William 
Holland in 1952 that the long-serving Chatham House director was duplicitous, 
pretending to help the IPR while at the same time working against it: ―It is quite clear that 
he intends to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds as long as he can, and then, if 
necessary, hunt with the hounds tout simple.‖25  In the wake of the Pacific Council 
meeting, Holland decided he should bypass Macadam and directly inform several 
Chatham House members serving on its Pacific Relations Committee—including Arthur 
Creech Jones, Sir Andrew McFadyean, Sir John Pratt, as well as Purcell—regarding 
Holland‘s impressions of the meeting.  When they heard, most were appalled.  Purcell 
replied that it was ―monstrous‖ that Macadam failed to consult them before floating his 
dissolution proposal.26  Within weeks, in a dramatic rebuke to their own director-general, 
the Chatham House Pacific Relations Committee announced that Macadam did not speak 
for the British group on IPR matters, and would never again represent them at IPR 
meetings.27     
                                                                                                                                                 
1953, in RG 59, Central Decimal File, 800.46/2-1653, National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA), College Park, MD. 
24 Peter Calvocoressci, a staff member of Chatham House from 1950-55, provided in his memoirs an 
unflattering portrait of Macadam, referring to him simply as ―the Director-General.‖  Calvocoressi, 
Threading My Way (London: Gerald Duckworth and Company, 1994), p. 152.   
25 ―Tout simple‖—in other words, on his own.  Victor Purcell to W.L. Holland, (Personal), July 28, 1952, 
in Box 30, Folder 4, IPR fonds, UBC.  
26 Purcell to Holland, Feb. 23, 1953, in Ibid. 
27 Pacific Relations Committee Minutes, March 31, 1953, in CHA 6/1/13, RIIA. 
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This episode may have remained yet another internal Chatham House-IPR dustup, 
but instead it erupted into the British press.  William Holland, who in mid-February 1953 
still did not know if Macadam might be able to bully his views on the IPR through 
Chatham House, made a bold decision to leak the confidential minutes of the Pacific 
Council meeting to Guy Wint, a longtime Institute friend and editorial writer for the 
Manchester Guardian.28  It was an act of desperation, one of the very few times Holland 
had acted deceptively as secretary-general.  The left-leaning Guardian was happy to 
receive such red meat against the notoriously stodgy and conservative denizens of 
Chatham House.  On March 19, the Guardian published an editorial that praised the 
IPR‘s work and condemned the ―British‖ proposal (it did not mention Macadam by 
name) to wind up the international Institute as ―deplorable,‖ saying the recommendation 
amounted to a surrender to its McCarthyist critics.  ―It is hard to believe that Chatham 
House would lower its standards and take part in any manoeuver that would be repugnant 
to the liberal spirit.  It ought rather to stand as the defender of academic liberties,‖ the 
editorial intoned.29  The Guardian editorial, combined with Chatham House‘s own 
rebuke of Macadam, served notice that the IPR‘s reputation would be publicly defended 
in Britain, at least for the time being.30 
                                                 
28 Holland wrote Wint: ―Please treat [the Pacific Council memorandum] with discretion.  I am sure you 
will be as surprised as many others at the meeting were at the strange position taken by Macadam.‖  Wint 
replied: ―Thank you very much for your letter and the memorandum.  I think we shall have an article in the 
Guardian about the future of the IPR.  But we won‘t give away the source of our information.‖  Holland to 
Wint, Feb. 19, 1953; and Wint to Holland, Feb. 24, 1953, both in Box 31, Folder 12, IPR fonds, UBC.       
29 Manchester Guardian Weekly editorial, March 19, 1953.  
30 Holland‘s gambit of using the press on behalf of the IPR succeeded almost too well.  The Guardian‘s 
flaying of Chatham House brought considerable embarrassment to the British council, and the resulting 
back-and-forth between the newspaper and Institute threatened to expose Holland‘s role in the initial leak.  
Sir Andrew McFadyean, a former businessman in Asia and a Liberal Party stalwart, had friendly ties to 
Holland and the IPR and now was tapped as chair of the Pacific Relations Committee.  McFadyean was not 
supportive of Macadam‘s actions, but he nevertheless felt obliged to defend Chatham House from the 
paper‘s charges.  McFadyean decided to write a letter to the Guardian in which he disputed the 
newspaper‘s account of the IPR meeting, asserting that the paper had little business commenting on a 
private meeting whose confidential discussions it could not possibly know.  The Guardian, in response, 
published a second editorial, on Nov. 28, 1953, in which it defended its accuracy and later quoted directly 
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Macadam‘s loss of confidence in the IPR, and the subsequent Guardian expose, 
had the effect of drawing into sharp relief the question of British support of the Institute.  
If Chatham House members truly felt that they could lead a Commonwealth-inspired 
group that could bring together East and West, why should they continue support an 
ailing international institute whose American members had caused them headaches for so 
many years?  Yet for the moment, whatever their misgivings, Chatham House members 
were not prepared to back their director in his bid for the IPR‘s dissolution.  Part of this 
was due to internal politics at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and Macadam‘s 
faltering leadership.  Part of this, too, was due to the need to keep American support for 
Commonwealth action.  The encouragement of Commonwealth ties, in other words, 
could not be seen to come at the expense of the Anglo-American partnership.  But finally, 
one must not overlook the importance of the show of support by Asian members for the 
IPR.  Whether Indian or Pakistani, Japanese or Indonesian, they made it known that 
formal affiliation with the IPR was a priority that must not be abandoned.   
If anything, the Macadam controversy made the British as well as the Americans 
more aware of the value of private Asian-West contact facilitated by the IPR; without this 
connection, Asian elites might very well go their own way and form an all-Asian group.  
As top Institute leaders prepared for the next international conference in Kyoto, this 
implied threat hung in the background.  The chairman of the Japanese IPR, Keizo 
                                                                                                                                                 
from the Pacific Council minutes.  ―Heaven knows how the M.G. came to possess them,‖ a frustrated 
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Shibusawa, a former governor of the Bank of Japan, wrote his Western counterparts in 
1953 that a conference should take place as soon as possible ―if IPR is confident of its 
original objectives and is really in for action as it should be.‖31  Shibusawa‘s tone was 
friendly but pointed, and served notice that the Japanese would not have infinite patience 
with further delays over Macadam‘s tactics. In the United States, rumors spread that 
Japan was giving serious thought to holding an interim IPR conference in Asia sometime 
in 1953 that would exclude Westerners.32  Hawaii‘s Melvin Conant wrote to the 
Japanese, warning that such a conference would ―impair the spirit‖ of future IPR 
gatherings, whose basis rested upon the East-West connection.33  In the end, officials 
agreed to postpone the IPR Kyoto conference one year, to the fall of 1954.34  Macadam‘s 
dustup was thus put uncomfortably behind them. 
 
THE KYOTO CONFERENCE, 1954 
More than 100 delegates descended on the former Japanese capitol city of Kyoto 
in the last week of September 1954 for the Institute of Pacific Relations‘ twelfth 
international conference.   International events in 1954 had cast a particular note of 
urgency into the Institute‘s work.   Early in the year, the French were defeated at Dien 
Bien Phu and by late April they were forced to concede independence to Indochina at the 
Geneva Conference.  The United States refused to recognize the Geneva Accords—
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June 1, 1953, in Box 42, Folder 6; and Edgar McInnis, President, Canadian Institute of International 
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drawing a provisional line between the northern and southern zones of Vietnam to 
facilitate the withdrawal of forces—in order to deny legitimacy to the communist-
controlled north.  In early September, the United States, France, Great Britain, Australia, 
New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan signed the Manila Pact, which 
created an anti-communist military alliance known as the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO).  The founding of SEATO now made it abundantly clear that the 
United States government saw Southeast Asia as a critical front in the Cold War.  But 
notable was the failure of many Asian countries to join in this anti-communist alliance: 
India, Indonesia and Burma preferred to maintain neutrality, while the Geneva Accords 
prevented Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos from official participation in any such 
international pact.  In sum, unaffiliated Asians were becoming ever more suspicious of 
American ―imperialism‖ on the continent.   
The Institute of Pacific Relations itself, meanwhile, found itself at a watershed 
moment.  The international organization would continue for now; this much was clear.  
But the central dynamic among its participants had shifted.  For years, the IPR had been 
largely a Western group looking East; its conferences had been dominated by American, 
British, Canadian and Australian delegates pursuing topics about Asia.  But by the early 
1950s, Asian members had reached a critical mass; Indians, Pakistanis, Japanese and 
Indonesians now began to assert their voices within the IPR.  Burma, Vietnam, Korea, 
Thailand and Ceylon still were not formally recognized as national councils, but 
individuals from these countries attended gatherings as ―guest observers.‖  These Asian 
voices were interested in discussing their own concerns, which did not necessarily accord 
with the West‘s perspective.  Poverty, land reform, population pressures, and trade were 
far more important to these Asian delegates than the preoccupation with communism.35  
                                                 
35 Benjamin Kizer to Albert Mayer, Oct. 20, 1954, in Box 27, Folder 16, IPR fonds, UBC. 
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Kyoto would represent a moment at which western IPR leaders were forced to reckon 
with Asians on their own terms, and a chance to think anew about the East-West 
partnership.  In Kyoto, the continent would be allowed to speak for itself. 
Even before the Kyoto conference began, IPR members sensed that the gathering 
would have a more assertive Asian perspective.  As the American Institute struggled 
under the cloud of McCarthyism, and as the British dealt with the fallout from 
Macadam‘s defeatism, Asian councils took the lead in planning the conference agenda.  
As chairman of the IPR‘s Program Committee, India‘s D.R. Gadgil prepared a draft 
agenda in early 1953 whose main theme stressed the ―Improvement of Living Standards 
in Asia‖ and largely avoided politically charged topics.  For Gadgil and others, debate 
over living standards and regional technical development were more productive than 
political discussions involving communist designs in Asia.  Not all members agreed, 
however.  At the March 1954 Commonwealth Relations conference in Lahore, some 
delegates took time from their usual business to hold an informal IPR Pacific Council 
meeting.  These representatives—especially British, Canadian and Australian members—
argued that it ―would not be possible to avoid a discussion of political and strategic 
issues,‖ and urged their inclusion in the Kyoto agenda.36  Holland agreed with their 
recommendations, and passed along a new revised agenda, disregarding Gadgil‘s earlier 
proposal.37  When Asian leaders received the new agenda, they were miffed at the 
changes.  The Japanese council‘s executive director, Nobutane Kiuchi, sent a frank letter 
                                                 
36 Those present at the informal meeting included two representatives each from the United Kingdom, 
Canada and Australia, as well as one representative from New Zealand, India, Pakistan and the United 
States.  See Edgar McInnis, ―Summary of an informal meeting of Pacific Council members,‖ March 21, 
1954, Box 28, Folder 15, IPR fonds, UBC. 
37 The omission was apparently unintentional, and Holland was apologetic for the misunderstanding.  See 
W.L. Holland to D.R. Gadgil, July 2, 1954; Gadgil to Holland, July 10, 1954; both in Box 26, Folder 2, IPR 
fonds, UBC.  Also see Holland to Edgar McInnis, June 24, 1954, in Box 41, Folder 1, IPR fonds, UBC. 
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of objection to Holland.  The proposed agenda was too ―Western‖ as distinguished from 
―Asian,‖ Kiuchi wrote on behalf of his council:  
[T]he problems of Asia seem to be presented in a particular context of … Western 
democracies vs. Communist countries.  Consequently, we fear, this agenda might 
give an undue impression that the conference were to discuss the problems of 
Asia with the primary objective of searching for what can be and should be done 
to retain Asia on the side of Western democracies in the cold war.38   
The Japanese, along with other Asian councils, believed that bringing up the Cold War 
would only serve to divide the delegates.  In the end, the Asian delegates largely won the 
day: the conference agenda remained primarily focused upon Asian standards of living 
with a provisional allowance for later discussion of international ramifications—a 
compromise that avoided putting Asians on the spot regarding their outlook on the Cold 
War.39       
Asian delegates again showed their newfound organizational strength over 
matters of the membership eligibility of the Soviet Union and Communist China.  The 
Chinese IPR had simply dissolved after the 1949 revolution.  The Soviet Union council, 
meanwhile, had last participated in the 1936 conference at Yosemite and was widely 
considered long-defunct.  Keeping these communist countries as even potential Institute 
participants was a political liability, however, in the wake of the McCarran hearings. 
Some American IPR members moved to strip the USSR of its eligibility to rejoin the 
group, citing the impossibility of a non-partisan, non-governmental, politically 
independent research body from emerging in a communist country.40  But the Indonesian 
Institute of World Affairs, backed by Japan and India, vetoed the idea, citing the Soviet 
Union‘s acknowledged position as a Pacific power.  ―The admittance of political 
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considerations on the matter of eligibility would create a precedent which in future might 
gravely impair the effectiveness of the work of the IPR,‖ wrote the Indonesian council‘s 
secretary-general, Soedjatmoko.41  In the end, the principle of inclusion overrode anti-
communism.  Westerners acquiesced to this objection, and thus the USSR, along with 
Communist China, remained free to participate in the IPR, however unlikely the prospect. 
It was an important symbolic move, if nothing else.  By keeping the door open to China 
and the USSR, the IPR could not be framed as a purely anti-communist international 
grouping. 
One measure of the conciliatory stance regarding the communist and capitalist 
divide was the liberal use of the phrase ―peaceful co-existence‖ at the Kyoto conference.  
This phrase was first associated with the communist states of Eastern Europe, which 
postulated ways in which to live peacefully alongside their capitalist neighbors.  
―Peaceful co-existence‖ also connoted an intentional thawing of the Cold War, and it 
became a catchphrase advocated by the majority of IPR participants, save for a few 
American delegates.42  Some of the most forceful and eloquent defenders of ―peaceful co-
existence‖ were in the British delegation, by far the most experienced and balanced group 
attending the conference.  Shaking off the previous year‘s controversy, Chatham House 
sent a powerful delegation with a mixture of academic, business and diplomatic 
backgrounds—but with a more progressive outlook than usual.  The head of the British 
delegation, Kenneth Younger, was a Labor Party leader and a former minister of state at 
the Foreign Office. Younger was already known for his efforts to move the British 
government toward closer ties with Communist China, and he quickly established himself 
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as one of the most dominant personalities of the conference.  He was supported by Lord 
Lindsay,43 a senior fellow in the international relations department at Australian National 
University, with deep and acknowledged connections to the Chinese communist regime.  
Without any other delegates with extensive knowledge of the Chinese government (and 
of course without the participation of the Chinese themselves), Younger and Lindsay‘s 
views took on heightened importance, and gave the British considerable influence at the 
conference.44   
One of the reasons why Asian voices emerged so strongly at Kyoto was the 
division among the Western delegates.  Whenever discussion turned to relations between 
the communist and non-communist worlds, the stature of the British soared and that of 
the Americans collapsed.45  British diplomatic recognition of the People‘s Republic of 
China in 1950 contributed to Asian goodwill toward the European power. The United 
States‘ refusal to do so, on the other hand, made them appear ideologically obstinate and 
unwilling to compromise with communist nations.  In early October, toward the end of 
the conference, The Mainichi, Japan‘s best-known English-language daily paper, 
sponsored a special political roundtable discussion between leaders of the American, 
British, Indian and Japanese delegations.  Kenneth Younger reiterated the need for 
―peaceful co-existence‖ but his American counterpart, University of Washington 
Professor Charles Martin, disagreed, calling it ―a magic phrase‖ that would only give 
communists time to regroup and revert to ―external aggression and revolutionary 
annihilation.‖46  Such talk did not impress the Indian representative H.R. Kunzru, the 
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head of the Indian Council of World Affairs, a former minister of parliament and close 
friend of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.  ―There are two alternatives before us,‖ 
Kunzru asserted plainly.  ―Peaceful co-existence and war.‖47  Other Asian delegates 
largely agreed with Kunzru‘s assessment of the world situation, and found intriguing 
India‘s foreign policy approach of neutralism in the Cold War. 
American delegates at Kyoto were deeply aware of the United States‘ poor 
reputation in Asia.  Charles Martin, for instance, described his country‘s standing in Asia 
as ―lower than a gopher.‖48  But despite widespread criticism of U.S. foreign policy at the 
conference, the American delegation to the IPR conference by and large found a 
somewhat sympathetic audience.  The precarious American IPR was more of a pitiable 
rather than formidable presence at the conference; Japanese and Indian delegates were 
less inclined to embarrass the Americans when they were facing such hardships at 
home.49  Secretary-General William Holland had unsuccessfully tried to enlist a number 
of prominent American businessmen with Asian interests to take part in the Kyoto 
conference, but none wished to be associated with an Institute still reeling from the 
McCarran hearings.50  The eventual 10-member American delegation, as a consequence, 
was small and admittedly uneven, composed entirely of university professors whose 
public pronouncements were regarded as ―cautious‖ and ―sincere‖ rather than particularly 
knowledgeable about technical issues involving Asian living standards.51  While 
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disappointed in the lack of diversity and expertise among the American delegates, 
Holland could only express thanks and relief that the American IPR was able to 
participate at all.52   
Despite their relative lack of stature, the American delegation to Kyoto received 
plenty of attention in the local press, a fact that made American officials take note.  
Gregory Henderson, a foreign service officer who ran the American Cultural Center in 
Kyoto, kept watch on the IPR conference and found much to like about the delegation‘s 
performance.  Henderson‘s report to the American embassy, which found its way to 
senior State Department officials in Washington, detailed the activities of the American 
delegation, which included numerous interviews with the local press and discussions with 
local Japanese leaders.  Although Henderson noted that the Washington professor Charles 
Martin was the sole American delegate who reliably supported U.S. Asian policy in all 
aspects, the foreign service officer wrote that the others were at least fair, and did their 
best to keep most criticism ―within the family.‖  With the widespread Japanese interest in 
the IPR conference and the attendant heavy press coverage, Henderson concluded that ―it 
is doubtful whether explanations of foreign policy have received so much prominent 
space in any similarly short period in the press of this [Kansai] region.‖  Overall, he 
concluded, the delegation was uniformly ―helpful … to the cause of American policy.‖53  
Here was a case in point for the public relations benefits of the American IPR: as an 
independent entity, the American group could act as an effective means for explaining 
United States policies in Asia at international conferences and at least receive an open 
hearing. 
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The significance of the Kyoto gathering and the ongoing connections engendered 
through the IPR can be seen in relation to the more famous Bandung conference held less 
than one year later.  On its own, the invitation by President Sukarno of Indonesia to host 
representatives of African and Asian nations—―Newly Emerging Forces,‖ as he called 
them—was seen as a threatening move by some in the West. The prospect of cooperation 
between the principal organizing nations of India, Indonesia and China, in particular, 
raised fears about an anti-Western bloc.  A ten-point ―declaration on the promotion of 
world peace and cooperation‖ included a statement regarding the disavowal of collective 
defense treaties to serve the interests of big powers, a clear swipe against the newly 
formed SEATO.  The Final Communiqué of the Bandung conference, in which these 
nations pledged greater direct technical assistance toward one another, also was noted as 
an act of independence from Western concerns.   
Yet to see Bandung as an act of defiance against the West, as John Foster Dulles 
did, reflected a particular Cold War mentality rather than a reflection of the conference 
itself.  Non-state actors associated with the IPR in attendance at the proceedings came 
away with a very different view.  Angadipuram Appadorai, the secretary of the Indian 
Council of World Affairs, noted that delegates touted ―mutual cooperation‖ but made no 
plans for setting up regional machinery or setting up any kind of exclusive arrangement 
that might limit contact with the West.54  George McTurnan Kahin, the associate director 
of the Southeast Asia program at Cornell University, was traveling in Indonesia and 
managed to secure a press pass to the Bandung conference.  The assertion of greater self-
confidence by Asian and African peoples, Kahin wrote later, would in all likelihood 
mean that they would have a greater determination, not less, to share decisions with the 
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West.55  These observers and others had witnessed firsthand that a rising Asian sensibility 
did not on its own necessitate a break from Western contact. 
The misreading of Bandung reflected the zero-sum geopolitical mentality of the 
Cold War, but it also reflected the preoccupation of viewing international relations 
through the lens of the nation-state.  At the Kyoto conference, as at Lucknow before then, 
Western and Asian delegates understood that ideological and political differences 
separated them but did not prevent constructive regional dialogue at the private level.  In 
fact, it was at the non-state level that greater understanding could be reached.  The ―true 
meeting-ground of East and West … begins with the recognition of impact of the past, of 
the years of colonial subjugation and its after-effects, of the blazing intoxication of pride 
and the muscle-flexing that comes with sudden self-government, of the drive to equality 
and self-respect,‖ wrote the Filipino statesman Carlos Romulo in the wake of the 
Bandung conference.56  Before nations could share foreign policies, they must begin to 
understand the deeper contexts in which these policies were formed.  Pacific 
internationalists recognized the necessity of this exchange; Western policymakers, 
however, all too often viewed such substantive exchange as a threat.        
 
CONCLUSION 
In the wake of political troubles for the Institute of Pacific Relations in the early 
1950s, Asian intellectuals did not withdraw from association; if anything, they clung 
more tightly to their best hope for substantive East-West collaboration and exchange.  
The IPR represented the strongest organization linking private elites in Asia—far 
stronger, for instance, than the Asian Regional Organization, which had done little since 
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its creation at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi.57  The McCarran 
hearings in the U.S. Senate had not weakened the IPR‘s reputation in Asia; in fact they 
served only to reinforce the Institute‘s brand as a truly independent organization in 
international affairs.  The IPR had bolstered its Asian membership, so that India, 
Pakistan, Japan and now Indonesia constituted thriving national councils committed to 
ongoing research projects and an international conference program.  When the IPR came 
under attack from one of its own—Ivison Macadam, of Britain‘s Chatham House—Asian 
delegates rushed to its aid.  Their interest was not merely a show of sympathy.  With a 
weakened American council and an ambivalent British group, Asian councils saw an 
opportunity to gain a greater position within the organization and finally shape the 
substantive agenda of the Institute‘s international work.   
Despite its precarious status, the Institute‘s potential benefit to the United States 
remained real.  Although IPR leaders had made it clear that they would not be pawns of 
the American government, some officials like Gregory Henderson saw a clear advantage 
to having such a private group explaining American policy to Asians.  The White House 
also was beginning to recognize the value of private, non-governmental groups as 
intermediaries in its effort to promote more positive images of the United States abroad.  
In the summer of 1954, in the wake of the Geneva Conference, President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower asked Congress to appropriate $5 million toward a presidential emergency 
fund for cultural exchange initiatives; administration officials also organized a People-to-
People campaign, an extensive state-private cooperative venture that encouraged ordinary 
Americans to engage in public relations work for the United States.58  Clearly the U.S. 
government was awakening to the fact that private groups often had a great ability to 
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sway foreign public opinion, and that prominent individuals, acting independent of the 
government, could be relied upon to humanize and perhaps strengthen the image of the 
United States.  And with official concern about Asian powers turning against the West, 
any kind of private contact with the West surely would be encouraged.  For the first time 
in years, IPR officials believed that their research and conference program might once 
again receive at least some quiet appreciation among higher circles.  
Rather than see a revitalization of its programs, however, Institute officials found 
themselves once more on the defensive—this time, at the hands of the Internal Revenue 
Service.  On May 26, 1955, T. Coleman Andrews, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
and friend of Senator Joseph McCarthy, revoked the international Institute of Pacific 
Relations‘ tax-exempt status, retroactive to Jan. 1, 1955.  The American IPR, as a 
member national council, was denied tax exemption two months later.  Without citing 
any evidence, Andrews maintained that the IPR had ―pursued its objectives through other 
than educational means‖ and had ―to a substantial extent engaged in the dissemination of 
controversial and partisan propaganda.‖  Virtually miming the charges laid out in the 
McCarran report from 1952, he charged that the IPR had ―attempted to influence, directly 
or indirectly, the policies and/or actions of governments and government officials,‖ 
presumably in relation to American policy in China during the 1940s.59  IPR officials 
were unable to confront Andrews directly about these charges; the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue resigned a few months later, citing (ironically enough) his opposition to 
the income tax.60  Even the Institute‘s friends in the State Department were unable to 
intervene into a matter that would take years of expensive litigation to clear up.  The IPR 
now was plunged into even greater financial uncertainty than ever before; indeed, for the 
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cash-strapped group, the revocation of tax-exemption represented a virtual death 
sentence.    
Time and again, Western private and public officials paid lip service to the idea of 
opening up greater private channels of dialogue with Asia in the mid-1950s, but these 
efforts proved to be dysfunctional and even directly contradicted by their own actions.  
Ivison Macadam‘s 1953 proposal to dissolve the Institute of Pacific Relations revealed a 
strain of long-standing British ambivalence regarding the IPR, and highlighted the 
ambiguous relationship between the Commonwealth and other international 
organizations.  In the United States, meanwhile, a new emphasis upon cultural diplomacy 
by the Eisenhower administration was countermanded by the residual impact of 
McCarthyism.  U.S. foundations, businesses and government officials continued to 
distance themselves from the organization, leaving it slowly twisting in the wind and 
vulnerable to fresh attacks by the IRS by 1955.  Yet despite these troubles, Asian 
members of the IPR stood by the Western-based Institute as the best hope for trans-
Pacific intellectual exchange.  Far from fleeing into the arms of anti-colonial compatriots 
in Africa, Asian intellectuals continued to reach out to friendly Westerners in the IPR, 
with hopes that a broader basis for ―peaceful co-existence‖ might develop between them.  
The bogey of Bandung must be placed into the context of such evidence of active 
cooperation among Western and Asian elites.  
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Chapter Seven 
Rethinking the East-West Connection, 1955-1960 
By the latter half of the 1950s, a growing number of American politicians and 
foundation officials recognized that intellectual exchange between the West and Asia—
an effort championed by the Institute of Pacific Relations since the 1920s—was not 
simply a matter of scholarly interest but was in fact a vital tool in the nation‘s struggle 
against global communism.  The United States Information Agency (USIA) made 
partnerships with non-governmental bodies a critical component of its propaganda 
strategy in the Cold War, expanding its Office of Private Cooperation to coordinate new 
public relations programs in developing areas.  As one historian of American Cold War 
propaganda has noted, the USIA especially targeted ―leadership groups‖ in its attempts to 
win over elites and thereby create a kind of ―ideational integration‖ between Americans 
and influential segments of foreign societies.1 Partnering with non-governmental groups 
was seen as a valuable cover to disguise official efforts at winning over the ―hearts and 
minds‖ of the developing non-communist world. Asia was a critical target for American 
propaganda, especially with the end of the direct U.S. occupation of Japan (1952) and the 
French withdrawal from Vietnam (1954).  By 1960, more than a third of USIA‘s budget 
was devoted to projects in the region, especially Southeast Asia.2    
Despite growing American interest in building intellectual networks with Asian 
elites, the 1950s also witnessed a critical decline of the American Institute of Pacific 
Relations, and indeed, the termination of the IPR‘s entire international structure by the 
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end of the decade.  This chapter provides a portrait of the Asia-centered non-
governmental groups that overtook the IPR during its final years. Unlike the approach of 
the IPR, the new American links to Asia instead were defined by the Cold War paradigm.  
The Committee for Free Asia (later the Asia Foundation), for instance, was far more 
interested in the dissemination of pro-American propaganda in Asia than in serving as a 
neutral clearinghouse for political and economic research and debate across the Pacific.  
John D. Rockefeller III‘s Asia Society, meanwhile, eschewed potentially controversial 
political subjects entirely and instead focused on connecting Westerners and Asians 
through cultural exchanges such as dinners and art exhibits.  By keeping its efforts 
focused on American audiences, the Asia Society avoided the charge of handing over 
control of its operations to foreign peoples and ideas inimical to the ―national interest.‖  
As an international non-governmental group dealing with Asia-Pacific problems, the 
Institute of Pacific Relations was susceptible to such attacks in the United States. 
American officials may have been concerned about the independence of a private 
international network like the IPR, but they were also concerned about the rise of pan-
Asian groups that excluded Westerners.  IPR leaders continued to defend their 
international organization across the Pacific as preferable to the Asian-only alternative.  
What turned out to be the IPR‘s final international conference, in Lahore, Pakistan, in 
1958, served as a useful counterbalance to the more extreme variety of anti-Western 
propaganda issuing from contemporaneous conferences such as that in Cairo, which 
featured the launching of the Afro-Asian Peoples‘ Solidarity Organization (AAPSO).  As 
the decade came to a close, the IPR‘s efforts to forge an intellectual ―bridge‖ across the 
Pacific Ocean were taken up by governmental bodies, specifically the creation of an East-
West Center in Hawaii.  The IPR‘s role had been superseded by governmental action, but 
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as United States officials quickly learned, building such connections was easier to assert 
than accomplish. 
 
“A MORE COORDINATED APPROACH” 
In the wake of the 1952 McCarran report, the American Institute of Pacific 
Relations found itself at a crossroads.  The American council had weathered charges of 
political infiltration in the State Department and survived, but many of its supporters had 
fled during the Institute‘s season of notoriety, and its reputation was now badly weakened 
in the United States.  Not only had some in Britain lost faith in the Institute‘s purpose, but 
many of its American backers were now turning tail.  In a moment of frustration, William 
Holland, the Institute‘s secretary-general, confessed to University of British Columbia 
history professor Fred Soward in March 1953 that he was ―furious and disgusted‖ that the 
wealthiest democracy in the world was unable to come up with enough funds and 
personnel to keep the American council fully functioning.3  During the next few years, it 
became increasingly clear that the American IPR‘s name had suffered a mortal blow, and 
might need to be renamed and reorganized along new lines.  But there were precious few 
ideas for replacing the American council as a coordinating body for Asian research in the 
United States, and as the American representative in the IPR‘s international organization.  
The need for such an organization was self-evident; the courage to continue the American 
council‘s work, however, was uncertain. 
By the 1950s the Institute of Pacific Relations was hardly alone in the study of the 
Asia-Pacific region in the United States.  Inspired by the pioneering work of the IPR and 
the new interest in the region since World War II, area studies programs covering the 
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whole of Asia had developed in a number of American universities including Harvard 
University, Yale University, Columbia University, Cornell University, the University of 
Pennsylvania, the Johns Hopkins University, the University of Michigan, the University 
of California-Berkeley and the University of Washington.  Other research centers such as 
Stanford University, the University of Chicago and the University of Minnesota featured 
specialized programs in the Far East or Southeast Asia.4  All of these groups had strong 
ties with the American IPR; indeed, many of its leaders were current or former Institute 
members themselves.  But now that universities were producing the vast majority of 
original research on Asia, some began to question the continued need to support the 
American IPR, especially given its political troubles.  In the face of this new reality, 
Institute leaders focused more on their role as a clearinghouse for research, their ability to 
move between the worlds of scholarship, business and government, and especially their 
long-standing ties to Asian intellectuals.  If the American group hoped to survive, it 
would need to undertake a major rebranding. 
Sensing the need for such a comprehensive self-examination, American Institute 
leaders decided to place their fate in the hands of an independent Planning and Review 
Committee.  In the spring of 1953, the president of Hunter College, George N. Shuster, 
informally agreed to serve as the Review Committee‘s chair.  Upon hearing the news of 
Shuster‘s acceptance of the position, the chairman of the American IPR, J. Morden 
Murphy, wrote him directly to make a pitch for the continuation of the American group.   
As the Far Eastern representative for the Bankers Trust Company, Murphy noted that he 
had had the opportunity to meet with most of the financial and political leaders of Asia, 
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and that in this capacity he had come to appreciate the work of the IPR as ―a uniquely 
useful and practically irreplaceable organization, whose demise would be a great loss to 
all concerned.‖5  Murphy, who only a few weeks earlier had agreed to take over the AIPR 
chairmanship himself, made note of the ―obvious hazards‖ associated with linking one‘s 
name with such a controversial group so soon after the McCarran hearings, but was 
convinced he had found a fellow brave soul in Shuster:  ―Surely, the three hundred years 
it has taken our unique democracy to grow, were not spent to create an incubator for 
mice.‖6  No sooner, however, had Shuster accepted the offer to review the American 
IPR‘s operations than he resigned to accept a more prestigious (and no doubt less 
controversial) full-time position offered by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: 
American representative to the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO).7   
With the Planning and Review Committee‘s work in limbo, the prospects for the 
American council grew bleak.  Many within the IPR were unsure of the wisdom of 
keeping the American council‘s name, given its notoriety within the United States.  The 
American Institute of Pacific Relations, which in the early days had been the strongest of 
the national institutes, now threatened to poison other councils.  Despite being a 
naturalized American citizen himself, William Holland as head of the international IPR 
was less concerned with the American group per se than the health of the international 
organization as a whole.  Holland believed he had a way out of this conundrum: the 
replacement of the AIPR with an entirely new body.  In a sweeping memorandum sent 
out to major supporters of the Institute, Holland called for the creation of a new non-
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partisan organization, a Coordinating Council on Asian Affairs.  Such a council, he 
suggested, might relate the work of various university programs and even initiate 
experimental projects by bringing together businesses, scholars and governmental 
officials and thus prevent the overlapping of work.  It would take on an even wider focus, 
encompassing East Asia, South Asia as well as the Middle East.  And presumably, 
although Holland never explicitly stated as much, it might enable a continued American 
presence in the international IPR.8   
Before any new Coordinating Council on Asian Affairs could come into 
existence, IPR leaders needed to visit their former backers at the Rockefeller Foundation 
to determine their level of enthusiasm for this venture.  The Rockefeller Foundation had 
been the strongest supporters of IPR operations over the years.  Institute leaders therefore 
believed they might be sympathetically inclined toward the group‘s reinvention.  William 
Holland approached Dean Rusk, the new president of the Rockefeller Foundation, in 
February 1953 about the possible reorganization of the American IPR, and Rusk agreed 
to have a meeting with the outgoing American IPR chairman Gerald Swope, the 80-year-
old former president of the General Electric Corporation.9  But in the course of the next 
few months, it became clear that the Rusk-led Rockefeller Foundation was uninterested 
in rehabilitating the group, even under a new name.  Skeptical about anything involving 
the Pacific institute, Rusk privately remarked to his colleagues that ―serious questions 
about IPR … have not been fully answered in our minds‖ and thus he rejected any pleas 
for support.10  By October 1953, top foundation officials had met with John D. 
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Rockefeller III and made two conclusions seemingly at odds: one, that the mission of the 
international IPR had ―demonstrated merit‖ performing functions that were of ―increasing 
importance‖ to understanding the Pacific area; and two, that the American IPR should be 
allowed to ―fade out‖ and have ―nature … take its course without any nudging‖ from the 
Rockefellers themselves.11  Only upon the death of the American IPR would the 
Rockefeller Foundation consider the merits of replacement groups.  Foundation officials 
clearly did not lament the prospect of the passing away of a group that had brought them 
so much recent unwanted attention. 
Rockefeller officials had reason to believe they might soon receive their wish.  At 
a special session of the American Institute of Pacific Relations on October 9, 1953, the 
executive committee voted to recommend disbanding the organization on January 31, 
1954.  They were having trouble finding a replacement leader for the Planning and 
Review Committee, and furthermore, they could no longer escape the reality of their 
ongoing financial woes.  Letters were sent to all 33 American IPR trustees, a majority of 
whom reluctantly agreed with the executive committee‘s decision to liquidate the 
American council.12  Word spread throughout the country and even abroad; public 
encomia soon appeared, praising the group‘s past work and bemoaning its current 
predicament.  ―The members of the McCarthy wing of American politics can now add 
one more feather to their caps,‖ lamented a December 1953 editorial in The Eastern 
                                                                                                                                                 
representative at the Honolulu IPR conference, nor to contribute Foundation funds for the support of the 
conference. We know that the American Council, IPR, is seriously considering complete liquidation; 
further, there are still some serious questions about IPR which have not been fully answered in our minds. 
Under the circumstances, we doubt that a further complication of the Foundation‘s role would be justified; 
or be offset by significant or lasting benefit from participation at Honolulu.‖  Dean Rusk to Edgar B. 
Young, Dec. 19, 1952, in Office of the Messrs. Rockefeller–World Affairs files, RG III 2 Q, Series 213, 
Box 10, Folder 74, RAC.  
11 Interview, Joseph H. Willits and Roger F. Evans with John D. Rockefeller III, Oct. 30, 1953, in RF files, 
RG 1.1, Series 200, Box 353, Folder 4202, RAC. 
12 Roger F. Evans, Interview with W.L. Holland, Oct. 22, 1953; Holland, Memorandum to AIPR Trustees, 
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Economist, a business journal published in New Delhi.13  Asians had come to trust the 
IPR as a respected independent voice, willing to stand up to the forces of McCarthyism.  
Reforming or reconstituting the American council would therefore be perceived as a 
capitulation to the ―vociferous and ill-informed groups‖ that launched attacks against the 
IPR in recent years.  The Eastern Economist concluded with a stern warning: ―No other 
organization in Asia is now equipped sufficiently well to attempt to fill the vacuum if the 
International Secretariat is weakened in its work.‖14  The imminent death of the American 
IPR, the journal believed, would not only affect American understanding of Asia but it 
would also have serious repercussions on the work of the international IPR. 
As the potential impact of the loss of the American Institute sank in, some trustees 
began to rethink their willingness to oversee its dissolution.  If the international IPR was 
so valuable, and American participation was so critical to its success, how could the 
American organization fold when there was no clear successor group?15  Allowing the 
group to ―fade out,‖ as some in the Rockefeller Foundation had hoped, might not be the 
best course after all.  Many trustees and members who had opposed the move to liquidate 
the group now recognized the need to act quickly and decisively to save the organization.  
Within a matter of weeks in November and December, American IPR supporters amassed 
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emergency cash donations totaling $16,000.   The fact that such money could be raised so 
quickly and on such short notice gave at least temporary hope that the infusion could 
stabilize the American group, and give it a stimulus upon which it might regain its 
financial footing.  When the organization‘s executive committee held a special follow-up 
meeting on January 5, 1954, members reversed course from their October decision and 
instead unanimously voted to continue the council‘s operations.  Once again, the 
American Institute of Pacific Relations had cheated death.16 
Cheating death was one thing; ensuring survival was quite another.  And even in 
this temporary resuscitation, the American Institute lost another ally.  Members of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations of Hawaii, anticipating the demise of the American IPR, had 
voted in December 1953 to sever all ties with the American organization and change its 
name to the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council (PAAC).  The IPR of Hawaii, whose 
original membership had helped found the Institute in 1925 and maintained healthy 
support, wished to separate formally from the mainland group and reconstitute itself as a 
purely local body.  For years, Hawaii members, like some of their compatriots on the 
West Coast, had chafed at the New York leadership of the American IPR.  The 
prospective liquidation of the American council, in their view, was an opportunity to 
make a clean break from the controversial group and re-establish Hawaii as a pre-eminent 
center for an Asian relations organization.  The surprise resuscitation of the mainland 
group caught them off guard and caused considerable anxiety.  Rather than congratulate 
the American council on its new lease on life, Hawaii members sent off angry missives 
demanding to know whether the vote was even legitimate and making it clear they would 
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not restore ties.17  As the American IPR teetered into 1954, it was thus a mere shell of an 
organization, whose very existence annoyed both friends and foes alike.  The group‘s 
dysfunctional nature only brought home the necessity of Holland‘s call for a ―coordinated 
approach‖ to Asian affairs.  But it was far from clear what organization, if not the 
American Institute of Pacific Relations, was prepared to assume that role.   
 
ESTABLISHING THE ASIA SOCIETY 
In the spring of 1954, the lawyer and diplomat Charles P. Noyes compiled a 
survey of American private activities in Asia on behalf of the Rockefeller Foundation.  
The Rockefellers were interested in sounding out the promise of philanthropic work on 
the continent.  The Rockefeller family had been instrumental in creating the Japan 
Society in the early years of the twentieth century, and for years they had been the largest 
backers of the Institute of Pacific Relations, but now they sought to develop an Asian-
wide organization of their own.  Noyes was the man they hired to help see this vision 
come to fruition.  During World War II Noyes had been an assistant to W. Averell 
Harriman, President Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s special representative in Great Britain, and 
after the war Noyes had served as a member of the United States Mission to the United 
Nations.  Based upon his experience he was hired as a special consultant to the 
Rockefeller Brothers fund in the early 1950s.18  Noyes was now put in charge of 
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assessing the field of American private groups in Asia and recommending a course of 
action for the Rockefeller Foundation.  His work became instrumental in the creation of 
the Rockefellers‘ new venture. 
Noyes made clear that private work in Asia had great potential, and depicted 
newly independent Asian nations as practically begging for the help and advice of 
Westerners rather than seeking their own way forward.  ―In spite of their political anti-
colonialism and neutralism, they are guided to a great extent by the values and mores of 
Western civilization,‖ Noyes wrote.  ―They are seeking to emulate and catch up to the 
more advanced Western nations.‖  The basic problem, however, was that the legacy of 
colonialism had prevented any cohesion from emerging among Asian countries, and yet 
such cohesion was essential if they hoped to withstand the pressures of Communist 
China.  Noyes believed that Nehru‘s form of neutralism would have only limited success, 
and that Asians elsewhere were eager to develop closer ties of friendship and commerce 
with the West.  He specifically cited Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines as sizeable 
countries who could develop into significant powers in their own right, and act as a 
bulwark against communism on the continent: 
They are the most important strategically for the United States and, if they remain 
friendly, could probably be held against Communist military pressure even if 
some of the mainland areas were lost. If they can be strengthened in their 
independence and come to have confidence in and friendship for the United States 
and each other, they might provide the nucleus of a stable Free Asia grouping.19 
The larger geopolitical ramifications of private work in Asia were clear in Noyes‘ report.  
Private contact, in his view, was an essential component in supporting American anti-
communist foreign policy and thus winning Asian minds. 
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The Rockefellers were aware, however, that to be seen as a private agent of 
American foreign policy would undermine the credibility of any independent 
organization.  Other groups working in the field already had been compromised through 
their overt political work.  For instance, the Committee for Free Asia (founded in 1951) 
disseminated information throughout the continent to promote anti-communist 
movements, especially through broadcasts on Radio Free Asia emanating from the 
Philippines and Pakistan.  Although the CFA‘s status as a Central Intelligence Agency 
front operation was not definitely established until the late 1960s, many Asian leaders on 
their own quickly recognized the group as mere propagandists and refused to work with 
it.  India refused even to grant a visa to Robert Blum, the CFA‘s president. In 1953, the 
group underwent reorganization and changed its name to the Asia Foundation with 
headquarters in San Francisco.  Lyman Hoover, the New York representative of the Asia 
Foundation who had spent time in China as a YMCA missionary, told the Rockefellers in 
early 1954 that the Asia Foundation was now trying to remove such overt ideological bias 
and ―avoid the impression that it is a vehicle for a U.S. anti-communist crusade.‖20  But 
the group nevertheless continued to accept secret CIA money and had an uncertain 
reputation among many independent Asian observers, including those associated with the 
IPR.21 
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If the Committee for Free Asia/Asia Foundation had a reputation for a strong 
political bias, other American institutions dealing with Asia were far more limited in 
scope, focusing almost entirely on specific educational programs.  The American Council 
on Asian Affairs, for instance, was a tiny operation run out of Philadelphia by John 
Melby, a retired foreign service officer, who placed Asian teachers in American schools 
and helped arrange the shipment of school supplies across the Pacific.  The China 
Institute of America, located in New York City and largely funded by Henry Luce, 
organized lectures and exhibits, while the Rockefeller‘s own New York-based Japan 
Society enabled activities like summer school programs in Japan.  The Fund for Asia, 
Inc., meanwhile, led by the writer James Michener, sponsored teaching fellowships and 
scholarships to Asia.  The Far Eastern Association (later renamed the Association for 
Asian Studies), founded in 1948, boasted some 800 members but drew entirely from 
universities, and had little contact in the business community or interest in pursuing a 
wider public program.  As Noyes continued to put out feelers to corporations and other 
major benefactors like the Ford Foundation, he found strong interest in the Rockefellers‘ 
taking the initiative in launching a new umbrella private Asian organization within the 
United States.22 
John D. Rockefeller III clearly saw an opening to take the lead in a general new 
Asian organization, but there remained the nagging issue of the American Institute of 
Pacific Relations.  The American IPR almost certainly would dissolve with the creation 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Asia Foundation.  Even now, I assure you, there are a number of otherwise well informed people, both 
Asians and Westerners, who have told me that the Committee for Free Asia up to quite recently was 
carrying on a number of secret or confidential activities, some of them along the lines of what used to be 
called clandestine operations in the O.S.S. [Office of Strategic Service] and O.W.I. [Office of War 
Information] psychological warfare division.‖  Holland to Brown, Dec. 6, 1954, in Box 41, Folder 3, IPR 
fonds, UBC.   
22 Charles P. Noyes, memorandum, Dec. 7, 1955, in Rockefeller Family files, RG 5, John D. Rockefeller 
III Papers, Box 39, Folder 368, RAC. 
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of a new Rockefeller group, he believed, but how would the Rockefellers respond?  
Charles P. Noyes laid out the ―problem of the IPR‖ to Rockefeller in a memorandum in 
late May 1955.  Noyes set forth three possible courses of action: 1) take over the 
responsibilities of the American IPR within the international IPR; 2) encourage another 
body (like the Far Eastern Association) to do so, or 3) simply proceed with its plans 
without reference to the probable dissolution of the IPR.  Noyes concluded that the third 
course of action entailed the least political risk in the United States, although he 
acknowledged the risks of hurting relations with other national councils in the IPR.23  In 
the meantime, Rockefeller himself made clear in public and private conversations that he 
believed his Foundation should avoid any course of action that might involve them in the 
affairs of either the American or international IPR.  ―These feelings are based first, on the 
change in the situation in this country since the IPR was formed which renders it no 
longer necessary to have any organization to carry on many of its functions and, second, 
on the public feeling toward IPR,‖ Rockefeller wrote to Hugh Borton of the East Asia 
Institute at Columbia University. ―I am afraid that if a new Asian agency was in any way 
thought of as the IPR‘s successor its usefulness would be substantially vitiated in 
advance.‖24  With this policy directive from the top, plans for the Rockefeller‘s Asian 
Society developed without any intention of assuming the responsibilities of the American 
IPR, or address (for the time being) any contemporary economic or political problems of 
the region.  
However much Rockefeller wished to avoid the problems of the IPR, the Internal 
Revenue Service Commissioner‘s decision to withdraw the Institute‘s tax-exempt status 
                                                 
23 Charles P. Noyes Memorandum to John D. Rockefeller III, ―A New Asian Organization – The Problem 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations,‖ May 26, 1955, in Rockefeller Family files, RG 5, Series 1, Sub-Series 
3-Asian interests, Box 36, Folder 339, RAC. 
24 John D. Rockefeller III to Hugh Borton, May 31, 1955, in Office of the Messrs. Rockefeller – World 
Affairs files, RG III 2 Q, Series 213, Box 10, Folder 75, RAC. 
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in the summer of 1955 sent into turmoil his efforts to launch a new Asian organization.  
Throughout the fall, Rockefeller officials debated whether the IRS ruling was an attack 
on the IPR in particular, or meant as a warning to other related organizations.  
Rockefeller of course already had sufficient money on his own to fund his Asia 
organization, but he recognized that his venture required outside financial support in 
order to gain legitimacy.  How would a group obtain such backing without the promise of 
tax-exempt status?  One thing was certain: if the IPR protested the IRS ruling, the matter 
would be drawn into public debate.  Any attempt to found a new Asian organization, 
regardless of its mission, would appear to be a successor group to the IPR, and would 
thus become a lightning rod for politically motivated attacks—the very thing Rockefeller 
wished to avoid.  Top Rockefeller officials agreed in late 1955 that it would be ―unwise 
and probably impractical‖ to establish a new Asian organization at that time, and matters 
were left to drift in this way for another year.25  
In December of 1956, Rockefeller officials finally launched their new 
organization—the Asia Society—after it had become clear that the IPR‘s tax troubles 
would not affect them, and after receiving a multi-year pledge from the Ford 
Foundation.26  Charles Noyes may have had ambitions regarding the organization‘s larger 
contribution toward the development of a ―Free Asia,‖ but Rockefeller Foundation 
officials had retreated from this broad international mission.   Instead, they couched their 
program interests in decidedly apolitical terms: 1) education in the United States 
concerning Asia; 2) assistance to Asians who come to this country; and 3) encouragement 
                                                 
25 Edgar B. Young and Charles P. Noyes, ―Memorandum: A Possible Asian Organization‖ to John D. 
Rockefeller III, Oct. 14, 1955, Rockefeller Family files, RG 5, Series 1, Sub-series 3-Asian relations, Box 
36, Folder 339, RAC. 
26 The significance of Ford Foundation support was not so much the amount--$25,000 per year for three 
years—but the fact that the Asia Society had the blessing not only of the Rockefeller Foundation but Ford 
as well.  As William Holland remarked at the time, ―That is quite a blessing!‖ Holland to A.S.B. Olver 
(Chatham House), Dec. 8, 1956, in Box 44, Folder 4, IPR fonds, UBC.  
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of cultural exchange as a basis of understanding and appreciation.  A January 1957 press 
release offered the anodyne statement that the Asia Society would contribute to ―the 
education of the United States public about the nations and people of Asia—their history, 
their culture and their way of life.‖27  The society‘s first executive director was Paul 
Sherbert, a relatively unknown former American consul and public affairs officer in 
India.  Its board of trustees, however, was formidable, including figures like Columbia 
University President Grayson Kirk, former US Ambassador to the United Nations Ernest 
Gross, former U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Edwin Stanton, and Pan American World 
Airways President Juan Trippe.   
Rockefeller could not avoid all criticism.  The IPR‘s old nemesis, Alfred 
Kohlberg, wrote to Rockefeller, complaining that some of the Asia Society‘s board 
members had past ties to the American IPR and that none had actively exposed 
communist infiltration.  Rockefeller carefully avoided future correspondence with the 
persistent critic and he caused no future trouble.28 Overall, the creation of the Asia 
Society was greeted with enthusiasm among most Asian specialists in the United States.  
If anything, its supporters wished that the Asia Society would take on more, not less.  The 
society‘s original program of dinners and exhibits sounded cautious, to be sure, but many 
in the IPR still held out hope that as the McCarthy era faded, the Rockefellers might soon 
take on the responsibility of spearheading a broader agenda for trans-Pacific research and 
                                                 
27 Press release, Jan. 1, 1957, Rockefeller Family files, RG 5, John D. Rockefeller III Papers, Box 36, 
Folder 341, RAC. 
28 Rockefeller wrote to Kohlberg that he was ―confident that all the Trustees are aware‖ of the history of 
the IPR and that they have in mind the ―best interests of the United States.‖  Kohlberg responded:  ―I am 
indeed devastated by your reply. … I shudder to think what will become of your new Asia Society under 
their direction.‖  Edgar B. Young, a Rockefeller Foundation official, proposed circulating copies of 
Kohlberg‘s letters to Asia Society board members.  Rockefeller did so, and also informed his board that he 
did not intend to engage Kohlberg regarding the Asia Society in the future—a tactic that apparently had its 
desired effect.   Rockefeller to Kohlberg, Dec. 18, 1956; Kohlberg to Rockefeller, Dec. 20, 1956; Young to 
Rockefeller, Dec. 21, 1956; Rockefeller to Board members, Jan. 2, 1957, all in Rockefeller Family files, 
RG 5, John D. Rockefeller III Papers, Box 36, Folder 341, RAC. 
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debate on contemporary political and economic matters, and eventually take part in the 
international IPR.29  
 
THE LAHORE CONFERENCE, 1958  
Despite the predictions of the Asia Society‘s new leadership, the Institute of 
Pacific Relations did not close up shop, at least not immediately.  First off, the IPR had a 
tax case to fight.  Sympathetic attorneys volunteered to work on the Institute‘s behalf to 
restore its tax exemption, but they could only do so if the group remained intact.  IPR 
leaders also carried on with their international program of research.  They continued to 
edit and publish the group‘s journal, Pacific Affairs.  They also planned and executed 
what would become the Institute‘s final international conference, held in Lahore, 
Pakistan in February 1958.  There they formally accepted a new national council (Burma) 
into the IPR fold.  And they continued to bide their time, hoping that within a year or two 
prominent American corporate and foundation leaders would realize that U.S. support of 
such an international confederation was in the national interest, and either sponsor a 
successor organization or bolster their own.  ―As an American I say this with some 
shame, but in the belief that they eventually do come to their senses,‖ Holland wrote 
leaders of the national councils in the fall of 1957.30  Holland was right that American 
leaders would soon wake up and recognize the need for greater contact between Western 
and Asian elites, but not in the way he predicted.  The U.S. government now stepped in 
where non-governmental groups had been toiling for decades.  By the close of the 
                                                 
29 One American IPR member, Donald Straus, suggested that the AIPR dissolve immediately – ―commit 
ceremonial suicide on the doorstep of the Asia Society‖ – and thereby force the Rockefellers to assume the 
AIPR‘s functions, but this view was not shared by many others.  W.L. Holland to Ernest A. Gross, March 
29, 1957, in Box 33, Folder 16, IPR fonds, UBC. 
30 W.L. Holland, ―Memorandum on the Future of the I.P.R.,‖ Nov. 19, 1957, in Box 44, Folder 15, IPR 
fonds, UBC. 
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decade, as the IPR shut its doors for good, U.S. congressmen and White House officials 
were busily engaged with the supposedly novel task of forging a network of Western and 
Asian elites.  The American government had entered into the business of intellectual 
bridge-building across the Pacific. 
For years, IPR leaders recognized the value in having governmental officials on 
their side.  Now, as their tax case wound its way through the court system, the Institute 
enlisted prominent friends to appeal to members of the State Department in order to 
intervene with the Treasury Department, but little public help was forthcoming.  
American IPR Chairman J. Morden Murphy and other colleagues wrote Undersecretary 
of State Christian Herter in a futile attempt to speed up their case and to convey the 
potentially dire consequences of the IRS commissioner‘s decision.  David Mitrany, of 
London‘s Lever Brothers firm, wrote Herter that if the IPR were forced out of business, 
no successor group could re-establish the same ties in Asia: 
It seems therefore both sad and perplexing that, at a time when we in the West 
find it so difficult to gain and keep the confidence of those who shape opinion in 
those distant countries, we should also deliberately undermine, and perhaps 
ultimately destroy, one of the very few organizations which can provide an 
invaluable degree of mutual trust, on the grounds of old connections and affection 
and allegiance.31 
Meanwhile, Walter Nash, a long-time IPR supporter who had recently become New 
Zealand‘s prime minister, heard about the Institute‘s tax situation at the 1958 SEATO 
conference in Manila and immediately approached Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 
telling him that the American government should ―stop this nonsense and recognize the 
usefulness of the IPR.‖32  Despite these direct appeals, neither Dulles nor Herter made 
                                                 
31 David Mitrany to Hon. Christian A. Herter, Jan. 10, 1958, in Box 38, Folder 9, IPR fonds, UBC. 
32 William Holland, in relating this story to Barbara Tuchman, another old IPR friend, noted that Dulles, 
while apparently relatively well informed on the subject, merely listened to Nash‘s plea on the IPR‘s 
behalf: ―I doubt if [Dulles] did anything about it afterwards, but it‘s nice to have a prime minister rooting 
for us.‖  Holland to Tuchman, June 17, 1958, in Box 40, Folder 2, IPR fonds, UBC.     
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any moves to intervene in the IPR‘s case, however privately sympathetic they may have 
been to the Institute‘s plight.   
Out of the spotlight, mid-level State Department officials continued to cooperate 
with the IPR‘s programs, especially in the context of the Institute‘s Lahore conference in 
February 1958.  Walter S. Robertson, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, 
who otherwise was a staunch conservative regarding Asian affairs,33 maintained a 
friendly correspondence with William Holland and provided American delegates to the 
conference multiple copies of recent official statements regarding U.S. foreign policy in 
Asia.  Robertson also directed the Consul General in Lahore, Andrew V. Corry, as well 
as the local United States Information Service office to provide help to the American 
delegation.  Besides overseeing the distribution of various position papers, Corry ended 
up hosting a reception for the dozen American delegates, including Professor and Mrs. 
Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago and Douglass Cater, then a young 
Washington editor of The Reporter.34 The IPR and the State Department both benefited 
through this arrangement.  Robertson certainly saw the unofficial gathering as an 
opportunity to clarify any ―misunderstanding‖ of American policy on the part of Asian 
delegates, while Holland was notably pleased to renew contacts with official Washington.  
Holland commended the ―efficient and courteous cooperation‖ extended to American IPR 
delegates during the Lahore conference, and warmly thanked both the Consulate and the 
USIS for their help.35   
                                                 
33 Robertson served as assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs from April 1953 through June 
1959, and was known best for his strident opposition to the diplomatic recognition of Communist China.  
E.W. Kenworthy, ―Robertson Quits as Aide to Dulles,‖ New York Times, April 2, 1959.   
34 Wright, an international law expert at the University of Chicago, was the unofficial leader of the 
American delegation.  Cater, in Pakistan on a fellowship, would later serve as a special assistant to 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, focusing on federal aid for education and the establishment of the Public 
Broadcasting System. 
35 W.L. Holland to Walter S. Robertson, Jan. 3, 1958; Robertson to Holland, Jan. 20, 1958; Holland to 
Robertson, Feb. 18, 1958, all in Box 39, Folder 6, IPR fonds, UBC. 
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But even as Holland congratulated himself on renewing these official ties, the 
Consulate Office in Lahore dispatched its own report on the IPR conference back to 
Washington, painting a far muddier picture of the American delegation‘s impact on Asian 
opinion.  Consul General Corry wrote that in some cases the American delegates 
generated more adverse publicity than positive views of American foreign policy.  One 
notable instance was a lecture given by conference participant Ralph Braibanti of Duke 
University, who spoke on the SEATO pact at the Political Science Club of the University 
of the Panjab during a break in the conference.  Corry complained that Braibanti focused 
almost exclusively on negative aspects of the pact.  The result was predictable: the next 
day, a headline in The Pakistan Times declared: ―SEATO Ineffective Organisation: US 
Professor Analyses Pact‘s Provisions.‖36  This was not just a matter of editorial 
manipulation; USIS officials in attendance at Braibanti‘s lecture reported that if anything, 
the report was ―milder than the speech itself.‖37  Corry‘s skeptical report to his State 
Department superiors merely demonstrated the almost untenable position the American 
IPR was in by the late 1950‘s.  The Institute was pleading for survival in the United 
States based on its position as an independent voice in international affairs, yet such 
independence signaled deviation from official policy in the eyes of the State Department, 
criticism that presumably must be minimized in the public relations battle for Asian 
minds.    
Even if the IPR‘s Lahore conference itself did not succeed in ingratiating the 
Institute to official Washington, at the very least it provided an important symbol of the 
ongoing potential of East-West interchange.  The theme of the conference, ―Problems of 
                                                 
36 Pakistan Times, Feb. 7, 1958. 
37 Andrew V. Corry, American Consul General, Lahore, to The Department of State, Washington, March 
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Foreign Policy in Southern and Eastern Asia,‖ did not lack scope, nor did it shy away 
from potential controversy.  Eleven national councils sent delegates, totaling some 100 
people, from Australia, Great Britain, Canada, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, the United States, and the newest admitted council, Burma.  Observers 
attended from the United Nations Technical Assistance Board, the International Labor 
Office and the Asia Foundation.  With the cooperation of the Provisional Government of 
West Pakistan, meetings were held in the West Pakistan Assembly Chamber.  Pakistan‘s 
Minister of Finance, Amjad Ali, opened the conference, flying in from Karachi 
specifically for the occasion, and the subsequent proceedings were fully covered by the 
local media, especially the Lahore and Karachi newspapers.38 Sharp exchanges were 
heard, to be sure, especially when Asian voices spoke up against the supposed injustices 
of the West, but tempers were held in check and most found the discussions 
worthwhile—valuable, if nothing else, for throwing light on the ―states of mind‖ in Asian 
countries concerning policies enacted in the region.39 
Of particular significance at the conference was the final roundtable on the 
incipient ―non-aligned‖ movement and the Afro-Asian outlook on world affairs.  Here, in 
the concluding discussion of what would be the final international conference held by the 
IPR, the Institute‘s approach was best on display.  The following exchange was typical of 
the conference.  An Indian delegate40 first stated the rationale for the non-aligned 
movement; someone, he said, must play the vital role of mediator between nuclear-armed 
power blocs.  A British delegate chimed in, complaining that non-aligned states were 
drawing a dangerous moral equivalence between communism and the West.  An 
                                                 
38 ―The Thirteenth IPR Conference at Lahore,‖ American Institute of Pacific Relations Annual Report 
1957-58, in Box 45, Folder 9, IPR fonds, UBC. 
39 Quincy Wright to Hon. Christian Herter, Feb. 27, 1958, in Box 40, Folder 6, IPR fonds, UBC. 
40 Names were not recorded in the minutes, in order to allow for the maximum free exchange of views. 
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Australian delegate wondered aloud whether newly independent Asian and African states 
were pursuing similar imperialist policies to the Western ones they decried.  An 
American delegate then spoke up, saying that it was perfectly natural that newly 
independent states should wish to break out independently in foreign relations, and that 
the West had no right to lecture Asians and Africans regarding the development of their 
own policies.  A Japanese delegate expressed horror over the birth of a new Afro-Asian 
―bloc.‖  Finally, the chairman of the conference, A.B.A. Haleem, head of the Pakistan 
Institute of International Affairs, brought the proceedings to a close.  There would be no 
Afro-Asian bloc, Haleem predicted.  Asians and Africans had no racial commonality, he 
explained, while Muslims had no racial consciousness at all.  The West, he concluded, 
had nothing to fear from ―the bogey of a strong Asian color consciousness.‖41  In the 
course of this single roundtable discussion, delegates had aired strong opinions, 
sometimes even criticizing their own countries, but ultimately they arrived at a sensible 
middle ground that emphasized the potential of East-West partnership.  It was the IPR 
method, encapsulated. 
The Institute‘s conference in Lahore stressed moderation, but such 
pronouncements alone could not slay the bogey of an anti-Western bloc.  In fact, the 
bogey had just been revitalized in Cairo at the inaugural meeting of the Afro-Asian 
People‘s Solidarity Organization, held in the last days of 1957 at the expressed invitation 
of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.   This conference brought together delegates 
from several Asian, Arab and African ―solidarity committees‖—non-governmental 
organizations led by well-known communist activists ―masquerading in the colours of 
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Conference, Lahore, in Box 75, Folder 5, IPR fonds, UBC. 
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Bandung,‖ according to British officials.42  The Cairo conference only exacerbated the 
polarizing tendencies of the Cold War, and reignited old fears by American and British 
officials alike regarding Afro-Asian solidarity.  Significantly, the Cairo conference also 
renewed fears regarding the supposed communist takeover of international non-
governmental organizations.  Why were non-governmental groups rather than 
governments represented at Cairo?  Communists, the theory went, bypassed 
governments, especially when those governments were not amenable to communism.  
―Communists are primarily concerned with winning over the people,‖ one British Foreign 
Office memorandum concluded forebodingly.43  Such sentiments crystallized the 
difficulties facing the IPR during the late 1950s.  Private international communication 
was itself now cause for suspicion.  Such was the logic of the Cold War.  
Some leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations thought that the Cairo 
conference would help their cause, in highlighting the contrast between such an explicitly 
anti-Western group and the IPR‘s more inclusive gathering at Lahore.44  But if anything, 
the Cairo gathering demonstrated even more clearly to Western officials that non-
governmental organizations dealing with international relations were susceptible to 
insidious left-wing influences and were by their very nature beyond the control of official 
diplomatic machinery.  The IPR was by no means a subversive organization—Institute 
leaders had made special efforts to reach out to American officials during the Lahore 
conference, and were eager to make a good impression to overseas diplomats—but the 
IPR was decidedly independent, and its open and frank conference format consistently 
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produced unreliable support for Western policies in Asia.  As a result, the Institute 
received only lukewarm backing among diplomatic officials, certainly not enough to 
reverse its terminal decline.  At the close of the 1950s, Western officials began thinking 
anew about the best ways to win over Asian minds to anti-communism.  With the IPR 
model of the private international relations organization now in tatters, they began trying 
to build an entirely new intellectual bridge across the Pacific.      
  
THE EAST-WEST CENTER: A NEW BRIDGE?  
On April 16, 1959, U.S. Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson spoke at the 
National Women‘s Press Club and announced a bold new proposal: the creation of an 
international center in Hawaii ―to attract scholars and students alike from both the Orient 
and the Occident.‖45  Hawaii had been granted American statehood less than a month 
before, and Johnson was prepared to capitalize on the news.  He had been in close contact 
with Ford Foundation officials as well as John A. Burns, the Hawaiian delegate to the 
U.S. House of Representatives, regarding the potential strategic impact of an East-West 
center.  Burns in particular peppered Johnson with memoranda extolling the virtues of 
such an idea.  One such note from Burns included a statement from a ―top-flight source 
… very much in line with my thinking‖ that claimed ―the most graphic and dramatic 
answer to communist propaganda is Hawaii.‖46  Communists had been adept at using 
―Little Rock‖ propaganda to exploit the United States‘ problems regarding racial 
integration, but in Hawaii, races worked alongside one another in tolerance and mutual 
                                                 
45 Dai Ho Chun, Director, International Cooperation Center, Hawaii, to Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson, April 21, 
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respect, thus making it a valuable Cold War asset.  The city of Honolulu could be worth 
―millions of dollars as Western propaganda if its story could reach the millions of non-
Caucasians whom the communists are subverting in the ‗battle for the minds of men,‘‖ 
Burns‘ source concluded.47  Almost 25 years after the founding of the IPR, Hawaii once 
again took center stage as a model for East-West reconciliation, but this time, it had the 
imprimatur of the American government.   
Top educators convened by Johnson to discuss his proposal were thrilled by the 
idea of a federally chartered institution in Hawaii.  They recommended that the project 
focus on mature students and especially faculty, with particular attention on the teaching 
of teachers in such areas as economic development, public administration, agricultural 
education, and health and nutrition.  The Hawaii center, in their minds, would be a place 
to train the next generation of Asian leaders, as well as bring together top experts on 
various issues from both the West and Asia.  But while the panel recognized the 
importance of federal help, it also was aware of the potential backlash. The project could 
not succeed, they concluded, if Asians believed the center was a tool in the Cold War.  
―The Asians must be assured that we are doing this out of a sincere desire to help them 
and to broaden our understanding,‖ the panel explained.48  All agreed that the center 
would be a success only if it were given the appropriate funding: at least $50 million in 
startup costs, with an additional $10 million anticipated for yearly operational expenses.  
The center promised enormous geopolitical dividends, but first required significant 
financial investment.  
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On June 9, 1959, Johnson formally introduced a bill in the U.S. Senate to 
establish a Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West.  The 
legislation was brought forward as part of the Mutual Security Act of 1959, in support of 
the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 as well as a previous Mutual 
Security Act of 1954.  The purpose of the new act—to promote ―better relations and 
understanding between the United States and the nations of Asia and the Pacific through 
cooperative study and research‖—read as if cribbed from the IPR‘s constitution.49  But if 
the edifice for this understanding had been in the process of construction for some time 
among high-minded private citizens, Johnson spoke as if he were laying the first stone.   
The East-West Center proposal, he claimed, was ―the foundation for what I envision as 
an intellectual bridge, joining together the best of the East and the West.‖50  In scope and 
ambition, perhaps, Johnson had reason to be optimistic.  Backed with millions of federal 
dollars, the East-West Center had the potential to do far more educational and cultural 
exchange work than the IPR had ever envisioned.  The center could become a kind of 
institute of advanced study, bringing in top-drawer experts from around the world to 
discuss contemporary political and economic problems in a setting where they could 
learn from one another.  And as a multinational association bridging West and East, the 
center could serve as a useful counterweight to the drift toward pan-Asianism. 
Johnson‘s original expansive vision for the East-West Center, however, was 
waylaid almost immediately.  The act placed the onus for the center‘s implementation in 
the hands of the Department of State, which promptly began to scale back the ambitious 
proposal.  No doubt, the East-West Center threatened to step on the toes of existing 
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bureaucracies like the USIS and other public relations agencies.  As State Department 
officials wrangled over the details, Johnson‘s proposal was increasingly watered down, 
and quickly subsumed within an existing plan by the University of Hawaii to expand its 
undergraduate program to encompass more scholarships and exchanges and the 
construction of some new facilities.  No longer was the center to be a federally chartered 
independent institution, but instead run through the University of Hawaii.  The plan for 
the center needed to be ―realistic,‖ a December 1959 State Department report concluded.  
―The University [of Hawaii] and other facilities involved should not be burdened with a 
program beyond their capabilities …‖51  William Gibbons of the Democratic Publicity 
Committee, Johnson‘s point person on the center, relayed the bad news to Johnson: the 
new plan, Gibbons wrote, ―raises serious doubts as to whether the plan carries out your 
original idea.‖52   
Other supporters of the original East-West Center proposal idea were crestfallen. 
Gillespie S. Evans, an 18-year veteran of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange 
program, privately confided his disappointment to Gibbons.  Evans‘ reading of the 
center‘s original plan had given him hope that it might function as a kind of ―permanent 
interparliamentary union,‖ with leaders from governments, universities and business 
confronting the hard realities of the United States position in Asia.  Evans envisioned a 
kind of perpetual IPR conference, whose recommendations could help guide policies for 
the region.  Instead, the revised proposal now focused entirely on long-term goals 
designed to build up influence in Asia from the grass-roots over a period of years.  Such 
influence that may never materialize, Evans wrote, and certainly not in time before a 
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major ―moment of truth‖ fell upon the United States in Asia.53  Writing in 1960, Evans 
perhaps sensed better than most the potential constellation of events that could drag the 
United States more deeply into Vietnam. 
As the East-West Center‘s plans were gummed up within Washington 
bureaucracy, the Soviets managed a public relations coup by announcing a similar 
initiative of their own.  During a trip to Indonesia in February 1960, Soviet Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev announced the creation of the University of Friendship of Peoples, a 
tuition-free technical institution in Moscow for students from Asia, Africa and Latin 
America.54  First-year enrollment anticipated 500 students, growing to as many as 4,000 
in a few years.  The news certainly highlighted the problems in launching Johnson‘s 
initiative. A Honolulu Star-Bulletin editorial demanded that Congress break the impasse 
and appropriate the funds to get the project moving.  The newspaper‘s editor, Riley H. 
Allen, forwarded the editorial to Senator Johnson, pointing out the obvious consequences 
of inaction.  The United States could not afford to fall behind the Soviet Union in the race 
for third-world minds, any more than they could afford to fall behind in the race for 
armaments.55   
The East-West Center finally launched on October 25, 1960, when the 
Department of State signed a grant-in-aid agreement with the University of Hawaii, 
which in turn agreed to administer the center through allocated federal funds.  Johnson‘s 
original ―bridge‖ concept for the center had given way to a more conventional university 
program, but its name and mission at the very least retained important political 
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symbolism.  The following spring, Johnson, now the U.S. vice president, flew to 
Honolulu to dedicate the center.  He told the assembled crowd that the center‘s opening 
was ―one of the most personally gratifying moments of my public life,‖ and made the 
bold prediction that ―of the works to which I have contributed I have the greatest 
confidence that this East-West Center will outlive them all.‖56  He stressed the 
differences between the Soviet model of education and that of the United States.  And in 
words that echoed his original proposal two years before, he stressed the ability to 
overcome the division across the Pacific Ocean:   ―The oldest such division which tyrants 
have used against peace and freedom is the division between East and West.  It is this 
division which we must end to clear the way to a world where peace is universal and 
freedom is universally secure.‖57  As President John F. Kennedy entered office with bold 
new international initiatives like the Peace Corps, such a world seemed more possible 
than even a few years before.   
Amid the celebrated unveiling of the East-West Center and the arrival of a new 
American presidential administration, however, a quieter loss took place.  After 35 years 
of operation, the international Institute of Pacific Relations dissolved in October 1960; 
the American Institute of Pacific Relations followed one year later.  Both groups survived 
long enough to witness a final victory in court in their struggle to regain tax-exempt 
status.  After years of Treasury Department foot-dragging, the U.S. District Court of New 
York ruled in March 1960 that the U.S. government had failed to produce any evidence 
to support the charges of former IRS Commissioner Coleman Andrews, and thus 
vindicated the Institute‘s status as a non-partisan organization.58  But depleted of funds 
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and exhausted from a decade of political battles, the Institute‘s leaders saw no way to go 
on.  William Holland, who had almost single-handedly run the American and 
international institutes in their waning years, accepted a position as Asian Studies 
professor at the University of British Columbia.  The university also agreed to take on the 
responsibility of publishing Pacific Affairs.  Up until the end, national councils, 
especially in Asia, argued against the IPR‘s dissolution, but moral support could not pay 
the bills.59  As institutes of international affairs, these national councils found new 
sources of support and reoriented their work, changed names, or dissolved themselves.   
As a new decade dawned, there appeared to be little support for an international 
non-governmental organization dealing with Asian affairs.  The U.S. State Department 
may have entered into the business of forging intellectual connections between 
Westerners and Asians, but its political motivations were all too apparent and its efforts 
were often thwarted by U.S. policies themselves.  But even as William Holland packed 
up the belongings of the IPR from its New York office, he rejected the notion that the 
IPR‘s mission had become irrelevant.  In a letter to American IPR trustees in the summer 
of 1960, Holland noted that it would simply take a ―few public spirited citizens‖ to 
restore the tradition of ―open free-swinging debate on difficult and delicate issues of 
Asian policy.‖60  The refusal of the Asia Society to take on this role was a ―discouraging‖ 
commentary on American leadership, it was true.  The failure to create a new 
independent organization to help the public better understand future regional challenges 
―would be a tragedy, indeed a disgrace,‖ Holland wrote.61  There existed a great number 
of thoughtful Americans who recognized the importance of a rapidly changing Asia and 
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the challenge to Western policies. But how would this be expressed without institutional 
coordination?     
From within the organization of the IPR, the dreams of Pacific internationalism 
appeared to be less feasible than ever in 1960.  American foundations had withdrawn 
support and focused upon U.S.-centered educational programs rather than private 
international work.  The American government lacked a coherent program to win Asian 
minds.  But outside the United States, the private connections established by the IPR 
would reconfigure themselves in subsequent years.  This new generation of Pacific 
internationalists would find revitalized energy in the promotion of regional economic 
collaboration.  The deepening crisis of the Vietnam War, meanwhile, would offer both a 
case study in the need for greater understanding between the West and Asia, as well as 
the basis for the establishment of new regional strategic partnerships.  The end of the IPR 
thus represented a dream delayed, not denied. 
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Epilogue 
The Legacy of Pacific Cooperation 
The dissolution of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1961 did not extinguish its 
animating principles.  In fact, the IPR‘s demise coincided with a renewed attention to 
Asia-Pacific regionalism by Western and Asian governments and non-state actors alike.  
The Cold War, and especially the conflict in Vietnam, intensified American interest in 
Asian regionalist schemes during the mid- and late-1960s.   Beyond the specific political 
objectives of that era, the effort to create broader Pacific-Asian economic ties has 
extended into the 21
st
 century and has encompassed official as well as private interests. In 
the last few decades, the proliferation and effectiveness of international non-
governmental organizations have continued to vindicate the IPR model of bringing 
together diplomatic, business and academic elites to discuss regional issues and 
harmonize interests across the Pacific.  But the establishment of an Asia-Pacific identity 
and institutionalized economic collaboration among Pacific countries is far from a 
realized dream.  As American hegemony in the Pacific has declined, intellectuals and 
governmental officials are again reviewing fundamental assumptions regarding the 
economic and geopolitical relationship between the ―West‖ and the ―rest.‖1  
The IPR‘s vision of trans-Pacific partnership, if not the Institute itself, outlasted 
two major competing approaches by the 1960s.  The first was the Commonwealth idea 
espoused by Great Britain and the so-called ―Old Dominions‖ of Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand.2  Some Chatham House leaders maintained after World War II that the loss 
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of the IPR would have no great impact upon its relations with Asian intellectuals since 
the British Commonwealth had expanded to become a multi-racial community, anchored 
by the participation of India, and linked through various institutes of international affairs.  
The Commonwealth model, according to this view, was not only an idealistic means to 
retain links to an imperial past, but a vital link between Asia (and Africa) and the West.3  
By the late 1950s, however, specifically during the crisis over the Suez Canal, the 
Commonwealth‘s serviceability as a cultural bridge suffered major setbacks.  Sir John 
Slessor, a former Royal Air Force chief of staff, wrote historian C. E. Carrington in 
September of 1956 (even before the failed military attack on Egypt), noting that the 
short-term damage to British morale from the Suez crisis paled in comparison to the more 
serious damage to ―the really big issue of the second half of the 20
th
 century—the 
struggle for the minds of the peoples in the uncommitted nations of Asia, and to a less 
extent Africa.‖4  Suez was merely was the most dramatic example of Britain‘s shrinking 
global influence.  Over subsequent years, Great Britain lost its ability to serve as a neutral 
arbiter for trans-Pacific intellectual exchange.5 
More concrete institutional troubles also plagued the Commonwealth project.  A 
series of unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences, held roughly every five years 
since 1933, drew together members of the various institutes of international affairs in the 
Old Dominions as well as newer Commonwealth countries in Asia and Africa.6  These 
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gatherings were originally inspired by IPR meetings, and eventually came to be viewed 
by some as a potential successor to the faltering Pacific institute.  But by the early 1960s, 
the conferences suffered both from the withdrawal of philanthropic support by the 
Carnegie Corporation as well as a lack of representation from Asian and African 
countries, few of which fielded institutes of international relations built on the Chatham 
House model.  Moreover, Britain‘s attempt to join the European Economic Community 
provoked additional questions regarding the Commonwealth‘s potential to become a truly 
meaningful international association. The Commonwealth Relations Conferences limped 
into the 1960s before quietly disbanding.7  
A more direct challenge to the IPR vision came from the prospect of a so-called 
―third world‖ line-up against the West.  The creation of the Afro-Asian Peoples‘ 
Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) at a Cairo conference in 1957-58 was the best-known 
non-governmental attempt to forge a popular international movement out of the spirit of 
neutralism first developed at the 1955 Asian-African conference in Bandung, Indonesia.  
Communist China emerged as an influential leader of AAPSO, which sought to support 
the liberation struggles of colonized and oppressed peoples around the world.  AAPSO 
offered the Chinese a chance to demonstrate their regional interest in Asian and African 
affairs, but this relationship quickly turned sour.  Chinese members increasingly took a 
hard communist line, eroding their influence among the ―non-aligned‖ nations such as 
Yugoslavia, Indonesia and Egypt.8  Most importantly, the Chinese suppression of the 
Tibetan revolt in 1959 and the subsequent flight of the Dalai Lama to India severed the 
diplomatic links between Peking and New Delhi.  In the fall of 1962, the eruption of the 
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Sino-Indian War signaled a dramatic end to the potential all-Asian regional partnerships 
proposed only a few years earlier.   
With the British Commonwealth and third-world solidarity models largely 
abandoned by the early 1960s, the United States began to take the lead in promoting 
regional organization in Asia.  Drawing upon efforts to build European and Latin 
American regional alliances, and seizing upon a thaw in Soviet-American relations in the 
wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, some U.S. governmental officials touted the idea that 
regional associations could reduce the tendency towards dangerous nationalism in Asia 
and help better coordinate American commitments there.  President Lyndon Johnson 
already had demonstrated his inclination toward encouraging a ―Free Asia‖ regional 
sensibility during his senatorial leadership for the creation of Hawaii‘s East-West Center 
in 1960.  A decisive moment arrived, however, with President Johnson‘s decision to 
escalate the Vietnam War in March 1965.  Because the American bombing campaign and 
the introduction of U.S. troops into Vietnam had the potential to cause region-wide 
instability, Johnson felt compelled to undertake a broad review of American policy there.  
In an April 7, 1965 speech at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Johnson 
announced that he was throwing his weight behind greater sub-regional cooperation in 
Southeast Asia, stressing its benefits on social and economic conditions: 
These countries of Southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverished people.  
Each day these people rise at dawn and struggle through until the night to wrestle 
existence from the soil. … Stability and peace do not come easily in such a land. 
… The American people have helped generously in times past in these works.  
Now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that 
conflict-torn corner of the world.  The first step is for the countries of Southeast 
Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for 
development. … The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and the 
existence of more than a hundred million people.9 
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Johnson‘s regional vision for Asia was intimately tied up with his commitment to 
economic justice—a sort of Great Society for the world.  Within months of the speech, 
the United States began to support the creation of an Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), the latter consisting of a nine-nation 
economic and political consultative body.  
Hidden beneath Johnson‘s rhetoric promoting regional economic uplift were hard 
strategic calculations based on the war in Vietnam—a fact that created its own impetus 
toward regional alliance.  Some Asian countries had soldiers committed to the defense of 
South Vietnam, and wished to coordinate their efforts with their Western partners.  The 
leaders of these nations (Australia, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, 
Thailand, the United States and Vietnam) met in Manila for a conference in October 
1966.  The Manila Declaration, issued on October 25, 1966, declared not only their 
collective resolve to support the United States‘ effort in Vietnam, but espoused larger 
regional aspirations.10  Western newspapers touted the Manila Declaration as a new dawn 
in Asian relations with the West.  In an editorial entitled ―New Building Blocs for Asia,‖ 
Fortune magazine reported that the threat of an anti-Western Asian bloc had now receded 
into the past: 
A decade ago, a good part of that world, by then reconstituted as so-called 
―emerging‖ nations, was oscillating wildly, between the pulls of Peking and 
Moscow, on the one hand, and, on the other, the seductive, silken attractions of 
Nehru‘s vision of a Third Force.  It was at Manila finally that the Asian and 
Pacific countries had the good sense to come together—under the shield of 
American power, to be sure—and begin the process of looking to one another for 
support, purpose and weight in the power balance.11 
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The task of containing communism in Southeast Asia, in this view, was part of a larger 
effort to give these nations time to find common ground.  The conflict in Vietnam merely 
crystallized the shared interests of the Asian nations who had rallied to support the 
American cause.  
In addition to the escalation of the war in Vietnam, political developments in 
Southeast Asia—specifically in Indonesia—furthered the potential for at least sub-
regional organization. In the early 1960s, the Indonesian President Sukarno had openly 
challenged the Malayan federation as a British neocolonial venture, and launched what 
became known as the policy of Confrontation (Konfrontasi), creating a situation that in 
itself, prevented regional collaboration from getting underway.  But in late 1965, a failed 
coup exposed the tensions within Sukarno‘s political coalition, and over the next few 
months he began to lose power to Major General Suharto, who eventually forced Sukarno 
to relinquish the presidency in early 1967.  As a staunch anti-communist, the new 
president Suharto now actively sought ties with fellow anti-communist Asian nations.  
The product of this outreach was the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) in August 1967.  For the next several years, foreign ministers and even 
heads of state of participating countries used ASEAN as a means to promote economic 
and cultural cooperation, as well as discuss political and security issues.  By the middle 
of the 1970s, ASEAN established a permanent secretariat in Jakarta, and earned a 
reputation as the best-organized sub-regional inter-governmental organization in the 
Asia-Pacific region.12 
Cooperation among Southeast Asian countries was one thing; Pacific-wide 
regional collaboration was quite another.  The only region-wide inter-governmental body 
in the postwar period was the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
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and the Far East (ECAFE).13  From the late 1940s onward, ECAFE served a critical role 
not only in helping to develop the ideas behind the Asian Development Bank, but also in 
providing institutional support for numerous economists interested in regional trade 
cooperation.  One such economist was the head of Japan‘s Economic Planning Agency, 
Saburo Okita, who had contributed to both IPR and ECAFE publications.  As Asia-
Pacific scholar Lawrence T. Woods has noted, Okita‘s decision in 1963 to leave ECAFE 
and lead the newly created Japan Economic Research Center (JERC) was an important 
moment in the first ―rekindling of interest‖ in non-governmental Pacific cooperation 
since the collapse of the IPR.14  Two years later, another Japanese economist, Kiyoshi 
Kojima, first aired a proposal to create a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA), an idea that 
led directly to the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) series 
beginning in 1967.  Whereas IPR conferences in earlier years were constitutionally 
barred from promoting specific agendas such as trade liberalization, PAFTAD 
conferences were under no such constraints.  The fact that most members were 
economists committed to free-trade principles made this grouping an even more explicit 
―epistemic community‖ designed around the advancement of liberal economic ideas.15   
Somewhat closer to the IPR spirit was the decision in the late 1970s to create a 
broad coalition of non-governmental figures to discuss regional problems with an 
economic focus.  In the spring of 1979, Masayoshi Ohira and Malcolm Fraser, the 
respective prime ministers of Japan and Australia, proposed a ―Pacific Community 
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seminar‖ to convene business, academic and governmental figures from around the 
Pacific region.  The result was the launching of the Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council (PECC) at an inaugural meeting in September 1980 in Canberra, Australia.  
Rather than focusing on particular state interests, this private and informal gathering 
assembled representatives from 11 different ―economies‖—Australia, Canada, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
(eventually) the United States—as well as three Pacific Island states of Papua New 
Guinea, Fiji and Tonga.  The PECC‘s mission was to promote the idea of economic 
interdependence within the region and thereby develop a larger Pacific community—
sentiments that closely echoed the first IPR gatherings.  The fact that the United States 
participated in, but did not dominate PECC proceedings, no doubt would have pleased 
former IPR stalwarts.  Throughout the 1980s, the PECC held almost annual gatherings 
and instituted a series of task forces on a number of issues such as minerals and energy, 
trade policy, foreign investment, and fisheries.16 
The presence of PECC along with the economists associated with the Pacific 
Trade and Development conferences (PAFTAD) were critical factors in creating a 
coherent intellectual community that promoted regional economic trade liberalization for 
the Asia-Pacific region in the 1980s, and reflected the importance of non-governmental 
actors.17   Such private international activity also was a significant factor in promoting 
inter-governmental regional economic collaboration later in the decade.  In the early 
1980s, governmental officials were wary of Pacific-wide cooperation.  Leaders of 
ASEAN, for example, did not wish to marginalize their organization within a larger 
Pacific conglomeration; meanwhile, the United States in the early years of the Reagan 
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administration focused more on global trade liberalization rather than regional solutions.  
But within a few years this reluctance eroded.  The rapid growth of East Asian 
economies, Japan‘s growing investment in Asian manufacturing, and the increasing 
percentage of American trade with Asia-Pacific countries (which by mid-decade 
outstripped US trade with Europe by $26 billion) suddenly made regional inter-
governmental economic collaboration an attractive proposition.  The presence of private 
groups like PECC and PAFTAD were institutional reminders that regional approaches 
could complement rather than compete with projects for liberalizing trade.  With the 
thawing of the Cold War and the resulting uncertainty about the region‘s future, the 
United States found itself more willing to enter into collaborative economic initiatives in 
the Asia-Pacific region to secure its interests.18      
The manifestation of this change of heart came in 1989 with the creation of the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), an inter-governmental grouping proposed 
by Australian and Japanese leaders, with inaugural members including Australia, Japan, 
the United States, Canada, New Zealand, South Korea, and the six ASEAN countries.19  
The purpose of APEC was to reduce trade barriers according to the principle of ―open 
regionalism‖—in other words, any lowering of trade restrictions would be extended to 
member and nonmember countries alike.  Rather than merely becoming another trading 
bloc, APEC reflected a non-discriminatory Asian-Pacific regional identity that embraced 
globalization.  ―We are fully aware that a regional community without a perspective for a 
global community, a regionalism that excludes globalism, has no possibility of 
development and prosperity,‖ concluded a Pacific Basin study group initiated by 
Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira in 1979, enunciating principles that would 
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become the cornerstone of APEC ten years later.20  With the end of the Cold War, it 
appeared for the first time that regional governments themselves were on the cusp of 
fashioning an Asia-Pacific sensibility, the fulfillment of a vision that had stretched back 
to the end of World War I.  
Although APEC represented the best potential for inter-governmental 
construction of a new trans-Pacific community, its central mission of trade liberalization 
proved to have a weak foundation.  During the Asian financial crises of 1997-98, when a 
widespread collapse in currencies and stock values plunged the region into economic and 
political chaos, APEC‘s feeble response disappointed the hopes of many.  Furthermore, 
Western and Asian members diverged in their analyses of the cause of the crisis.  
Western governments continued to tout economic liberalization, placing the blame on the 
shoulders of Asian domestic policies and refusing the Japanese and Taiwanese proposal 
for an Asian monetary fund separate from that of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
Angry at the Western response, some Asian APEC members revived a 1990 proposal by 
Mahathir bin Mohamad, the prime minister of Malaysia, to establish an East Asian 
Economic Group that would exclude the United States and other Western nations.21  The 
basis of such a group focused on meetings between ASEAN members and China, Japan 
and South Korea—a configuration known as ASEAN Plus Three (APT).  Since its 
establishment in 1997, APT has touted itself as a potential rival to other regional 
associations like the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
and has taken the lead in holding regular East Asia summits.22 
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The East Asia summits and the accompanying discussions of a potential East 
Asian Community represent a challenge not only to the ―open regional‖ economic 
grouping advocated by APEC, but more broadly to the trans-Pacific association of 
peoples advocated by the Pan-Pacific Union and Institute of Pacific Relations as far back 
as World War I.  For much of the past century, a similar dynamic has manifested itself: 
Western nations have lived in fear of an organized Asia hostile to Western interests.  In 
the 1930s and 1940s, this threat took the form of the Japanese Economic Co-Prosperity 
Sphere.  In the aftermath of World War II, the threat transformed itself into that of Afro-
Asian solidarity and third-world neutralism in the context of the Cold War.  Throughout 
these tumultuous years, Pacific internationalists maintained a vision of East-West 
partnership that attempted to transcend geopolitical realities of the day and maintain 
dialogue on common interests.   
The legacy of Pacific internationalists should be seen not simply through recent 
efforts at economic cooperation but also through ―track-two‖ unofficial dialogue 
regarding Asia-Pacific security matters.  The most important international non-
governmental group to take up this challenge is the Council for Security Cooperation in 
the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), launched in 1993 and comprised of representatives from the 
business, academic and diplomatic communities in Asia, North America and even 
Europe.  As a regional confidence-building institution, CSCAP more closely resembles 
the Institute of Pacific Relations than perhaps any other group of its kind.  Supporters of 
the CSCAP method recognize that considerable constraints operate against the overt 
success of these non-governmental efforts, yet nevertheless there are many ―measured 
optimists‖ who believe in exploring new forms of security cooperation outside of a 
balance-of-power model.23  It is difficult to measure the degree of success of 
                                                 
23 Paul M. Evans, ―Assessing the ARF and CSCAP,‖ in Hung-Mao Tien and Tun-Jen Cheng, eds., The 
Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific (New York: East Gate Books, 2000), pp. 154-157. 
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organizations like the CSCAP yet their continued growth and activity suggests the 
importance of such non-governmental gatherings to more formal diplomatic exchange.    
If the last century was the American Century, will the next finally usher in the 
much-discussed Pacific Century?24  And if so, what will be the place of the United States 
(and more broadly, ―the West‖) in this new international order?  Scholars only recently 
have come to grips with the ideology and practice of American imperialism.  Far fewer 
have outlined the way in which the United States can adapt itself to a post-hegemonic 
future in the context of a reinvigorated and perhaps more united Asian continent.25  
Already in ways large and small, nations around the world are questioning American 
leadership on global issues from the fight against terrorism to nuclear proliferation and 
climate change.  Meanwhile, the Asian ―march to modernity‖ offers intriguing glimpses 
into the power and potential of this dynamic region.  The West‘s decision to respond to 
these developments with either paranoia or partnership will largely determine the history 
of the next century.  The ability of non-state actors to pressure nation-states to uphold 
democratic ideals, furthermore, will continue to measure our progress toward Edward 
Carter‘s gracious world society.      
 
                                                 
24For commentary on the rise and fall of this much-debated idea, see Editorial, ―The Pacific Century,‖ 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 12, Nos. 3-4 (1990-91): v-vii; Ravi Arvind Palat, ―Pacific Century: Myth or 
Reality?‖ Theory and Society, Vol. 25, No. 3 (June 1996): 303-347; and Rosemary Foot and Andrew 
Walter, ―Whatever Happened to the Pacific Century?,‖ Review of International Studies, Vol. 25 (Dec. 
1999): 245-269.  
25 A few notable works to grapple with the prospect of the end of American global dominance include 
Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (New 
York: PublicAffairs, 2008); Parag Khanna, The Second World (New York: Random House, 2008); and 
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